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This Article argues
argues that
that courts
courts should
should use the doctrine
doctrine of good faith
faith in
contract law to prohibit
prohibitimproper
in contract
contract
improper considerations
considerations of race in
contract formation
formation
and performance,
and should
should recognize
recognize good faith
and
performance, and
faith as aa device for
for eliminateliminatsubordinationthat
that can function
ing racial
racial subordination
function beyond the scope of conventional
conventional
rights laws provide
civil rights
rights discourse.
discourse. Although civil rights
provide important
important remedies
discrimination,the elimination
elimination of racial
racialsubordination
subordinationcannot
cannot
to victims of discrimination,
remain the exclusive domain
domain of civil rights
law. Rather,
substantive
rights law.
Rather, other substantive
remain
areas of law can and
and should incorporate
incorporate expansive equality principles
areas
principles to
achieve that
end. For
For example,
this Article demonstrates
demonstrates how the implied
achieve
that end.
example, this
obligation of good faith
contract law,
applied in the at-will employment
faith in contract
law, applied
obligation
equality principles
principles to provide
provide alternate
alternate remeremecontext, can employ expansive equality
dies to at-will employees who may not be able to obtain
obtain civil rights
remedies
dies
rights remedies
because of the onerous
onerous burdens
burdens they must satisfy
satisfY in order
order to prevail
prevail on their
because
claims. Although courts
largely
civil rights
rights claims.
courts have used the goodfaith
faith doctrine
doctrine largely
economically efficient outcomes,
outcomes, this
this Article further
argues that
to achieve economically
further argues
courts need not limit the doctrine's
doctrine's use in that
that way. By screening
screeningthe doctrine
doctrine
courts
through the lenses of critical
race and law and
of goodfaith
faith through
critical race
and market economy
theories,
this Article argues
argues that using
doctrine of good faith
theories, this
using the doctrine
faith to prohibit
prohibit
improper
considerationsof race
race in contracting
consistent not only with the
improper considerations
contracting is consistent
equitable principles
embodied by
doctrine, but also with the contractual
contractual
equitable
principles embodied
by the doctrine,
goals
protectingparties'
parties' bargains,
bargains, wealth formation,
formation, and
and the facilitation
facilitation
goals of protecting
of exchange
exchange transactions.
transactions.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................
INTRODUCTION
.................................................

I.

1026
1026

THE IMPLIED COVENANT
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
FAITH AND
AND FAIR
FAIR
DEALING .................................................
................................................

1033
1033

A. A Primer: The Standards
Standards ...........................
........................... 1033
1033
"ForgoneOpportunities"
Opportunities"Approach
Approach .............
............. 1034
1034
1. The "Forgone
2. The "Excluder
"ExcluderAnalysis" Approach
................. 1035
1035
AjJProach .................

tt Assistant
Assistant Professor
Professor of
of Law, Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase College
College
1993;J.D., University
am
of Law. B.A.,
B.A., Brown
Brown University,
University, 1993;j.D.,
University of
of Michigan Law School, 1996. I1 am
thankful to the following people for reading
reading drafts
drafts of
of this Article and
and for their insightful
comments and generous support
support and guidance: Sumi Cho, Gabriel (Jack) Chin, Frank
Frank
Rudy Cooper, Nancy
Nancy Firak, Robin
Robin Paul Malloy, and Allison
Allison Lowery
Lowery Palmer. 1I am also parKaufmann, Catherine Howard, and Marie Bolton for their
ticularly grateful to Caroline
Caroline Kaufmann,
their
excellent research assistance.
assistance. Many thanks also to Andrew Lehman.
Lehman. All errors made
made in
this Article are, of course, mine alone.

1025
1025

HeinOnline -- 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1025 2002-2003

1026
1026

LAW REVIEW
REVIEW
CORNELL LAW

[Vol. 88:1025

...........
B. The Dominance
Dominance of the Economic Model ...........
1. Law and
and Economics
Economics ..............................
l.
2. The Obvious Case:
Case: Forgone
Forgone Opportunities
Opportunities ............
..........
3. The Less Obvious Case:
Case: Excluder
..........
Excluder Analysis ..
........
C. Critique of the Economic
Economic Model
Model of Good
Good Faith .....
.....
II.
II.

1038
1038
1038
1041
1042
1047

"LAw AND MARKET
MARKET ECONOMY"
ROBIN PAUL
PAUL MAILOY'S
MALLOY's "LAw

1049
III.
1054
III.
1054
A. History and
.....................
1054
and Guiding Principles .....................
1054
1. Overview: The Perpetrator-Victim
Perpetrator-VictimCritique
Critique of
1.
Antidiscrimination
Antidiscrimination Law ............................
.......................... 1059
2. Overview: The Expansive and
and Restrictive Visions of
Equality .........................................
......................................... 1061
Equality
B. A Critical Race Critique of the Economic Model ....
.... 1063
IV.
CASES
AND RACIAL
IV.
CASES INVOLVING
INVOLVING GOOD FAITH AND
T H EO RY ..................................................
THEORy
................................................
CRITICAL
.......
CRITICAL RACE
RACE THEORY:
THEORY: FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS
CONCEPTS .......

DISCRIMINATION IN THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT:
CONTEXT:

1066
1066
A. The Basics of At-Will Employment ..................
.................. 1066
B. Preclusion
Preclusion of Common Law Contract and Tort
Tort
Antidiscrimination Statutes: The Alternate
Claims by Antidiscrimination
Rem
edies Doctrine
................................. 1069
Remedies
Doctrine .................................
1. Opposing
...............................
l.
Opposing Positions
Positions ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
2. Analogous Positive
Cases: Rojo and Tate ..........
.......... 1073
1073
Positive Cases:
a. California:
California:Rojo v. Kliger ....................
1073
.................... 1073
b. Oklahoma:
1076
Oklahoma: Tate v. Browning-Ferris,
Browning-Ferris, Inc
Inc......
..... 1076
c. Tying Up Rojo and
and Tate .....................
..................... 1079
Cases: Contractual
Good Faith
Faith
3. Analogous Negative Cases:
Contractual Good
Claim
s
..........................................
1080
Claims .......................................... 1080
....... 1080
1080
a. Bakken
Bakken v. North American Coal Corp .......
b. Bennett
Bennett v. Beiersdorf, Inc
Inc....................
.................. 1082
Special Case:
Case: Guz v. Bechtel
Inc.. . 1083
c. A Special
Bechtel National,
National, Inc.
d. Critique
Cases..................
Critique of the Negative Cases
. ................. 1085
CRITIQUE
.............................
CRITIQUE Or
OF THE CASE LAw
LAw .............................

V.

THE
EXPANSIVE-EQUALITY APPROACH
THE EXPANSIVE-EQUALITY
ApPROACH TO CONTRACTUAL

GOOD FAITH:
FAITH: SCHUSTER
GOOD
SCHUSTER

v. DEROCILI
DERoci ......................
v.
. . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 1089
1095

CONCLUSION ..................................................
CONCLUSION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "•........
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

This Article interrogates
controversial issue: should contractual
interrogates a controversial
claims for breach
breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in at-will
at-will employment
employment contracts be available to plaintiffs if the
prejudice?1 The varied
breach is based on allegedly improper racial prejudice?!
varied

I! Although
Although the
of this
this Article
Article is
is limited
limited to
to theorizing
definition of
good faith
faith
the scope
scope of
theorizing aa definition
of good
that would preclude
preclude the improper consideration of race
race in the context of the
the contractual
employment relationship, its thesis may be applied
applied more widely to improper consideration
consideration
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and inconsistent judicial responses to this question have spawned several articles. 22 This Article's response focuses on how the contractual
doctrine of good faith is used in at-will employment
doctrine
employment cases. Specifiincorporates a critical race critique of the ways in
in
cally, the Article incorporates
conventional, statutory
which the availability
availability of conventional,
statutory civil rights remedies
have, in many jurisdictions, precluded at-will employees
employees from asserting contractual
contractual good faith claims against their former employers
the
whose conduct
conduct was racially
racially motivated. The Article concludes
concludes that the
use of racial prejudice in the contracting
contracting process should provide a
good faith cause of action
is
action for at-will employees. This conclusion is
reached
reached by synthesizing law and market
market economy
economy theory and critical
race theory, and applying the product
product of that synthesis to several such
such
at-will and good faith cases.
The first problem
problem addressed
addressed in this Article is the way in which the
current interpretation
interpretation of the doctrine
doctrine of good faith is used to premight
clude suit in many valid
valid contexts. For example,
example, an employer might
terminate a competent, Black, female, at-will employee based on racist
racist
because the employer
assumptions or evaluations of her performance,
performance, because
employer
adequate mentoring
has failed to provide her with adequate
mentoring and access to institutional information
information relative to her White and/or male co-workers.
This action clearly
clearly violates
violates the plain meaning
meaning of the term "good faith."
nevertheless are split over whether an employer's
Courts nevertheless
employer's discriminaaction
tion provides
provides the at-will employee with a common law cause of action
of
good
faith
if
the
employee
for breach
breach of the implied
implied covenant
employee may
pursue civil rights remedies
remedies by suing under state or federal antidisstatutes.33
crimination statutes.
crimination

contractual claim is justified
The refusal to allow such a contractual
justified by the law
economics approach
approach to good faith, which this Article argues has
and economics
"excluder
subsumed the broader
broader good faith approach known as the "excluder
conceptualized by Robert
excluder analysis
analysis." 4 The excluder
analysis."4
analysis approach, conceptualized

in the contracting process
process of, for example, national origin, ethnicity, gender, sexual
sexual orientation,
tation, age, and disability.
Discriminationin
ContractPerformance:
See, e.g.,
Steven J.
J. Burton,
Burton, Racial
Racial Discrimination
22 See,
e.g., Steven
in Contract
Performance: Patterson
Patterson and
and
Patterson v.
(1990) (arguing
fuRV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 431 (1990)
(arguing that Patterson
aa State Law Alternative,
Alternative, 25 HARV.
McLean Credit
Union, 491
Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164 (1989),
(1989), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (which then
enforcement of contracts) did not
consideration of race in the making and enforcement
prohibited
prohibited the consideration
reach
reach the performance
performance of contracts, was wrongly
wrongly decided, and advocating
advocating the use of state
contract law to address
performance); Neil C.
G. Williams,
contract
address racial discrimination in contract
contract performance);
Offer, Acceptance, and
and Improper
Considerations:A Common-Law Model
Modelfor the Prohibition
Prohibitionof Racial
Offer,
Impraper Considerations:
Discrimination
ContractingProcess,
Process,62 GEo.
CEO. WASH.
WASH. L. Rv.
REv. 183, 184 (1994)
(1994) (arguing that
Discrimination in the Contracting
"contract
prohibition of
racial discrimination
discrimination in
in the
formation, performance, en"contract law's
law's prohibition
of racial
the formation,
termination of a contract
forcement, or termination
contract would be perfectly consistent with its natural,
natural, orderly evolution in [the twentieth
century]").
twentieth century],,).
See infra
infra Parts IV.B-V.
33
See
See infra
infra Part l.
I.
44
See
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Summers!>5 and adopted by the Restatement (Second) of
ofContracts/'
Summers
Contracts,' defines
good
faith
conduct
as
the
opposite
of
bad
faith
conduct
in the process
good
conduct
77
of contract
example, because courts define the
contract formation. Thus, for example,
withholding of relevant information in the contracting
contracting process
process as bad
bad
faith, a contracting
contracting party
must
disclose
all
such
information
in
order
party
disclose
information
to satisfy the implied obligation
faith.8 Refusing to act in
in
obligation of good faith.s
good
good faith because of racism, however, is not defined
defined as bad faith per
per
contractual in nature
se. Rather, the bad act itself must be purely
purely contractual
(e.g.,
a
party
withholds
necessary
information
because
her
(e.g.,
withholds necessary information because of his or her
racism).9
racism).9 Racism
Racism in contracting
contracting is thus viewed as a mere
mere bad motive,
rather than as a form of contractual
contractual bad faith itself.
of
The Article addresses this problem by suggesting an alteration of
the doctrine of good faith based on a law and market economy
economy approach,
economics or excluder
proach, rather
rather than a law and economics
excluder approach. The
law and
market
economy
approach
challenges
and
approach challenges the law and economics
economics
individuals can weigh the costs and benefits of actions
assumption that individuals
unimpacted by cultural influences.lO
influences.' 0 Under
Under
in an objective
objective manner, unimpacted
law and market
economy
theory,
individuals'
cultural
biases
(such
as
market economy
individuals'
how they define, interpret, and weigh
weigh the
racism or sexism) affect how
excosts and benefits of their actions."
actions. 1 I This theory reveals that the excluder
approach
to
good
faith,
as
it
has
been
appropriated
by
the
law
cluder approach
appropriated
and economics
economics movement, makes an untenable distinction between
between
specifically related
related
general cultural biases on the one
one hand, and acts specifically
to contract formation with the attendant benefits and obligations that
that
derive therefrom
therefrom on the other.
addressed in this Article is that
The second and related
related problem addressed
that
excluder analysis
the excluder
analysis approach leads courts to abandon
abandon victims of raSee
S. Summers,
Summers, "Good
"Good Faith"
Faith"in
General Contract
ContractLaw and the Sales
Sales Provisions
Provisions of
of
55
See Robert
Robert S.
in General
the Uniform
Uniform Commercial
Commercial Code,
195, 199-207
Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
REv. 195,
199-207 (1968)
(1968) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Summers,
Good Faith];
GeneralDuty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and ConceptuConceptuGood
Faith]; Robert S. Summers,
Summers, The General
Faith-Its Recognition
alization,
818-21, 825-30 (1982)
[hereinafter Summers,
alization, 67 CORNELL
CORNELL L. REV.
REv. 810, 818-21,
(1982) [hereinafter
Summers, General
General
Duty].
6 See
(SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §
§ 205
cmt. aa (1981);
(1981); see
infra Part
fi
See RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS
205 cmt.
see also
also infra
Part
l.A.2 (discussing the excluder
approach to good faith and its subsequent
1.A.2
excluder analysis approach
subsequent adoption
Contracts).
by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
See
(" [G] ood faith ...
77
See Summers,
Summers, Good
Good Faith,
Faith, supra
supra note
note 5, at 196 ("[G]ood
... is best understood
understood
'excluder'-it is a phrase
as an 'excluder'-it
phrase which
which has no general meaning
meaning or meanings
meanings of
of its own, but
heterogeneous forms of bad faith." (footnote
which serves to exclude many heterogeneous
(footnote omitted)).
omitted)).
88 See id.
id. at 203.
99 See infra
1, TV.
1V.
infra Parts
Parts 1,
10
infra Part 11.
I. Robin Paul
10
For a discussion of law and market
market economy
economy theory, see infra
Malloy developed the conceptual
conceptual framework of law and market economy
economy theory. See ROBIN
PAUL MALLOY,
MALLOY, LAW
ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING
REINTERPRETING THE
VALUES OF LAw
LAW AND
PAUL
LAw AND MARKET
MARKET ECONOMY:
THE VALUES
AND EcoNOMICS (2000).
(2000).
NOMICS
MALLOY, supra
11 I1 See MAI.LOY,
supra note 10, at 6; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive
Axpressive Theory of
of
Contract:
From Feminist
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization
RationalChoice
Choice in Contract
ContractLaw,
Contract: From
RPconcejJtualization of Rational
Law, 146
146
economist Elizabeth
U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998)
(1998) (applying economist
Elizabeth Anderson's reconception of "raeconomic approach
approach to contract law).
law).
tional choice" to effect
effect a consciously feminist economic
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cist contracting
contracting to conventional
conventional civil rights laws. The procedural difficulties
inherent in civil rights law, however, often leave the at-will
at-will
culties inherent
employee
employee who has been subjected
subjected to racism in the contractual
contractual process
12
without a remedy.
remedy.12
Hence, the excluder
excluder analysis approach
approach to good
good
faith combines
combines with the procedural
procedural barriers in civil rights law to preclude many valid claims. The Article addresses
addresses this second problem
demonstrates the inappropriateby way of a critical race critique that demonstrates
ness of abandoning at-will employees
employees to the remedies of civil rights
law. This critique in essence states that conventional
conventional civil rights law,
which may provide redress for the most egregious racist offenses
offenses in
the workplace,
workplace, not only does not provide such redress
redress for, but also has
legitimized, less onerous but more pervasive
pervasive forms of racism in the
workplace. 13
I
On the basis of the forgoing critiques, this Article proposes the
addition of another formulation of the doctrine
doctrine of good faith, one
that explicitly comports with substantive
substantive and expansive
expansive notions of
of
equality.
14 The application
equality.14
application of this formulation would provide wrongly
terminated
employees a contractual
contractual basis for relief based on the
terminated at-will employees
implied
implied obligation
obligation of good faith in cases in which civil rights remedies
15
are out of reach. IS
In order to demonstrate
demonstrate the need for a reformulation of the docbasic primer on
on
trine of good faith, Part LA
I.A of this Article provides a basic
12
See infra
note 211
211 and
and accompanying
accompanying text;
text; see
see also
also infra
Part III.A
(discussing critical
critical
12 See
infra note
infra Part
lILA (discussing
legal and critical
critical race studies challenges
challenges to the notion that the law is or can be applied
applied
objectively)..
objectively)
13
See infra Part III.B.
14 See
See infra
14
infra Part
Part lII.A.2
I1IA.2 (discussing Kimberl
Kimberle Crenshaw's
Crenshaw's notion of an "expansive" approach
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
MACKINNON, SEX
proach to the goals of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law); see also CATHARINE
EQUALITY 2-43
(2001) [hereinafter
[hereinafter MACKINNON,
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALI'IY]
EQUALITY] (providing a feminist criEQUALI'IY
2-43 (2001)
tique
tique of formal equality
equality in the context of sex discrimination law); CATHARINE
CATHARINE A. MACKINMAcKIN~
NON,
[hereinafter MACKINNON,
NON, TOWARD AA FEMINIST
FEMINIST THEORY
THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 (1989)
(1989) [hereinafter
MAcKINNON,
FEMINIST
(same).
FEMINIST THEORY] (same).
My
analogized
My conception of "equality,"
"equality," a term
term used throughout this Article, might be analogized
to Iris
Iris Marion
of justice.
justice. IRIS
IRIS MARION
MARION YOUNG,JUSTICE
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND
to
Marion Young's
Young's conception
conception of
AND THE
THE POLITPOLIT.
ICS OF DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE (1990).
(1990). In this
this influential work, Young critiques
critiques modern,
modern, liberal,
liberal, distributive theories of justice
justice as reductionist in their "tendency to reduce political subjects to a
unity
difference," id.
and
id. at 3, and
unity and to value commonness
commonness or sameness
sameness over
over specificity and difference,"
argues instead that "[o]ppression
"[o]ppression and domination
... should be the primary terms for
domination ...
conceptualizing
conceptualizing injustice,"
injustice," id.
id. at 9. Young
Young further asserts:
[The
on
[The distributive paradigm]
paradigm] tends to focus thinking about social justice
justice on
the allocation of
and
of material
material goods
goods such as things, resources, income,
income, and
wealth,
especiallyjobs.
wealth, or on the distribution of social positions, especially
jobs. This focus
structure and institutional
institutional context that often help
tends to ignore the social structure
help
... are issues of
determine distributive patterns. Of particular importance ...
of
decision-making power and procedures, division of labor, and culture.
culture.
Id. at 15. Responding
[d.
Responding to those identified problems,
problems, Young defines injustice
injustice as being cominstitutionalconstraint
prised of the systemic, social conditions
conditions of "oppression,
"oppression, the institutional
constraint on selfselfdevelopment,
self-determination." Id.
development, and
and domination, the institutional
institutional constraint
constraint on seU:determination."
[d. at 37
37
(emphasis added).
added).
15
See infra
1.<;
infra Part V.
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the contractually
contractually based implied covenant
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
scholarly controversy
surrounding the articulation and
and
and the scholarly
controversy surrounding
formulation of a workable good faith standard. Using case law, Part
I.B demonstrates
LB
demonstrates that, despite the controversy
controversy and the concededly
surrounding the good faith standard, the
amorphous state of the law surrounding
courts'
courts' formulations are by and large based
based on an economic analysis
of the doctrine of good faith and contract
contract law. This case law analysis
begins to critique
critique the current economic formulations of the good
faith standard and, in particular, the way in which those economic
formulations leave no room for consideration
consideration of how the ideology of
of
racial subordination
subordination may corrupt the contracting
contracting process and cause
cause
non-breaching parties.
subsequent harm to non-breaching
II of this Article extends the critique
Part 11
critique of the economic formulation of the doctrine of good faith by explaining and applying Profesparticular
sor Robin Paul Malloy's law and market economy theory, in particular
effected
because Malloy's "reinterpretation" of law and economics
economics is effected
16
on economic
economic terms.
terms.16
Focusing further on the semiotic nature of Malloy's law and market
market economy theory, this Article becomes
becomes a necessary
screen, in addition to the screen of law and economics,
which
economics, through which
to analyze contractual
contractual good faith claims and cases.
Part III adds another theoretical screen
screen to the critique
critique and analytheory
sis by setting forth the foundational concepts of critical race theory
that guide the descriptive
descriptive and normative aspects of this project. Part
III.A focuses on two key concepts. First, it examines
examines the perpetratorlILA
victim critique of conventional
conventional antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination discourse,
discourse, as articulated by critical legal scholar Alan David Freeman and critical race
race
scholar Charles R. Lawrence
Lawrence III. This critique
critique states that civil rights
law legitimatized
legitimatized everyday forms of unconscious and subconscious
rasubconscious racism through its procedural
procedural mechanisms, which are wrongly and almost singularly concerned
concerned with the intent and perspective
perspective of the
perpetrators of discrimination.
discrimination.' 177 Part lILA
III.A also discusses
alleged perpetrators
Kimberl Crenshaw's
Kimberle
Crenshaw's critique of traditional civil rights discourse as
16
See
MALLOY, supra note 10, at 1-22 (describing the methodology of law and market
16
See MALLOY,
supra note 10, at 1-22 (describing the methodology of law and market
economy
and contrasting
contrasting it
theory
it with
law and
and economics
economics scholarship).
economy theory and
with traditional
traditional law
scholarship).
17
With respect
respect to
to the
word "discrimination,"
"discrimination," which
this Article
tries to
avoid in
setin set17
With
the word
which this
Article tries
to avoid
ting out the normative aspects
of
this
Catharine MacKinnon has stated
aspect~
project, Catharine
stated in the
the
context of her critique of formal equality:
Fundamentally, the law
law has often
often failed to call the problem
problem of discriminaIt has intion by a real name-say, white supremacy
supremacy or male dominance. It
stead used more neutral
or
neutral terms like "racism" or "racial classifications"
classifications" or
"race," or
or "sexism"
"sexism" or
classifications" or
or "sex,"
terms that fail to specify
"race,"
or "sex
"sex classifications"
"sex," terms
who is
who
is doing what
what to
to whom. As
As a result, while many conditions of actual
disadvantage are obscured,
obscured, situations
situations in which the affected
affected and agentic
agentic
disadvantage
groups appear reversed
reversed can easily be made
made to look like discrimination. Abstractions (are you treated the same or differently?)
differently?) may be inverted far
more readily than substance
or
substance (are you victimized by white supremacy
supremacy or
male dominance or both?).
both?).
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embodying
embodying a restrictive
restrictive view
view of
of the
the goal
goal of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law that
that
seeks to prevent
prevent discrete
discrete and egregious
egregious acts
acts of race-based
race-based wrongdoseeks
rather than eliminate
eliminate the pervasive
pervasive ideological
ideological and
and material
material coning, rather
proposes
further
Crenshaw
of racial
racial subordination.
subordination. Crenshaw
proposes that legal
ditions of
decision makers
makers recognize
recognize and
and apply
apply a more
more expansive
expansive view of
of antidisdecision
criminatory goals, a view which would be concerned
concerned primarily
primarily with the
the
criminatory
elimination of the ideological
ideological and material
material components
components of racial
racial subelimination
ordination and White
White supremacy.
ordination
presenting a general
general critical
critical race
race critique
critique of law and economBy presenting
III.B sets the stage for this Article's
ics, Part
Part 1ll.B
Article's critique of
of the economic
economic
approach to the doctrine of good faith and, using Crenshaw's
Crenshaw's phraseapproach
ology, its proposal
proposal of an "expansive
approach to good
good faith.
"expansive equality" approach
IIl.B also
also argues
argues that
that Malloy's
Malloy's law
law and
and market
market economy
economy theory
Part III.B
plays a crucial role
role in developing
developing that critique, because
because it directly
directly confronts law and economics
economics theory
theory in a manner that also recognizes
recognizes the
complex
complex and multiplistic
multiplistic realities
realities of market actors, whose
whose actions are
membership
dictated by their
their individual identities
identities as well as by their membership
dictated
in broader
broader communities.
communities.
market
Part
Part IV further
further synthesizes critical
critical race theory and law and
and market
"expansive equality" approach
economy theory
theory to formulate the "expansive
approach to the
doctrine of good
good faith. It does so by analyzing
analyzing a specific
specific body of good
good
limited
employment context, because
because that limited
faith cases in the at-will employment
body of law
law best
best demonstrates
demonstrates the inadequacy
inadequacy of civil rights remedies
for victims of racial discrimination in the workplace.
workplace. Part IV's analysis
of that body of law illustrates how the contractual obligation of good
good
faith may be used to provide redress in cases in which antidiscrimination law precludes civil rights redress. More theoretically and imporgood
tantly, the case law analysis demonstrates
demonstrates why the doctrine
doctrine of good
faith and contract law should provide redress for victims of racial subordination. In analyzing
analyzing the cases from a fused critical race and law
and market
market economy perspective,
perspective, Part IV also argues that expansive
theoryjustify
and substantive equality and Malloy's market theory
justify a reconceprecognizes that a benefit
tualization of good faith, one that recognizes
benefit flowing
tualization
contractual relationship
relationship is freedom from racial subordinafrom every contractual
tion through the contracting process.
of
reconception, Part IV.A reviews the erosion of
In arriving at this reconception,
the at-will employment doctrine, which permits an employer or employee to terminate his or her employment relationship
relationship at any time
this Article continues to use
supra note 14, at 21. Although this
supra
tenns
MacKinnon's concerns with the use of those "neutral"
terms such as "racism" and "sexism," MacKinnon's
noted. This Article's use of those terms suggests that "racism"
tenns
"racism" connotes
terms are well noted.
"sexism" conand that "sexism"
subordination and
supremacy and racial subordination
continuing practices of white supremacy
asalmost all assubordination in almost
dominance and sexual subordination
male dominance
practices of male
continuing practices
notes continuing
of American life and culture.
pects of

EQUALITY,
MAcKINNON,
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALllY,
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for no reason, after proper notice. This erosion, initiated
initiated primarily
primarily to
protect employees
employees from unjust termination, has emerged
emerged through the
judicial and legislative creation
creation of several exceptions
exceptions to the at-will doctrine, one of which is the good faith exception.
notwithstanding the exceptions to the
IV.B discusses
Part N.B
discusses· how, notwithstanding
doctrine of at-will employment, courts have failed to render
render a considered and consistent treatment
treatment of cases in which
which at-will
at-will employees
employees have
attempted to bring both
both contractual
contractual and tortious good faith claims
based on facts that also allegedly
allegedly give rise to statutory discrimination
discrimination
claims. Part IV.B
N.B critiques
critiques the courts' conclusions from a critical race
perspective, arguing that they are the result of an unwarranted
unwarranted overconventional civil rights law to remedy
remedy currently cognizareliance on conventional
ble forms of racial discrimination.
A review of the case law begins in Part IV.B.1,
N.B.l, which
which discusses the
majority and minority
positions
on
the
"alternate
remedies
doctrine,"
minority
based
under which
which state common
common law claims for breach of good faith based
on allegedly
allegedly discriminatory
discriminatory conduct
conduct are precluded by statutory antidiscrimination
minority positidiscrimination schemes. This section argues that the minority
tion, which rejects the alternate
alternate remedies
remedies doctrine, is the better
better
position. Part IV.B.2
N.B.2 focuses further on cases in which
which courts have
taken the minority position. In those cases, at-will plaintiffs
plaintiffs successand tort claims for breach
good
fully brought
brought discrimination
discrimination claims and
breach of good
IV.B.2 argues that those cases should
should
faith or wrongful discharge. Part N.B.2
be analogized
analogized to cases in which plaintiffs attempt to bring state comof
mon law claims for breach of the contractual
contractual implied obligation of
good faith, and that such contractual
contractual claims should be permitted, dein
IV.B.3 examines
spite existing
existing case law to the contrary. Part N.B.3
examines cases in
the
atin
contractual good faith claims
which the courts
courts have rejected contractual
context because of the availability of statutory antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination
will context
remedies. This section offers
offers a critical race and law and market
market economy critique
of
the
courts'
holdings
in
those
cases,
and
argues for a
critique
exceptions to the at-will
fusion of the public policy and good faith exceptions
employment
employment doctrine.
expansive-equality good-faith
Part V puts this expansive-equality
good-faith exception into play.
It argues that an expansive
expansive equality approach
approach to the doctrine
doctrine of contractual
good
faith
should
enable
contractual
good
faith
claims
notcontractual good
claims nottractual
withstanding the availability of civil rights remedies
remedies based on the same
same
factual allegations. Part V describes
describes how such good faith claims might
might
be brought
brought and analyzed
analyzed in real life cases by discussing and analogizing Schuster v. Derocili,18
Derocili,18 a recent case in which the Delaware Supreme
Court sustained the plaintiff's
plaintiffs contractual
contractual good faith claim, which
which was
based on sexually
sexually harassing conduct in the workplace, despite and be18

18

775 A.2d
1029 (Del.
775
A.2d 1029
(Del. 2001).
2001).
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cause of the limited availability of statutory civil rights remedies for
such sexual subordination. Part V argues that the court's analysis in
the Schuster
Schuster decision is grounded in aa profound understanding of
of the
mechanisms and conditions of male domination, and that it should be
Schuster court's analysis actualanalogized to race cases. Because the Schuster
izes this Article's proposed expansive equality approach to the doctrine of contractual
contractual good faith, Part V
V argues that it is the model by
adjudicate contractual
contractual good faith
which courts should analyze and adjudicate
claims rooted in allegations that might also give rise to antidiscrimination claims.
II
THE IMPLIED
IMPLIED COVENANT
COVENANT OF
OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR
FAIR DEAI"ING
DEALING
THE
GOOD FAITH

A.

A Primer: The Standards
A

dealing' 9 has been
The implied obligation of good faith and fair dealingl9
been
2
Restatement (Second)
(Second) of Contracts,20
Contracts, " is implied into every
adopted by the Restatement
contract governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code,2 1 and in most
Commercial Code,21
most
22
jurisdictions
jurisdictions is implied into every
every contract
contract at common law. 22
Thereintroduce and incorpofore, it is the ideal vehicle through which to introduce
rate the goals
goals of "expansive equality" into contract law. This is so
because, although
although the concept
concept of good faith is relatively
because,
relatively easy to grasp,
the actual
can
actual standard by which good faith or its absence
absence is discerned
discerned can
discussion of what
be frustratingly
frustratingly elusive. A sophisticated
sophisticated and lively discussion
what
constitutes good faith, whether
constitutes
whether among students or
or scholars,
scholars, reflects
not only how the meaning
meaning of good faith might fluctuate with the times
and the context of the transaction, but also how the meaning
meaning of the
the
reconstitute and reintercommon law invariably
invariably shifts as the courts reconstitute
19
the implied
implied obligation
obligation of
of good
good faith
the obligation
19 Although
Although the
faith isis often
often referred
referred to
to as
as the
obligation
of good
of
good faith and fair dealing, this Article
Article will subsequently
subsequently refer
refer to the implied
implied obligation
obligation
simply
as that
faith. Regarding
the term
"good faith
simply as
that of
of good
good faith.
Regarding the
term "good
faith and
and fair dealing,"
dealing," the distinguished
Farnsworth, currently
currently the Reporter
Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
guished Professor E. Allan Farnsworth,
of
Contracts,
"'Good faith'
used in
connections. It has tradiContracts, has
has stated:
stated: "'Good
faith' has
has also
also been
been used
in other
other connections.
tionally
standard of honesty
for
tionally been
been used to set the
the standard
honesty for
for good
good faith purchase,
purchase, rather
rather than for
performance.
performance. Coupling
Coupling itit with
with the term
term fair
fair dealing
dealing may
may help
help to make it more
more descriptive
1999).
of performance."
performance." E. ALLAN
ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS §§ 7.17,
7.17, at 504 n.3 (3d
(3d ed.
ed. 1999).
20
("Every contract
20 RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(SECOND) OF
OF CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS §§ 205
205 (1981)
(1981) ("Every
contract imposes
imposes upon
each
of good
each party
party aa duty
duty of
good faith
faith and
and fair dealing
dealing in its performance
performance and
and its enforcement.").
enforcement.").
21
21 U.C.C.
U.C.C. §§ 1-304
1-304 (West
(West Supp.
Supp. 2002)
2002) ("Every
("Every contract
contract or duty
duty within
within [the
[the Uniform
Uniform
Commercial Code]
Commercial
Code] imposes
imposes an obligation
obligation of
of good faith in
in its performance
performance and enforcement."); U.C.C.
ment.");
U.C.C. §§ 1-201
1-201 (b)
(b) (20)
(20) (West
(West Supp.
Supp. 2002)
2002) (defining
(defining good faith generally
generally as
as "honesty
dealing").
the observance
observance of
of reasonable
reasonable commercial
commercial standards
standards of fair dealing").
esty in
in fact
fact and the
22
See
22
See Steven
Steven J.
J. Burton,
Burton, Breach
Breach of
of Contract
Contract and
and the
the Common
Common Law
Law Duty
Duty to
to Perform
Perform in
in Good
Good
Faith,
94 HARv.
HARv. L.
L. REV.
REV. 369
369 app.
app. (1980)
(1980) (citing
(citing cases
cases from
from jurisdictions
jurisdictions that
that expressly
expressly imFaith, 94
pose
pose an
an implied
implied duty
duty of
of good
good faith in the performance
performance of all contracts);
contracts); Thomas A.
A. DiaDiamond
mond &
& Howard
Howard Foss,
Foss, Proposed
ProjJosed Standards
Standards far
far Evaluating
Evaluating When
When the
the Covenant
Covenant of
of Good Faith
Faith and
and
FairDealing
Violated: A
Fair Dealing Has
Has Been
Been Violated:
A Frameworkfor
Framework for Resolving the
the Mystery,
Mystery, 47
47 HASTrINcS
HASTINGS L.J.
LJ. 585,
585, 585
585
n.1
n.l (1996)
(1996) (same).
(same).
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23 Even classroom
pret the law. 23
about good faith during
discussions about
school highlight the general tension in the law
the first year of law school
between equity and justice on the one hand, and some amount of
of
pragmatic certainty delineated by legal rules on the other.
Many scholars, with different goals in mind, have attempted to
example, various
formulate a workable
workable good faith standard. For example,
contracting parties a
scholars have proposed
proposed a standard
standard that gives contracting
measure of predictability
predictability that enables them to behave accordingly,
and which permits courts and juries to make principled rather than
24
intuitive judgments about good faith conduct. 24
However, two approaches continue
continue to guide ongoing efforts toward formulating a
Summers's
workable standard for the doctrine of good faith: Robert Summers's
"excluder analysis" and
and Steven
Steven Burton's
Burton's "forgone
"forgone opportunities"
"excluder analysis"
25
approach .25
approach.

1.
1.

"ForgoneOpportunities"
Opportunities" Approach
Approach
The ''Forgone

The "forgone opportunities" approach,
approach, first theorized by Burton,
is essentially
essentially an economic
economic analysis of the doctrine of good faith. The
analysis begins with an economic inquiry into the cost perspective
perspective on
contractual
breach.
Burton
suggests
that,
from
an
economic
contractual
economic perspective, bad faith breach is analytically similar to simple breach by failure
attempt
to perform an express promise, in that both involve a party's attempt
recapture opportunities
to recapture
opportunities forgone in the contracting
contracting process (in the
form of resources committed at the time of contracting
contracting to particular
particular
2 6 Further, one of
Burton's
uses in the future).
future).26
Burton's basic premises is that,
because contracts
on
contracts often involve
involve some "discretion
"discretion in performance"
performance" on
the part
of
the
contracting
parties,
a
"weaker"
party
at
the
mercy
of
part
contracting
of
this discretion
discretion in performance
performance might
might require
require some protection
protection against
against
27 The
a "stronger" party.
party.27
duty of good faith performance
performance supplies
supplies this
23 As
Justice Holmes
wrote, the
law "will
"will become
become entirely
entirely consistent
consistent only
it
23
As Justice
Holmes wrote,
the law
only when
when it
ceases to
COMMON LAw
LAW 36 (Boston,
ceases
to grow." O.W. HOLMES,
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
(Boston, Little, Brown,
Brown, & Co.
1881).
1881).
24
See,
24
See, e.g.,
e.g., Burton,
Burton, supra
supra note
note 22,
22, at
at 378-94
378-94 (proposing
(proposing the
the "forgone
"forgone opportunities"
opportunities"
approach to good faith); Diamond &
approach
& Foss,
Foss, supra
supra note 22,
22. at
at 600-24
600-24 (proposing
(proposing two
two categorical standards
standards for
for assessing good
good faith claims:
claims: commercial
commercial unreasonableness
unreasonableness and
and
dishonesty).
dishonesty) .
25
25 Legal
Legal scholars
scholars and
and commentators
commentators continue
continue to
to theorize
theorize about
about the
the most
most desirable
desirable
and
and useable
useable articulation
articulation of
of the
the good
good faith standard.
standard. Indeed,
Indeed, more than
than one hundred law
review and
review
and bar
bar journal
journal articles
articles have
have been
been written
written about
about the
the implied
implied duty
duty of
of good faith
faith in
in
the past
the
past twenty years
years alone. Many
Many of those articles, however,
however, focus on good faith in particuparticularized
such as
and labor.
larized contexts,
contexts, such
as insurance,
insurance, contracting,
contracting, and
labor. For
For purposes
purposes of
of this
this Article,
Article, II
focus
on Burton's
Burton's and
and Summers's
Summers's approaches,
approaches, because other formulations
formulations of the duty
duty of
of
focus on
good faith may be subsumed within them.
26
See
26
See Burton,
Burton, supra
supra note
note 22,
22, at
at 373-78.
373-78.
27
See
id,
at
380-84.
This
discretion
27 See id. at 380-84. This discretion arises,
arises, for
for example,
example, if
if the
the decision
decision regarding
regarding cercertain
of performance
performance is
is delayed
delayed and
and decisionmaking
decisionmaking authority
authority is
is assigned
assigned to
to one
one of
of
tain terms
terms of
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protection, and therefore
therefore its application in a given set of circum28
discretion. 28
that discretion.
of that
legitimacy of the exercise of
stances depends on the legitimacy
Burton's analysis also criticizes
"reasonable contemplation"
criticizes the "reasonable
contemplation"
method of distinguishing
distinguishing legitimate
legitimate from illegitimate
illegitimate uses of discre29 According to the reasonable
tion. 29
contemplation approach,
reasonable contemplation
approach, the
duty of good faith performance
performance permits parties to exercise
exercise their discretion
. . . reasonably
of
cretion "for any purpose
purpose ...
reasonably within the contemplation
contemplation of
the parties."30
parties." 30 Therefore,
Therefore, bad faith conduct includes any exercise of
of
discretion
beyond
the
range
of
the
parties'
reasonable
contemplation.
discretion
parties' reasonable
Burton criticizes this approach
approach as too reliant on "an amorphous total'31
ity of the circumstances at the time of formation,
formation,"31
and disapproves
of the open-ended and far-reaching
far-reaching factual inquiry
inquiry it potentially
potentially requires to discern
the
parties'
intentions
and
reasonable
discern
parties' intentions
reasonable
3 2
32
expectations.
expectations.
Burton
Burton thus formulates his forgone opportunities
opportunities approach
approach in order to "make
"make[[J] it possible to identify
particularity the
identify with greater
greater particularity
relevant expectations
expectations and motives that have been held to constitute
33
bad faith."
durfaith."33
The forgone opportunities
opportunities approach
approach assumes that during the contract
formation
process,
contracting
parties
forgo
opportucontract
contracting parties
34
nities to enter into other agreements.
Burton describes
agreements. 34
describes bad faith
conduct as the exercise
exercise of contractual discretion
discretion on the part of one
opportunities forgone during
party in an attempt to "recapture" those opportunities
because parties
contract formation, because
parties to the resulting contract should
contract precluded
subsequent recapture
recapture of
have known
known that the contract
precluded the subsequent
of
application of this forthose opportunities.3
opportunities. 355 Burton argues that the application
gone opportunities
opportunities approach is desirable
desirable because it enables
enables courts to
employ a less amorphous and more factually particularized
particularized inquiry
inquiry in
their assessment of whether
whether a party has breached the implied obligacase.3366
given case.
tion of good faith in aa given
2.

The "Excluder
"ExcluderAnalysis" Approach
Approach

rendered one of the most important
Summers rendered
important critiques of Burton's forgone opportunities approach in 1982, and in so doing, built
built
Id. at
the parties, or if terms in the contract
contract are unclear, ambiguous, or simply omitted. [d.
380.
28
See
id. at
at 382-83.
382-83.
28
See id.
29
at 387.
29 Id.
[d. at
387.
30
Id.
at 385-86
385-86 (footnotes
(footnotes omitted).
omitted).
30
[d. at
31
31 Id.
[d. at 387.
32
32

33
33
34
34

Id.
[d.
See id.
id.
id. at 388 ("[E]ach
("[Elach party must forgo some
See id.
some future opportunity upon formation

and thus restrain its future freedom
freedom in some way.").
way.").
35
See id.
id. at 388-89.
35
36
Id.
at 390-92;
text accompanying
accompanying note
32.
36
[d. at
390-92; see
see supra
supra text
note 32.
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37
upon his earlier
earlier influential
influential work on the doctrine
doctrine of good faith.
faith.37
CenSummers's theory of good faith, first articulated in 1968, is the
the
tral to Summers's
notion that good faith is defined as the negative corollary of bad
faith. 38 Accordingly,
cannot be reduced to a
faith.3s
Accordingly, good faith performance cannot
certain
appropriate and acceptable behaviors;
certain and specific set of appropriate
rather, good faith derives its meaning by "rul[ing]
heter"rul [ing] out radically
radically heterfaith."'
bad
of
forms
ogeneous
ogeneous
faith."39
Based on this general normative
normative principle, Summers critiques
Burton's
forgone
opportunities
Burton's
opportunities approach to good faith, arguing that
good faith should not and cannot be defined in purely economic
411
terms. 40
described only
terms.
Summers further posits that good faith can be described
through the exclusion of contextually
contextually recognizable
recognizable forms of bad faith
conduct
contract. 4 1 He promotes,
conduct in the performance
performance of a given contract.41
promotes, in
deliberate and direct opposition
opposition to Burton, a more open-ended
deliberate
open-ended approach
proach to good faith "in the nature of a principle
principle or maxim," as op42
posed to a "rule."
"rule."42 Nonetheless, in his 1968 article, Summers also
also
acknowledges the need for some delimiting
categorization of bad
delimiting categorization
acknowledges
nonexhaustive list of
of
faith conduct, and formulates
formulates an inclusive but nonexhaustive
43
eight such categories.
categories. 43
Summers's excluder approach
approach to the doctrine of good faith reSummers's
44 Inceived explicit approval
Restatement (Second)
(Second) of Contracts.
Contracts. 44
approval in the Restatement
37
See Summers,
37 See
Summers, General
General Duty,
Duty, supra
supra note 5, at 830-34. Summers's 1982 critique of the
forgone opportunities
opportunities approach
approach expanded
expanded upon his earlier work on good faith, in
in which
which
he first developed the excluder analysis. See Summers, Good Faith,
supra note
Faith, supra
note 5.
38
See
Summers, Good
Good Faith,
Faith, supra
supra note 5, at 200-01.
38
See Summers,
200-01.
39
Id. at 204.
39
Id.
40
See
Summers, General
GeneralDuty,
40
See Summers,
Duty, supra
supra note 5, at 826-27, 830-34. Summers's critique of
of
Burton's
summarizes certain
Burton's economic
economic approach to good faith succinctly summarizes
certain aspects of a more
general
opgeneral critique of law and economics. For example,
example, Summers critiques the forgone
forgone opportunities
portunities approach as positively or descriptively
descriptively "ahistoric," amoral in the sense that it
disregards the "moral" component of contractual
contractual obligations, and overly speculative in its
purported
id. at 827.
purported economic
economic reasoning. See id.
41
See
id. at 818-21.
818-21.
41
See id.
42
See
821 (describing
(describing the
excluder conceptualization
of good
good faith
42
See id.
id. at
at 821
the excluder
conceptualization of
faith as
as encapsuencapsulated in section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts);
Contracts); see also RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(SECOND)
OF CONTRAcrs
'good faith'
OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981)
(1981) ("The phrase 'good
faith' is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat
context....
[I]t excludes a variety
somewhat with the context.
... [Ilt
variety of types
characterized as involving
).
of conduct
conduct characterized
involving 'bad
'bad faith'
faith'........ ").
43
See
note 5,
5, at 203. The eight categories
categories of bad faith
43
See Summers,
Summers, Good
Good Faith,
Faith, supra
supra note
concealment of defects
(and their
their good faith opposites)
opposites) are:
are: concealment
defects in goods sold (full disclosure
disclosure
of material facts); willful failure to perform
perform in full when
when there
there has been substantial
substantial perperformance without known material
specifications);
formance (substantial
(substantial performance
material deviation from specifications);
coercive abuse of bargaining
bargaining power
power to raise
raise contract price (refraining from such abuse);
abuse);
coercive
intentional frustration
contractual obligations (coopintentional
fmstration of another party's ability
ability to perform contractual
(mitigation of damages);
arbitrary
erative action); conscious failure to mitigate
mitigate damages (mitigation
damages); arbitrary
and capricious
exercise of
overreaching
and
capricious exercise
of power
power to terminate a contract (reasonable action); overreaching
interpretation
interpretation); and
interpretation of contract terms (fair
(fair and reasonable interpretation);
and harassment to
adequate assurances).
assurances). Id.
obtain repeated assurances
assurances of performance (acceptance
(acceptance of adequate
Id.
44
Although the
the Restatement
44
Although
Restatement adopted
adopted the excluder approach to good faith, the UniGeneral Duty, supra
supra note 5, at 824-25.
form Commercial
Commercial Code did not. See Summers, General
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Restatement (Second)
(Second) note
deed, the comments to section 205 of the Restatement
that:
and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in perperSubterfuges and
conduct to be justified.
formance even though the actor believes his conduct
or may consist
consist
But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or
inaction, and fair dealing may require more than
than honesty.
honesty. A comof inaction,
plete
catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following
plete catalogue
following
types are among those which have been recognized in judicial
judicial decisions: evasion
evasion of the spirit of
of the bargain, lack of diligence
and
diligence and
sions:
off, willful rendering of imperfect
imperfect performance,
slacking off,
performance, abuse of a
interference with or failure to cooperate
power to specify terms, and interference
cooperate
performance. 4455
in the other party's
party's performance.

The comments to section 205 also appear to adopt Summers's articulation of the primary
"'jusprimary rationales for the doctrine of good faith: "Juslaw.'''46 The Restatement (Second)
(Second)
tice and ......justice
justice according to law."'46
states:
states:
The phrase
The
phrase "good faith" is used in a variety
variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies
meaning
varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performenforcement of a contract emphasizes
emphasizes faithfulness to an
ance or enforcement
agreed common
common purpose
purpose and consistency with the justified
justified expectaconduct
tions of the other party; it excludes
excludes a variety of types of conduct
characterized as involving "bad
"badfaith"
characterized
faith" because
because they violate community
47
reasonableness.47
or reasonableness.
decency, fairness
standards of decency,
fairness or
standards
Despite Summers's
reflected in the RestateDespite
Summers's emphasis on justice,
justice, reflected
Restatement's
language concerning
concerning "community
ment's language
"community standards of decency, fair4
this Article argues
ness or reasonableness,"
reasonableness,"48
argues that Summers's
Summers's excluder
excluder
analysis
approach
has
been
employed
in
practice
primarily
analysis approach has been employed
practice primarily to bring
bring
about
efficiency. 49 Although this Article does
about economic
economic efficiency.49
does not argue
argue
Rather,
the Uniform
Uniform Commercial
Commercial Code
Rather, the
Code defines
defines good
good faith as "honesty in fact and
and the
the observance
standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. §
§ 1-201(b)
of reasonable
reasonable commercial
commercial standards
1-201 (b) (20)
(20)
servance of
(West 2002).
2002).
45
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS
45
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 205
205 cmt. d (1981)
(1981) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
46
supra note
note 5,
5, at 826
supra
46 Summers,
Summers, General
General Duty,
Duty, supra
826 (quoting Summers, Good Faith,
Faith, supra
note
fact, Summers
note 5,
5, at
at 198).
198). In
In fact,
Summers notes
notes that
that although
although the Restatement (Second) did not
not adopt
adopt
his
language ...
his specific
specific formulation,
formulation, "the
"the overlap
overlap between
between the
the [Restatement's]
[Restatement'sllanguage
... and
and my own
own
formulation
formulation is great."
great." Id.
Id.
47
(SECOND) OF
47 RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS §§ 205
205 cmt.
cmt. aa (1981)
(1981) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
48
Id.
48
Id.
49
49 Economic
Economic efficiency
efficiency is
is not
not necessarily
necessarily inconsistent
inconsistent with justice.
justice. For example,
example, in a
famous
famous article,
article, Guido
Guido Calabresi
Calabresi and
and A.
A. Douglas
Douglas Melamed
Melamed refute
refute the notion
notion that justice
justice
concerns
concerns are
are merely
merely residual
residual in
in the
the economic
economic analysis
analysis calculus,
calculus, arguing
arguing that "many
"many entitlements
are described
described as
on justice
can easily
ments that
that properly
properly are
as based
based on
justice in
in our
our society
society can
easily be
be explained
explained
in
efficiency or
in terms
terms either
either of
of broad
broad distributional
distributional preferences
preferences like
like equality
equality or
or of efficiency
or of
of both."
Guido
A. Douglas
Guido Calabresi
Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed,
Melamed, Property
Property Rules,
Rules, Liability
Liability Rules,
Rules, and Inalienability:
Inalienability: One
View
the Cathedral,
1089, 1105
View of
of the
Cathedral, 85
85 HARV.
HARV. L.
L. REv.
REv. 1089,
11 05 (1972);
(1972); see also RICHARD
RICI-IARD A. POSNER,
POSNER, ECOEcoNOMIC
NOMIC ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS OF
OF LAW
LAw §§ 4.13
4.13 (5th ed. Aspen
Aspen Publishers
Publishers 1998)
1998) (providing
(providin~ an economic
economic
justification
justification of
of quasi-contractual
quasi-contractual restitutionary
restitutionalY recovery
recovery for benefits
benefits conferred
confen:ed to
to preserve
preserve
life,
life, health,
health, or
or property).
property).
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that efficiency
efficiency of transactional
transactional exchange
exchange should not be a goal of contract law, it contends
pricontends that, in some cases, Summers's
Summers's call for the primacy ofjustice
should
be
meaningfully
revived.
This
"call"
is
different
of justice
meaningfully
different
from Summers's
Summers's simply in that it posits that good faith should encomconception of justice
pass a specific
specific conception
justice modeled on substantive equality
1°
and Iris Marion Young's oppression/domination
oppression/domination model of injustice. 55o
Before moving to a discussion of this Article's proposed model of
of
good faith in the at-will employment context, however, Part I.B discusses how the excluder
excluder analysis approach has been used to effect an
economic model of the doctrine of good faith.
B.

The Dominance of the Economic
Economic Model

Although the forgone
. Although the forgone opportunities
opportunities and
and excluder
excluder analysis approaches are philosophically
philosophically and methodogically
methodogically distinct, the applicaeconomic analysis of the doctrine
tion of each in substance
substance reflects an economic
doctrine
Because of the impact and importance of market analyof good faith. Because
sis and economic
economic analysis on the law generally, and because
because the conclusions and proposals
proposals set forth in subsequent sections
sections of this Article
Article
entrenchment of economic
economic analysis of the law from a criticritique the entrenchment
set
cal race and law and market
market economy
economy perspective,
perspective, it is necessary to set
forth some basic principles of law and economics as a foundation
foundation for
for
further arguments
oppositional approaches
forarguments about the two oppositional
approaches to the formulation of a good faith standard.
1.
1.

Law and Economics
Economics

Richard
Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law has significantly influenced
development of law and economics
economics scholarship.51
scholarship. 5 1 Building
enced the development
Building
52 and
upon the foundational
foundational work of scholars
scholars such as Ronald Coase 52
and
53
Guido Calabresi,
groundwork for the
Calabresi,53 Posner's seminal text laid the groundwork
the

50
50

See supra
supra note
and accompanying
accompanying text.
See
note 14
14 and
text.

(1972).
(1972).
See,
e.g.,
R.H.
Coase,
The
Problem
of
Social
Cost,
3J.L.
& ECON.
EcoN. 1
1 (1960)
See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
(1960) (discussing
(discussing
transaction costs
what has come to be known as the "Coase theorem," which states that if transaction
are minimal, private bargaining
efficient allocation
allocation of resources, regardless
bargaining will lead to an efficient
of how the law assigns rights).
53
See, e.g.,
e.g., Guido
Guido Calabresi,
Calabresi, Some
on Risk
Risk Distribution
Distributionand
and the Law of Torts,
53
See,
Some Thoughts
Thoughts on
Tarts, 70
(1961) (expanding economic
YALE L.J.
LJ. 499 (1961)
economic analysis
analysis into tort law).
51
51

RICHARD A.
A. POSNER,
POSNER, ECONOMIC
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS OF
OF LAw
LAw
RiCHARD

52
52
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55 over the past thirty
54 of law and economics
developing discourse
developing
discourse 54
economics 55
Economic Analysis oj
of Law, Posner demonstrates
demonstrates the primacy of
years. In Economic
efficiency, or the "allocation of resources in which
which value
value is maxi56
57
mized,"
mized,"56
in the law. 57
Significantly, in the book's introductory
introductory materials, Posner carefully defines
of
defines and differentiates
differentiates between
between two models of
efficiency, one based
Pareto-superiority and the other
based on a concept of Pareto-superiority
other
on the Kaldor-Hicks
Kaldor-Hicks construction
efficiency as wealth
construction of efficiency
wealth maximiza58 The Pareto-superior
Pareto-superior model describes an efficient
tion. 58
efficient transaction
transaction
or reallocation of resources as "one that makes at least one person
person
'59
better
In contrast, the more elastic
better off and no one worse off."
off."59
Kaldor-Hicks
Kaldor-Hicks model is
concerned with whether
not concerned
whether or not a reallocation
reallocation of resources will
make certain individuals worse off, but rather with whether or not
not
society's
[A] reallocation
society's aggregate
aggregate utility has been maximized. [AJ
reallocation of
of
efficient if those who gain from it obtain enough
resources is efficient
enough to
....60
fully compensate those who lose from it ....
60
Posner
Posner adopts the Kaldor-Hicks
Kaldor-Hicks conception
conception of efficiency, which he
he
' 61
maximization."
"wealth
as
describes
also
maximization."61

Using
maximization as a foundation for his
Using this notion of wealth maximization
theory of law and economics, Posner goes on to describe
describe that theory
62
as having both positive and normative aspects.
aspects. 62
In the positivist
positivist
sense, Posner's analysis
analysis can be used to describe
describe many of the legal results and rules underlying
underlying our common law. That is, the common law
63
reaches efficient
In the normative sense, Posner asserts
efficient outcomes. 63
that legal decision
decision makers should prefer legal rules that promote the
54 This
Article uses
deliberately to imply that law and economics
54
This Article
uses the
the word "discourse" deliberately
representation by which legal meaning and knowledge
knowledge are
constitutes a specific system of representation
reproduction of knowlproduced and reproduced.
reproduced. Moreover,
Moreover, this Article
Article assumes that the reproduction
economics by legal scholars,
edge through
through the discursive practice of law and economics
scholars, teachers, lawyers, and judges
correlated to how power is configured,
judges is directly
directly correlated
configured, reconfigured, held, and
and
circulated in society at large. See Stuart Hall, The Work of
REPRESENTATION:
ofRepresentation,
Representation, in REPRESENTATION:
SIGNIFYING PRACrICES
CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS
REPRESENTATIONS AND
AND SIGNIfYING
PRACTICES 13, 41-51 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997)
(discussing discourse
discourse and its relationship to knowledge,
knowledge, truth, and
and power in society).
55
In this
age of
post-law and
and economics,
economics, Posnerian economic analysis continues
continues to
55
In
this age
of post-law
to
be regarded as foundational and is referred to as the Chicago School of Law and
and
Economics.
56 POSNER,
POSNER, supra
49, §
§ 1.2,
1.2, at
at 13.
56
supra note
note 49,
13.
57
id. §§ 2.1-2.3.
57
See, e.g.,
e.g., id.
58
See
1.2, at 14-15.
58
See id.
id. § 1.2,
59
Id. §§ 1.2,
1.2, at
at 14.
14. "In
"In other words, the criterion of Pareto superiority
59
Id.
superiority is unanimity of
of
all affected
affected persons."
persons." Id.
Id.
60
ROBIN PAUL
PAUL MALLOY,
LAW AND
A COMPARATIVE
COMPARATIVE APPROACH
APPROACH TO
60
ROBIN
MALLOY, LAw
AND ECONOMICS:
ECONOMICS: A
TO THEORY
THEORY
AND PRACTICE
PRACrICE 40 (1990).
(1990).
61
POSNER, supra
supra note
§1.2, at
14.
61
POSNER,
note 49,
49, §1.2,
at 14.
62
Id.
62
Id. §§ 2.2.
2.2.
63
See
Posner asserts
63
See id.
id. Posner
asserts that
that
. . bear
reasoning....
many areas of the law.
law ...
bear the stamp of economic reasoning.
. . . What
What
we may
may call
efficiency theory
common law
law is
not that
every comcomwe
call the
the efficiency
theory of
of the
the common
is not
that every
mon law doctrine and decision
.... The theory is that the comdecision is efficient ....
com-
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64
efficient allocation of resources. 54
Efficiency as wealth maximization
maximization
efficient
in
thus forms the bedrock of Posner's economic
economic analysis of the law in
both its positive and normative aspects.
In one sense, economic analysis of contract law guides lawyering
lawyering
approach a
and judicial
judicial decision making to produce
produce conditions that approach
bargaining and to correct many of the market failures
state of efficient bargaining
65
These
that can occur in the contracting
contracting process. 55
These goals are realized
realized
66
56
by minimizing transaction costs.
In
turn,
if
transaction
costs
are
costs.
transaction
contracting parties
minimized, individual
individual contracting
parties can achieve their goals, bewould permit and require the strict
strict
cause perfectly
perfectly efficient
efficient contracts would
enforcement of all contractual
contractual obligations,
judienforcement
obligations, without the need for judi67
cial gap-filling
gap-filling and regulation. Although a perfect contracting
contracting enviefficient
ronment is impossible to obtain in the real world, the efficient
application of legal rules contributes
contributes to wealth formation and
maximization.

Although
explanation is overgeneralized,
Although the preceding
preceding explanation
overgeneralized, further
further
theorizing of the economically
environment is pretheorizing
economically ideal contracting
contracting environment
assumptions. One conmised broadly on a few different conditions or assumptions.
dition assumes that only rational decision makers
makers can enter into
enforceable exchange
transactions. 6 The individual
enforceable
exchange transactions.68
individual rationality of a
given decision maker is determined
determined by that party's ability to order his
or her preferences
preferences and, consequently,
consequently, to maintain stable
stable prefer69
Robin Paul Malloy notes that these
ences. fi9
these rational
rational actors "know
maximizing the
mon law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing
wealth of society.
Id.
/d. §§ 2.2, at 27.
64
See id.
id. §§ 2.2.
2.2.
54
See
65
See Owen
Owen M.
The Death
the Law?,
72 CORNELL
CORNELL L.
L. REV.
REV. 1,5
1, 5 (1986).
Owen Fiss
Fiss
fi5
See
M. Fiss,
Fiss, 17!e
Death of
of the
Law?, 72
(1986). Owen
has stated:
The aim of th[e] ...
.. .normative[
normative [ ] branch of law and economics is not to
to
describe or explain how decisions
decisions were in fact made or predict how they
will be made, but
.... According
but rather
rather to guide them ....
According to
to this branch
branch of law
and economics, the normative
normative concepts of the law should be construed
construed and
applied in such a way as to make the judicial
instrument for
for
judicial power an instrument
perfecting the market.
perfecting
Id.; see also
also ROBERT COOTER &
& THOMAS
Id.;
THOMAS ULEN,
ULEN, LAW
LAw AND
AND ECONOMICS
ECONOMICS 205-12 (Addison Wesley
Longman, Inc. 3d ed. 2000) (discussing the concepts of perfect contracts and market
market
failure).
66
Transaction cost~
costs are
"the costs
costs of
rights." POSNER,
POSNER, supra
55
Transaction
are "the
of effecting
effecting aa transfer
transfer of
of rights."
sU/Jra
note 49, § 3.1,
3.1, at 39. More
specifically,
transaction
costs
are
"[c]onditions
More
transaction cost~
"[c]onditions impeding the
carrying out of mutually beneficial exchanges;
exchanges; such costs include
include information
information costs, costs
of negotiating
MALLOY,
negotiating and contracting, and costs imposed by taxes and regulations." MALLOY,
supra note 60, glossary
glossary at 163.
supra
67
See
COOTR & UL N, supra note 65, at 205-06; ROIERT CoorER & THOMAS ULEN,
fi7
See COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 65, at 205-06; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
ECONOMICS 230 (1988)
(1988) [hereinafter
[hereinafter COOTER
LAW AND
LAW AND
AND ECONOMICS
COOTER & ULEN, 1988
1988 LAw
AND ECONOMICS].
ECONOMICS].
68
See
CoorER &
& ULEN,
note 65,
65, at
60, at
at 31-32.
31-32.
58
See COOTIcR
ULEN, supra
supra note
at 206-07;
206-07; MALLOY,
MALLOY, supra
supra note
note 60,
69
COOTER
&
ULEN,
supra
note
65,
COOTER & ULEN, sU/Jra note
at 206.
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' 70
what they
they want" and "can take clues from the market.
market."70
In pursuing
their stable preferences, however, rational decision makers
makers may be
be
constrained by factors beyond their control, such as fraudulent or opconstrained
portunistic manipulations
manipulations by the other
portunistic
other party to a contract. 7711 Thus,
from an economic
economic perspective,
perspective, one aspect of contract law that helps
to create
contracting environment
deterring
create a perfect contracting
environment is its goal of deterring
opportunistically toward their contracting parpeople from "behaving opportunistically
parencourage the optimal
ties, in order to encourage
optimal timing of economic activity
measures. "72
self-protective measures."72
obviate costly self-protective
and ...
... obviate
With respect to contract
contract law in particular, Posner further argues
that the typical contract
contract case is
a setting of low transaction costs, and therefore
therefore a judicial
judicial failure to
discover the efficient
efficient solution can be rectified
rectified for the future by a
drafting change. This point suggests
suggests that contract law cannot readily be used to achieve goals other than efficiency. A ruling that fails
to interpolate the efficient
efficient term will not affect future conduct; it will
be reversed by the parties in their subsequent
subsequent dealings. It will only
73
costs. 73
avoidable-transaction costs.
additional-and avoidable-transaction
impose additional-and

It is the suggestion that "contract law cannot
cannot readily be used to
achieve goals other than efficiency" that this Article disputes.

2.

Obvious Case:
Case: Forgone
Forgone Opportunities
Opportunities
The Obvious

described
The "amorphous" nature of the duty of good faith, as described
Burton,7 4 appears to exist in tension with basic principles
by Burton,74
principles of a conventional economic analysis
analysis of the law. It is this tension that Burton
Burton
attempts to ease through
the
forgone
opportunities
approach
through
opportunities approach to the
75
faith. In doing so, Burton not only deftly deploys
doctrine of good faith.75
the positivist strategy of law and economics
description
economics (through
(through his description
70
MALLOY, supra
note 60,
60, at
at 32.
who are
under the
the law
law to
incapa70 MALLOY,
supra note
32. Actors
Actors who
are presumed
presumed under
to be
be incapable of ordering their preferences
preferences (such as minors and the insane) are deemed to be legally
incompetent
incompetent and
and therefore "cannot conclude an enforceable
enforceable contract." COOTER
COOTER &
& ULEN,
ULEN,
supra note 65, at 206. Although legal incompetence
incompetence generally
generally enables a party to avoid
avoid
supra
contractual
contractual obligations, there are exceptions. See, e.g.,
e.g., Hauer v. Union State
State Bank, 532
N.W.2d
456, 462-66 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
N.W.2d 456,462-66
1995) (holding that, in the absence
absence of special
special circumstances
stances obviating restitution, a mental incompetent may disaffirm a contract
contract but must
must
consideration received from the counterparty);
counterparty); Dodson v.
v. Shrader, 824
make restitution of consideration
S.W.2d
545, 549-50
549-50 (Tenn. 1992)
1992) (holding that, in the absence of overreaching, undue
S.W.2d 545,
influence,
or other
unfairness to
influence, or
other unfairness
to the minor party, the counterparty
counterparty is entitled upon the
minor's
disaffirmation of
of the
contract to
to reasonable
reasonable compensation
compensation for
for depreciation
depreciation of
of or
or
minor's disaffirmation
the contract
damage
to the counterparty's
counterparty's consideration).
damage to
consideration).
71
See COOTER
& ULEN,
note 65,
65, at
at 206-07.
206-07.
71
See
COOTER &
ULEN, supra
supra note
72
POSNER, supra
supra note
note 49,
49, §§ 4.1,
at 103.
Posner also
also states
that "it
"it is
always obvious
obvious
72
POSNER,
4.1, at
103. Posner
states that
is not
not always
when a party
is behaving
opportunistically." Id.
party is
behaving opportunistically."
Id.
73 Id.
Id. § 4.1,
4.1, at 108.
73
108.
74 See
Burton, supra
74
See Burton,
supra note 22, at 371-72.
75 See
Part I.A.1
(describing Burton's
opportunities theory of good
75
See supra
supra Part
LA.1 (describing
Burton's forgone
forgone opportunities
good
faith).
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of cases
cases in which
which courts applied
applied the then-unnamed
then-unnamed forgone opportunities approach),76
approach),76 but also successfully
successfully presents his normative
normative argument. His advocacy
advocacy of a particularized
particularized factual inquiry into the
attempted
attempted recapture of forgone opportunities is one that is explicitly
77
economic
economic and sharply focused on the notion of costs,
costs,77
one of the
foundational concepts
concepts of law and economics. Thus, the forgone opportunities
portunities approach
approach is essentially
essentially an economic analysis of the doctrine of good faith.
3.

The Less Obvious Case:
Case: Excluder Analysis

opportunities approach,
In contrast to Burton's forgone opportunities
approach, Summers's excluder analysis of the doctrine of good
good faith appears
appears to be
grounded in fundamental
notions
of
fairness,
rather
fundamental
rather than in eco78
Practically speaking, however, this Article suggests
nomic analysis. Practically
that the scope of the duty of good faith under the excluder analysis
approach-its ability to preclude various kinds of bad faith conductapproach-its
conducttends ultimately to foster conditions that contribute
contribute toward
toward an economically perfect contracting environment, and not to foster conditions leading toward a level of equality consistent
consistent with expansive
79
justice.
of
notions
justice. 79
In his 1968 article,
article, Summers extracts from case
case law several distinct forms of bad faith conduct and their good faith counterparts.8800
For example, a seller acts in bad faith by concealing
concealing a defect in his
product;
of
product; the good faith counterpart is the seller's full disclosure
disclosure of
material
material facts. 881' In economic terms, a crucial condition
condition of the ideal
contracting
contracting parties
contracting environment is that all contracting
parties have access to
"full information
consequences of [their]
information about the nature and consequences
choice
[s]."82
choice[s]
."82 Another example
example of an act of bad faith is a contractor
contractor
who openly abuses his bargaining
power
to
coerce
an
increase
in conbargaining power
tract
refrain from the abuse of
of
tract price;
price; the good faith counterpart is to refrain·
76
76

77

77

78
78

See
supra note
See Burton,
Burton, supra
note 22, at 387-92.
Cf id.
at 375-76
375-76 (outlining
(outlining a "wholly economic
economic description
costs").
Cf
id. at
description of contracting
contracting costs").
See
supra
Part
I.A.2
(discussing
Summers's
excluder analysis
good faith);
See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing Summers's excluder
analysis theory
theory of
of good
faith);

see also
also FARNSWORTH,
supra note 19,
FARNSWORTH, supra
19, § 7.17, at 504 ("Th[e] implied
implied duty [of good faith] is
based on fundamental notions
notions of fairness.").
fairness.").
79
Cf infta
Il.A.2 (discussing
(discussing Kimberle
Kimberl6 Crenshaw's
Crenshaw's critique
of antidiscrimination
79
Cf
infra Part
Part 1II.A.2
critique of
antidiscrimination
law as legitimatizing
reconceptualization of the expansive
legitimatizing racial
racial subordination, and her reconceptualization
antidiscrimination law).
goals of antidiscrimination
80 Summers,
Good Faith,
supra note
5, at
at 203.
80
Summers, Good
Faith, supra
note 5,
203.
81
Id.
v. Wyo.
Wyo. Cattle
Cattle Ranche
Ranche Co.,
Co., 128
128 U.S.
383, 388
388 (1888».
(1888)).
81
Id. (citing
(citing Stewart
Stewart v.
U.S. 383,
82
COOTER
1988 LAw
LAW AND
AND ECONOMICS,
ECONOMICS, supra
supra note
67, at
235 (emphasis
82
COOTER &
& ULEN,
ULEN, 1988
note 67,
at 235
(emphasis omitomitted); see also Robin Paul Malloy, Invisible Hand
Posner
Hand or Sleight of Hand?
Hand? Adam Smith, Richard
Richard Posner
and the Philosophy
Philosophy of Law and
and Economics,
KAN. L. REV.
Economics, 36 U. RAN.
REV. 209, 243 (1988)
(1988) (stating that the
neoclassical model of economics assumes that "people have access
neoclassical
access to perfect
perfect
information").
information") .
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agreement
bargaining power.8833 Similarly, a party who enters into an agreement·
the
benefits
deriving
prevents
the
other
party
from
and then prevents
party
benefits of the
agreement
counterpart is to act coopagreement acts in bad faith; the good faith counterpart
against
eratively. 8R44 These excluder-analysis
prohibitions against
excluder-analysis good faith prohibitions
effectuate another economic
abusive or uncooperative
uncooperative conduct effectuate
economic goal,
because they deter contracting
contracting parties
parties from behaving
behaving opportunisti"obviate [s] costly
cally toward one another, which, Posner has stated, "obviate[s]
perfect contracting
contracting environself-protective measures."85
measures." 8 5 Because a perfect
self-protective
costs, 86 these good faith prohibiment requires minimal transaction costs,86
contracting parties
tions further economic goals by preventing both contracting
contract
extraneous transaction
from incurring
incurring extraneous
transaction costs arising after contract
8877
formation.
contract
economic analysis to contract
The application
application of conventional
conventional economic
contracting environment, judicial
law suggests that, in a perfect
perfect contracting
judicial interinvalidate contracts only in the most
vention would be necessary
necessary to invalidate
egregious of circumstances
circumstances (e.g., if one party has induced the other
other
contracting
contracting party, through fraud or duress, to enter
enter into the agreement). 8 8 Such judicial
ment).88
judicial intervention would be inappropriate, however,
if the agreement were merely unfair to one of the parties. As stated
stated
about
...
fairdoes
not
care
"[t] he market
more succinctly
succinctly by Malloy, "[t]he
... fair.... As long as there are no artificial
orjustice
ness or
justice ....
artificial barriers to success,
market."89 This
no one should be offended
offended by the functioning of the market."89
particular assumption is inconsistent
inconsistent with Summers's stated conclusion about the role and purpose
purpose of the good faith obligation
obligation in con°° Yet,
tract law, which is to ensure fairness in the contracting process. 90
the doctrine of good faith, even in its excluder analysis form, is frequently applied to achieve the conditions required to construct a perfect contracting
contracting environment.
Decisions in two recent cases exemplify
exemplify the ways in which
which applications of the excluder
excluder analysis yield economically
economically driven results. For
Bank,91 the District Court for the
Kleiner v. First
example, in Kleiner
First National
National Bank,91
Northern
Northern District of Georgia used a definition of good faith that
adopts the excluder
excluder analysis approach
approach in recognizing
recognizing the validity of
of
covenant of good faith
the plaintiffs'
plaintiffs' claim
claim for breach
breach of an implied covenant
Brew203 (citing
Lingenfelder v.
supra note
Summers, Good
Good Faith,
83
83 Summers,
Faith, supra
note 5,
5, at
at 203
(citing LingenfeJder
v. Wainwright
Wainwright Brewery
ery Co.,
Co., 15 S.W.
S.w. 844, 848
848 (Mo. 1891)).
1891».
Div. 1919».
1919)).
N.Y.S. 670,
670, 673
673 (App.
(App. Div.
84
Id. (citing
(citing Carns
Carns v.
v. Bassick,
Bassick, 175
84 [d.
175 N.Y.S.
49,
§
4.1,
at
103.
supra
note
85
POSNER,
85 POSNER, supra note 49, § 4.1, at 103.
at 108.
108.
note 49,
4.1, at
207-12; POSNER,
supra note
65, at
& ULEN,
86
See COOTER
86
See
COOTER &
ULEN, supra
note 65,
at 207-12;
POSNER, supra
supra note
49, §§ 4.1,
236; MALLOY,
supra
supranote
note 67,
67, at
at 236;
AND ECONOMICS,
ECONOMICS, supra
& ULEN,
ULEN, 1988
1988 LAw
LAW AND
87
See COOTER
COOTER &
87 See
MALLOY, supra
note 60, at 34-38.
275-77.
65, at
at 261-64,
261-64, 275-77.
See CoOTER
COOTER &
& ULEN,
88
88
See
ULEN, supra
supra note
note 65,
supra note
note 60,
89
MALLOY, supra
89 MALLOY,
60, at
at 32.
32.
5, at
supra note
Summers, General
90 See
90
See Summers,
General Duty,
Duty, supra
note 5,
at 826.
826.
581 F. Supp. 955 (N.D.
(N.D. Ga. 1984).
1984).
91
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alleged in pertinent
and fair dealing. 9922 In that case, the plaintiffs
plaintiffs alleged
pertinent part
defendant bank breached
breached its contractual
contractual obligation
that the defendant
obligation of good
faith by charging
charging interest
interest on the plaintiffs'
plaintiffs' loans in a manner inconsis9 3 The
tent with the terms of the promissory
promissory notes they had signed. 93
relevant
relevant term at issue concerned
concerned the rate of interest on the loans,
94 Although the
denominated the "prime rate" in the notes. 94
which was denominated
prime rate was defined in the notes, the bank argued
that
its meaning
argued
should instead be interpreted
interpreted in accordance
accordance with the trade meaning
of the term prime rate. 9955 The court quoted language from the RestateRestateContracts section 205, which describes
describes the excluder
ment (Second) of Contracts
excluder
analysis approach,go
approach,9 6 and noted that "[aJrguably,
"[a]rguably, where an agreement
agreement
permits
permits one party to unilaterally
unilaterally determine
determine the extent of the other's
required
performance, an obligation of good faith in making such a
required performance,
determination
implied. '9 7 The court then denied the plaintiffs'
plaintiffs' modetermination is implied."97
summary judgment, but allowed
tion for summary
allowed the question of whether the
prime rates were good faith estimates to go to the jury.98
jury.98
excluder
Although the Kleiner
Kleiner court employed the Restatement's excluder
analysis
analysis approach
approach to good faith, the facts appear
appear more compatible
with the purely economic
economic forgone opportunities approach. The
court's
whether
court's analysis
analysis of the facts in Kleiner
Kleiner seemed to depend on whether
the bank legitimately
legitimately exercised
exercised its discretion
discretion in setting the prime rate
and, if not, on whether the bank was attempting to recapture
recapture an opportunity
manner it knew it had forgone at the
portunity to reset those rates
rates in a manner
time of contract
contract formation.9
formation. 999 This analysis
Burton's
analysis is precisely
precisely what Burton's
00
Kleiner
forgone opportunities approach contemplates. loo
Thus, the Kleiner
court
would
have
reached
the
same
conclusion
under
a
forgone
opcourt
reached
conclusion
portunities approach
excluder
approach as it did under the Restatement's
Restatement's excluder
analysis.
Kleiner illustrates
differences between
illustrates that although
although the differences
between the two
approaches
performance remain pure in theory, they
approaches to good faith performance
are easily elided in practice in purely commercial
commercial cases. If those theoretically divergent meanings are conflated
conflated in practice, then the theoretical
between the approaches
retical distinction between
approaches is rendered
rendered meaningless.
meaningless.
Although this does not present a significant
significant analytical problem in
cases like Kleiner,
Kleiner, the question remains
remains whether
whether the eliding of these
92
See id.
960 n.5
(relying in
in part
the Restatement
Restatement (Second)
(Second) of
Contracts§
§ 205
205 (1981)
(1981)
92
See
id. at
at 960
n.5 (relying
part on
on the
of Contracts
approach
excluder analysis).
analysis).
approach to good faith, which
which adopts
adopts Summers's excluder
93
See id.
id. at 957-58.
93
See
94
See id.
id. at 958-59.
94
95
id.
95
See id.
96
id. at 960 n.5.
96
See id.
97
97

98

99
100
100

Id.at 960.
[d.
See ill.
id.

id. at 959-60.
See id.
See Burton,
Burton, supra
note 22,
See
supra note
22, at
at 387-92.
387-92.

HeinOnline -- 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1044 2002-2003

2003]

CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS

1045

theoretical
differences ever matters. Are there cases in which the thetheoretical differences
approaches should be
oretical distinction between
between the good faith approaches
revived?
01
Larson v. Larson'
The case of Larson
LarsonlOl
suggests an affirmative
affirmative answer to
that question, although probably because it is a divorce case rather
rather
than a commercial
Larson involved
commercial case. Larson
involved a settlement agreement
agreement between former spouses, and the term at issue concerned
concerned the payment
payment
0 2 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Mr. Larson
of alimony.1
alimony.102
Larson
set
agreed to pay alimony and child support
support to Mrs. Larson in a set
emancipation of their youngest
monthly amount until the emancipation
youngest child, and
03
thirty percent
Larsons'
percent of his gross earned income
income thereafter.1
thereafter. 103
The Larsons'
agreement also stated that both parties
settlement agreement
parties intended
intended the agreement to govern their obligations
obligations independently, regardless of future
events that might change
change either of their positions.'
positions.10044 After
Mter the emancipation of their youngest child, Mr. Larson-ail
Larson-an apparently healthy
fifty-five year old-retired
old-retired and stopped making alimony payments,
0 5 Mrs. Larson subsequently
income.'105
claiming that he had no earned income.
agreement due to the
filed a motion to modify the settlement agreement
06
changed
circumstances of her ex-husband.
ex-husband.'106
changed circumstances
The lower court
7
10
107
granted the motion.
granted
motion.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Appeals
Appeals Court of Massachusetts set forth some additional facts about the Larsons'
sachusetts
Larsons' relationship. When the couple divorced
divorced in 1983, Mr. Larson had an annual
earned
income of approxiearned income
income of $90,000, an annual
annual unearned
unearned income
mately
$10,000, and net assets worth
$600,000.108 Mrs. Larson
mately $10,000,
worth almost $600,000.108
Larson
was a homemaker who had been financially dependent on her husband during their marriage and whose net worth was "modest."109
"modest."'1 9 At
the time Mrs. Larson filed her motion to modify the settlement
settlement agreement, Mr. Larson had retired and was living on $50,000 per year of
of
unearned
unearned income, and had a net worth of approximately
110 Mrs. Larson
$1,000,000.110
$1,000,000.
Larson had a weekly earned income of $97, a
weekly unearned
$104, and assets worth about $400,000.111
unearned income of $104,
$400,000. 111
636 N.E.2d
1365 (Mass.
101 636
N.E.2d 1365
(Mass.
See id.
id. at
1366-67.
102 See
at 1366-67.
Id. at
1366.
103 [d.
at 1366.

App. Ct.
1994).
App.
Ct. 1994).

104
104

Id.
[d.
See id.
id. at
1366-67.
See
at 1366-67.
106
Id. at
106
[d.
at 1366.
1366.
107
Id. The
The trial
court ordered
ordered Mr.
Mr. Larson
Larson to
to pay
month in
107
[d.
trial court
pay approximately
approximately $1,000
$1,000 per
per month
in
Id. at 1367.
1367.
alimony. [d.
108
Id. at
108
[d.
at 1366.
1366.

1o5
105

109
109

Id.
[d.
Id.
[d.
11
Id. Her principal asset
obtained in the di111
[d.
asset was the marital
marital home, which
which she had obtained
Id.
vorce settlement. [d.
I lo
11
()
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breach
The appellate court also discussed
discussed at length Mr. Larson's
Larson's breach
of his duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance
performance of the
settlement agreement.
agreement.ll1122 The court stated that Mr. Larson's decision
decision
to retire at the age of fifty-five,
fifty-five, while in good health, without otherwise
otherwise
providing for his ex-wife's
ex-wife's support, "deprived the wife of her reasonaagreement and amounted
bly anticipated fruits of the separation
separation agreement
amounted to an
an
1 13
'evasion of
of the
spirit of
of the
the bargain."'
'evasion
the spirit
bargain. "'113 What is striking about the
appellate court's
court's reasoning
reasoning and its reliance
reliance on the excluder analysis
approach is the absence
of
language
that refers explicitly to the guidabsence
ing principles
principles of fairness, equality, and justice, even though the facts,
which
warrant at least
appellate court restated in detail, easily warrant
least
which the appellate
114
mention of those principles. 114
Only the concurring judge recognized that Mr. Larson's early and abrupt retirement
retirement was "patently un1 5
irrational"' 116
and ofttimes irrational"
"emotional,
the
acknowledged
16
fair,"115
fair," and acknowledged
nature of divorce cases. The absence of similar
similar language
language in the majority opinion raises the following question: Why are legal analyses of
of
noneconomic
noneconomic or only partially economic facts so often discussed exclusively in economic terms, even in cases in which the law cited to
support these analyses theoretically
theoretically dictates or at least permits
permits consid1 17
equality?
and
fairness
as
such
factors
noneconomic
of
eration
noneconomic
as fairness and equality?117
In arguing that the excluder analysis functions practically
practically as an
economic model, this Article does not suggest that the Kleiner
Kleinerand Lareconomic
Larson courts reached the wrong results, or that their decisions are the
the
misunderstanding of the excluder
excluder analysis. Nor does this
result of a misunderstanding
Article
Article contend
contend that courts should not use the duty of good faith perSee id
at 1367-68.
See
id. at
1367-68.
Id.
at
1368
(quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF
OF CONTRACTS
205 cmt.
cmt. d
d (1981)).
Id. at 1368 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS §§ 205
(1981».
The lower
lower court
court also
also discussed
in more
1114
14 The
discussed the
the case
case in
more economic
economic than
than equitable
equitable terms,
terms,
certainly implicates some policy issues
although its reasoning certainly
issues as well:
"[The husband's interpretation
interpretation of the agreement]
agreement] would
would place
place an undue
hardship
standard of living of the wife which
hardship and reduction in the standard
which neither
she nor the Court, which passed on
on the
tbe fairness of the original agreement,
would reasonably have anticipated.
anticipated. It is one thing to exclude unearned
income as a source
source of alimony when
when the husband
husband was
was a successful surgeon
with many years
matyears of productive earnings
earnings before him but quite another
another matfifty-five...
ter when that husband at the age of fifty-five
... in excellent
excellent health
health voluntarily retires in order
order to pursue another lifestyle. The husband is entitled to
retire, but he is not entitled to place
place the total economic burden of that
that
voluntary
voluntary act
act upon his former wife of many years who because
because of a lack of
of
earning
could
earning capacity
capacity and
and the loss of alimony at a point in time where she could
her later
charge but
not put aside enough for ber
later years is not rendered a public charge
but
is reduced
reduced to very modest standard of living well below that to which she
she
was accustomed both during and after the marriage."
Id. at 1367 (quoting
unpublished opinion of the probate judge below) (second
(quoting the unpublished
(second alteration in original).
original).
Id. at
at 1368
J., concurring).
concurring).
1115
15 [d.
1368 (Brown,
(Brown, J.,
Id. at
at 1369
1369 (Brown,
J., concurring).
concurring).
1116
16 Id.
(Brown, J.,
For aa discussion
definition of
equality advanced
advanced in
this Article,
Article, see
1117
17 For
discussion of
of the
the definition
of equality
in this
see supra
supra note
note
14.
14.
1 12
112
113
113
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exchange process. It simply
formance to optimize efficiency
efficiency in the exchange
takes issue with the way in which courts have
of
have deployed
deployed the doctrine of
good faith as an alternate means to effect an economic
economic analysis of the
law. Thus, this Article intends to critique the economic
economic analysis
analysis of the
doctrine
of
good
faith
and
to
revive
the
old
debate
between
doctrine
between Burton
Burton
and Summers, taking sides with Summers
Summers but from a more critical
perspective.
perspective.
C.

Critique of the Economic
Economic Model of Good Faith
Faith

The Chicago School of Law and Economics, as Posner himself
himself
concedes,
categorized as both politically
concedes, can fairly be categorized
politically and economi18
cally conservative.
conservative.' 118
Now, however, almost thirty years after the publication of the first edition of Economic
Economic Analysis of Law,119
Law," 9 law and
economics scholarship
economics
scholarship embodies
embodies the spectrum
spectrum of political ideolo0
2 1 and
120
scholars situated both to the right
gies. 12
Legal scholars
right l21
to the
the
118 See,
See, e.g.,
e.g.,
Richard A.
Posner, Law
REv. 163,
163,
118
Richard
A. Posner,
Law and
and Economics
Economics Is
Is Moral,
Moral, 24
24 VAL.
VAL. U.
U. L.
L. REv.
(1990). As Posner has stated:
165-66 (1990).
I consider
consider myself to be a pragmatic
pragmatic economic libertarian
libertarian.....
. . . By libertarian, II mean someone who believes in minimum
minimum government-as
government-as little govsuspicious of public
ernment as possible. I mean someone who is suspicious
people should look to themselves rather
rather than
intervention, who thinks that people
to their
their government for their happiness, their future, their success
success in life. I
general sense, not in a literal
mean a practitioner of laissez faire in a general
literal sense.
person....
I mean a small government person
....
The
The reason I affixed the adjective "economic"
~economic" is not that I am protective
economic theory to try to figure
economic liberty...
liberty ... but that I use economic
only of economic
appropriate boundaries
out what the appropriate
boundaries of the minimum state are. Basically
...sericorrect ...
my view is that the role of government is to intervene and correct
failures....
market failures
....
ous market
My third term, pragmatic,
pragmatic, comes from my opening remark
remark about not being
enthusiastic
discourse....
enthusiastic about
about moral discourse
.... My point is only that I do not intend to try to derive
derive my free-market views from something more fundamental, more rigorously
rigorously philosophical.
philosophical. And
And the consequence
consequence of this lack of
of
foundations
free-market
foundations is that I am not dogmatically
dogmatically attached to any of my free-market
views.
Id.
Id.
119
See POSNER,
POSNER, supra
note 51.
51.
119
See
supra note
120
For an
primer on
on the
various approaches
to law
law and
and economics
economics scholarscholar120
For
an excellent
excellent primer
the various
approaches to
ship, see generally MALLOY, supra
that:
supra note 60. Malloy argues that:
The
... require
The proper study
study of law and economics should
should ...
require us to evaluate
evaluate
arrangements while exploring
consequences that such
exploring the consequences
such
alternative social arrangements
alternatives have
economics....
[T] he
between law and
and economics
.... [T]he
alternatives
have on the relationship between
primary goal of law and economics
certain
economics should
should be to investigate
investigate how certain
values
current sovalues or principles will be affected by changing a community's current
economic arrangements.
cial, political, and economic
arrangements.
Id.
Id. at 4. Thus, Malloy argues
argues that the study of law and economics requires
requires a comparative
comparative
approach.
Id. at 5. In his analysis, Malloy
discusses and compares the conservative,
approach. Id.
Malloy discusses
conservative, liberal,
left communitarian
communitarian and
and neo-Marxist,
neo-Marxist, libertarian, and
and classical
classical liberal
liberal approaches
approaches to law
and
id. at 60-101,
and economics, see id.
60-101, and applies those readings to various
various cases in contract,
constitutional, employment, and tort law, see id.
id.at 104-54.
property, criminal, constitutional,
121 For
For example,
in mounting
controversial argument
argument against employment
employment discrimi121
example, in
mounting a controversial
nation laws,
Epstein has
nation
laws, Richard
Richard Epstein
has argued
argued that
that discrimination
discrimination based on irrational hatred of
of
or distaste
for people
people belonging
to certain classifications
or
distaste for
belonging to
classifications (such as women or minorities)
minorities)

HeinOnline -- 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1047 2002-2003

1048

CORNELL LAW
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1025
88:1025

122
left l22
of Posner engage in law and economics
economics scholarship, either
either by
arguing
conservative, free-market
arguing to extend
extend its conservative,
free-market direction across various
areas of substantive
substantive law, or by attacking, deconstructing,
deconstructing, or rerouting
rerouting
its direction toward
toward a more values-based
values-based theory of law and econom12 3
ics.
Yet, it
iCS. 123 Yet,
it is
is the
the conservative
conservative model of law and economics that remains well entrenched
entrenched within the legal academy.124
academy.' 2 4 Because
Because of that

will be extinguished
extinguished by market
market forces because
because such distaste is inefficient, but that "voluntary sorting" based on "commonality of preferences"-which
preferences"-which often
often tracks along
along racial, ethnic, or gender lines-will (and should)
should) survive because it increases satisfaction in the
workplace by allowing workers to avoid distasteful
distasteful associations. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
EpSTEIN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
(1992).
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
GROUNDS: THE
THE CASE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS
LAws 66-69 (1992).
But see Ian Ayres, Alternative
Alternative Grounds:
Grounds:Epstein's
DiscriminationAnalysis in Other
Other Market
Market Settings,
Epstein s Discrimination
Settings,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67 (1994)
discrimination
(1994) (critiquing Epstein's libertarian analysis
analysis of discrimination
law). Even
Lockean
Posner has criticized
criticized Epstein's libertarian views, stating
stating that Epstein's Lockean
law).
Even Posner
"derive [s]a sense of
of
informs his model
model of law and economics, "derive[s]
view of natural rights, which informs
minimum
118, at
minimum government
government smaller than even I think appropriate."
appropriate." Posner, supra
supra note 118,
171.
171.
122
See,
A. ACKERMAN,
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
SOCIAL JUSTICE
THE LIBERAL
LIBERAL STATE
STATE 181
181 n.5,
122
See, e.g.,
e.g., BRUCE
BRUCE A.
JUSTICE IN
IN THE
n.5, 200
200
(1980) (indirectly
(1980)
(indirectly engaging law and
and economics
economics by constructing, in part, a liberal
liberal "ideal
transactional
"affirm ...
transactional structure" on economic terms that would "atlirm
... the right of every citizen
citizen
to exchange goods, services, and meanings with his fellows
fellows on
on terms that do not require
him to concede
concede that his search
search for the good is any less important than his fellows' pursuit
pursuit
Law, Economics,
Problem of Legal Culture,
Culture, 1986
of happiness"); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Ackerman, Law,
Economics, and the Problem
1986
DUKE
"neoclassical economics
economics takes an extremely reducDUKE L.J.
LJ. 929, 940, 942 (arguing
(arguing that "neoclassical
tionist view of culture in general
"categorically regeneral and conversation
conversation in particular,"
particular," and "categorically
ject[ing]
. . the standard economist's condescending
ject[ing] ....
condescending attitude toward
toward other disciplines
that do take
take seriously the deep
deep problems
problems that are generated every
every time social meanings are
exchanged through symbolic
Property Rules,
Rules, Liability
exchanged
symbolic processes"); Shubha Ghosh, Property
Liability Rules, and
Termination Rights:
at the Employment at
at Will Debate
Franchising
Termination
Rights: A Fresh
Fresh Look at
Debate with Applications
Applications to Franchising
and Family
Family Law, 75 OR. L. REv. 969, 979-1016 (1996)
(1996) (arguing that economic
economic models'
presumptions in favor of at-will employment
presumptions
employment relationships
relationships erroneously
erroneously assume the absence
absence
of positive
externalities in employment
observing public
positive and negative externalities
employment contracts, and observing
ramifications
ramifications of such "private" employment agreements);
agreements); Robin Paul Malloy, Is Law and
Economics Moral?-Humanistic
Moral?-HumanisticEconomics
Classical Liberal
Critique of Posner's
Economics
Economics and aa Classical
Liberal Oritique
Posner's Economic
Economic
Analysis, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 147
147 (1990)
Analysis,
(1990) (promoting
(promoting a classical liberal
liberal approach to law and
and
economics
economics that disputes the underlying values
values of Posner's view of law and economics).
economics).
Indeed, even scholars to the far left
left of Posner
Posner have at times engaged
engaged law and economic
economic
Cultural Law and Economics,
Deischolarship. See, e.g., Linz Audain, Critical
Critical Cultural
Economics, the Culture
Culture of Deindividualization, the Paradox
(1995) (incorporating
(incorporating cultural
ndividualization,
Paradox of Blackness,
Blackness, 70 IND. L.J.
LJ. 709 (1995)
in Private
Form and Substance
Substance in
Private
studies into a law and economics analysis); Duncan Kennedy, Form
Law Adjudication,
1740-53, 1762-66, 1776 (1976)
Adjudication, 89 HARV.
fuRV. L. REV. 1685, 1740-53,
(1976) (arguing, in relestandards are "instrumenvant part, that economic
economic principles
principles embedded in legal rules
rules and standards
tal to [and not independent
substantive objectives").
objectives"). Significantly, both
independent of] the pursuit of substantive
legal and nonlegal feminist scholars also have
have critiqued the Chicago School
School and have proeconomic analysis as well as law and economics analysis. See,
posed alternate models for economic
e.g., ELIZABETH
ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS
ECONOMICS (1993);
(1993); Hadfield, supra
supra note
11.
11.
123 See
notes 121-22.
121-22.
123
See supra
supra notes
124
See
Ian
Ayres,
with a
Liver Complaint,
Never
Complaint, 1997
1997 WIS.
Wis. L.
L. REV.
124
See Ian Ayres, Never Confuse
Confuse Efficiency
Elficiency with
a Liver
REV. 503,
503,
"[h]egemony of [e]conomic
supra note 65,
504-06 (describing the "[h]egemony
[e]conomic [a]nalysis" in law); Fiss, supra
representation of critical legal scholars
at 22 (discussing the disparate
disparate representation
scholars and
and judges
judges compared
compared
to their law and economics counterparts
bench);
counterparts on "top-tier" law faculties
faculties and the federal bench);
Foreword:Identity,
Identity, Democracy,
Communicative Power,
Power, Inter/National
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword:
Democracy, Communicative
Inter/National Labor
Evolution of LatCrit
LatCrit Theo~y
Rights and the Evolution
Themy and Community, 53 U. MIAMI
MIAMI L. REV. 575,
575, 655-56
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discourse's descriptive and normative power, this Article attempts to
reapply law and economics analysis to contract law through a discussion and critique of the implied obligation of good faith from a critical race as well as law and market economy perspective.
II
ROBIN PAUL MALLOY'S
MARKET
ROBIN
MALLOY'S "LAw AND MARKET

ECONOMVY" THEORY
THEORY
ECONOMY"
conservative model of law
A particularly important critique of the conservative
economics-Malloy's theory of law and market economyI25-wareconomy1 25 -warand economics-Malloy's
rants detailed discussion
reinterpretation
discussion here. Malloy's critique and reinterpretation
of law and economics, utilizing economic
economic and market terms, enables
critical
evaluate the economic
critical scholars to better evaluate
economic analysis of the law.
reality
This is important because
because critical
critical scholars must reckon with the reality
and problems
of
the
market,
contractual context, as
problems
especially in the contractual
entrenchment and depoliticization
depoliticization of the
well as with the institutional
institutional entrenchment
economic
economic analysis of the law.
In developing
developing his theory of law and market economy, Malloy arargues that the existing, highly influential law and economics discourse
discourse
is flawed because
inaccurately assumes the pribecause it unrealistically
unrealistically and inaccurately
macy
of
efficiency
understanding of both the exchange
exchange process
macy
efficiency in its understanding
126 By
and market
market theory.
theory.126
deploying a semiotic
semiotic analysis and reinterpretation of law and economics, Malloy
Malloy persuasively
persuasively argues that creativity
and
discovery,
not
efficiency,
drive
wealth formation and
tivity
efficiency,
27
maximization.
maximization. 127
Malloy's
Malloy's innovation
innovation as a law and economics
economics scholar is not only
substantive,
methodological. Malloy
Malloy uses Peircian semiotics,
semiotics,
substantive, but also methodological.
derived
Sanders Peirce,128
Peirce,1 28 to reinterderived from the philosophy of Charles
Charles Sanders
(1999)
(contrasting the
marginalization in the legal academy
(1999) (contrasting
the marginalization
academy of critical
critical and other
other "out"outsider" legal scholars
economics scholars).
scholars with the preferential
preferential treatment
treatment of law and economics
scholars).
125
MALLOY, supra
note 10.
10.
125
MALLOY,
supra note
126
See
126
See id. at
at 2-4.
127
127 See
See id.
id. passim.
passim.
128
Charles
128 Charles Sanders
Sanders Peirce
Peirce was
was an
an influential
influential twentieth
twentieth century
century American
American philosopher
philosopher
who
who "provided
"provided the theoretical
theoretical foundation
foundation for
for Legal
Legal Realism,"
Realism," and
and who is "generally
"generally acknowledged...
knowledged ... as one
one of
of the
the greatest
greatest thinkers of
of the
the 20th
20th century
century for whom the
the law
law served
served
as
as prototype
prototype for a general
general theory of signs."
signs." Roberta
Roberta Kevelson,
Kevelson, Introduction
Introduction to 11 LAw
LAw AND
AND
SEMIOTICS
SEMIOTICS 1,
1, 14
14 (Roberta
(Roberta Kevelson
Kevelson ed.,
ed., 1987).
1987). Peirce
Peirce was a contemporary
contemporary of
of Oliver
Oliver WenWendell
dell Holmes,
Holmes, and both were
were members
members of the Metaphysical
Metaphysical Club, a discussion group
group that
that
met
in Cambridge,
the early
met regularly
regularly in
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Massachusetts in
in the
early 1870s.
1870s. ROBERTA
ROBERTA KEVELSON,
KEVELSON, THE
LAw
LAw AS
AS A
A SYSTEM
SYSTEM OF SIGNS
SIGNS 88 (1988);John
(1988);John T. Valauri, Peirce
Peirce and Holmes,
Holmes, in 1 PEIRCE AND
AND LAw:
LAw:
ISSUES
SEMIOTICS 187,
187 (Roberta
ISSUES IN
IN PRAGMATISM,
PRAGMATISM, LEGAL
LEGAL REALISM,
REALISM, AND
AND SEMIOTICS
187, 187
(Roberta Kevelson
Kevelson ed.,

1991).
came to
to legal
1991). Legal
Legal semioticians
semioticians have
have argued
argued that
that Holmes
Holmes came
legal realism
realism indirectly
indirectly by
by way
of
of Peirce's
Peirce's semiotic
semiotic theory
theory and
and philosophical
philosophical pragmatism.
pragmatism. See KEVELSON,
KEvELSON, supra,
sujlra, at
at 5-8.
5-8. But
But
see
see Valauri,
Valauri, supra,
supra, at
at 187-88
187-88 (asserting
(asserting that
that the proof
proof of influence
influence between
between Peirce
Peirce and
and
Holmes
Holmes is
is "ultimately
"ultimately contradictory
contradictory and
and inconclusive").
inconclusive").
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pret the values
science or
values of law and economics. 129 Semiotics is the science
or
study of signs, and can loosely be described
described as a type of linguistic theory that explains the formation and reproduction
reproduction of linguistic struc130 Its more philosophical
tures. 13°
philosophical derivations,
derivations, of which Peircian
Peircian
semiotics
concerned with the "process of 'knowing,'
'knowing,' and
and
semiotics is one, are concerned
the construction
construction of meaning
meaning and value
value within a dialogic
dialogic or relational
system of exchange,"
exchange," which are grounded in experience and
3
history. 1311'
reinterpretation demonstrates, the most sigAs Malloy's semiotic
semiotic reinterpretation
nificant interpretive concept
semiotics imparts is that the
concept that Peircian semiotics
the
32
processes of legal analysis and interpretation
other
interpretation are additive.
additive. 1'
132 In other
words, one who engages
engages in legal discourse generally filters her analysis
through
through several
several different screens or lenses of interpretation,
interpretation, and no
interpret
single screen
screen is the only screen through
through which
which she should interpret
the law. For example, this Article
is
filtered
through
the
multiple
Article
multiple
lenses of critical race theory, law and market economy theory, and law
and economics. Each of those discourses is only one screen
screen through
which an individual may interpret or understand
understand the law, and each
each of
of
those discourses
discourses may in turn
be
constituted
of
multiple
other
screens.
turn
constituted
The additive nature
nature of legal analysis
analysis is certainly
certainly not a new discovery;
discovery; it
is something that all law students learn in the first year of law school,
common law and the casebook
casebook pedagogy
when they are introduced
introduced to common
that dominates
dominates the doctrinal
doctrinal classroom. This additive nature is particularly relevant
relevant from a critical perspective because of the potentially
infinite ways, for example, one may interpret, reproduce, reinterpret,
and reconstruct
reconstruct the meaning of good faith.

129
129
130
130

MALLOY,
at 23.
MALLOY, supra
supra note
note 10,
10, at
23.
See
id. at
at 29.
WINFRIED NOTH,
NOTH, HANDBOOK
SEMIOTICS (1990)
(providSee id.
29. See
See generally
generally WINFRIED
HANDBOOK OF
OF SEMIOTICS
(1990) (provid-

comprehensive overview of the vast field of semiotic
ing a comprehensive
semiotic research).
research).
131
MALLOY,
supra note
id. at 32-33. Because semiotics
semiotics examines the pro131
MALLOY, supra
note 10, at 29; see id.
development of much constructionist,
cess of knowing, it enabled
enabled the development
constructionist, postmodern,
postmodem, and
deconstructionist thought. See Hall, supra
supra note 54, at 36 ("The underlying argument
deconstructionist
argument behind the [Saussurian]
approach is that,
that, since all cultural objects convey
[Saussurianl semiotic approach
convey meaning,
.... "); id.
id. at
and all cultural practices depend on meaning, they must make
make use of signs ....
30-39. Hall further links semiotics to the formation and circulation
circulation of power through
id. at 41-51.
discursive formations and practices. See id.
41-51. Moreover,
Moreover, some law and
and semiotics
scholars have argued
IlA, is linked
argued that the critical
critical legal studies movement, see infra
infra Part 1I1.A,
linked
SeeJ.M.
Balkin, The Promise
REv. 1831
directly to semiotics. See
J.M. Balkin,
Promise of Legal Seniotics,
Semiotics, 69 TEx.
TEX. L. REV.
Politics of Legal
Legal Semiotics,
Semiotics, 69 TEx.
Rxv. 1779 (1991).
(1991). Analo(1991); Jeremy Paul, The Politics
TEX. L. REv.
Article is to develop further connections
connections between semiotics
gously, one of the goals of this Article
and critical
contribute to fields of scholarship.
critical race
race theory that may contribute
scholarship.
132
See
MALLOY, supra
10, at
at 61-69
note 10,
(arguing that
that the
132
See MALLOY,
supra note
61-69 (arguing
the study of
of "the
"the relationship
relationship
between law and market theory...
between
theory ... should...
should ... focus on the implications and consequences
consequences
relational exchange," and that the exchange
exchange process is "reciprocal,"
of relational
"reciprocal," "integrative," "dynamic," and "situational").
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semiotic interpretation
interpretation of the legal term, or, semiThus, Peircian
Peircian semiotic
133 good faith
faith illustrates that it lacks a single
otically speaking, "sign,"
"sign,"133
true meaning. Contractual
Contractual good faith may mean one thing to a critical race scholar, another to a conventional
conventional law and economics
economics scholar,
and another to a law and market economy
economy scholar. A practicing
practicing commercial lawyer, depending on his client's
problem,
will
argue for a
client's problem,
judicial
or
judicial definition of good faith that is consistent
consistent with one, all, or
none of those scholarly
scholarly interpretations. The production
production of meaning,
and of legal meaning
meaning in particular, is relational
relational in nature, and the
meaning
meaning of any given sign, such as good faith, is subject to constantly
shifting interpretations.
interpretations. This indeterminacy
indeterminacy is exemplified
exemplified by the theoretical
between Burton and Summers over the proper
proper formuoretical debate between
lation
of
a
standard
of
good
faith.
lation
Although extreme applications
applications of this principle
principle of indetermi134
nacy
nacyl34
may lead ultimately
ultimately to the destabilization
destabilization of various legal doctrines and concepts, those engaged in Peircian
Peircian semiotics would not
135
employ such extreme applications.
In this respect, Peircian semioscholars perhaps share something
something in common:
ticians and critical race scholars
a refusal to forgo legal reform as a vehicle for progressive social
change. Peircian semiotics recognizes
recognizes certain limitations
limitations on interpretation, which exist because meaning is not only relational
relational in nature,
36
37
but also experiential1136
and communal.1I37
That is, meaning refer3
Thus, for example, good faith may have a particences community.1138
ular descriptive
descriptive or normative meaning
community of critical race
meaning to a community
race
scholars,
scholars, who would generally agree that good faith does and should
conduct in the contracting
contracting process. Meaning also refprohibit racist conduct
ref-

133
note 130,
130, at
at 42
(describing Peirce's
Peirce's "sign
as consisting
consisting of
133 See
See NOTH,
NOTH, supra
supra note
42 (describing
"sign model
model as
of aa
signified, cognition
cognition produced
mind' (internal quotation
sign, thing signified,
produced in the min{['
quotation
triple connection of sign,
id. at 79-91 (discussing generally
generally the concept
concept of sign);
also UMBERTO Eco,
omitted)); id.
sign); see also
Eco,
LANGUAGE 14-45 (1984)
(discussing signs); MALLOY,
MALLOY,
SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
(1984) (discussing
supra note 10, at 29-36 (providing
concept
supra
(providing a brief overview of semiotics
semiotics and
and discussing the concept
sign).
of sign).
134
infra Part
III.A (discussing critical legal
scholarship's focus on the indetermi134 See
See infra
Part ULA
legal scholarship's
nacy of legal rules).
rules).
135
See,
e.g., MALLOY,
MALLOY, supra
supra note
135
See, e.g.,
note 10, at
at 161 ("A second weakness in the critical
critical approach
[to law]
recognize that all complex systems, including
including the market
market
law] is that it typically fails to recognize
exchange process, are...
exchange
are ... determinate in some respects (habit and convention based),
based), and
indeterminate in other respects
creative discovery).");
discovery).");
indeterminate
respects (influenced by chance, surprise, and creative
see also
also UMBERTO
INTERPRETATION 37-41 (1990)
UMBERTO Eco, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION
(1990) (arguing that, although Peircian
Peircian semiotics may welcome
welcome the notion
notion of "unlimited semiosis" by the interpreter, "the process of semiosis produces
produces in the long run a socially shared
shared notion
notion of the
thing that the community
community is engaged to take as if it were in itself true").
136
See
at 67,
67, 76.
76.
136
See MALLOY,
MALLOY, supra
supra note
note 10,
10, at
137
See
Eco,
supra
note
135,
at
40-41.
137 See Eco, supra note 135, at 40-41.
138 See
See MALLOY,
at 46,
46, 57-77.
57-77.
138
MALLOY, supra
supra note
note 10,
10, at
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history, 1' 9 which suggests, for
for
erences experience and, by extension, history,13V
example,
that
Black
or
female
consumers
example,
consumers who have negotiated contracts for the purchase of new cars may believe that the particular contracting process is infected with bad faith conduct, while their White
14
and
male counterparts may disagree. 14o
In short, Malloy's semiotic
and male
reinterpretation of law and economics takes account of politics, comreinterpretation
141
culture.141
and culture.
munity, and

Malloy's semiotic critique of the dominant role of efficiency in
law and economics
economics discourse takes issue primarily with the overly "de-

terminate
efficiency calculus situated firmly "within a
terminate process" of an efficiency
convention, and
static and closed environment" and based on "habit, convention,
42
continuity."'
That
is,
Malloy
continuity."142
takes issue not with the role of effimotivator of wealth formation, but rather with
ciency as the principal motivator
the fact that it dominates
dominates economic legal analysis in a manner inconsocioeconomic reality.
sistent with the shifting
shifting and dynamic
dynamic nature
nature of socioeconomic
From a semiotic
semiotic perspective,
efficiency-driven interpreperspective, the dominant, efficiency-driven
imperfect lens through
tive model
model is an inadequate
inadequate or at best imperfect
through which to
exchanges because
evaluate the market and
and market exchanges
because it fails to give pri119
See Hall,
Hall, supra
note 54,
54, at
at 41-44
41-44 (arguing
(arguing that power
13V
See
supra note
power circulates
circulates through the production of
knowledge, which
tion
of knowledge,
which in turn depends
depends on who is historically
historically situated to engage
engage in
certain discursive
discursive practices).
practices).
140
Ian Ayres
has explored
explored in
in great
depth the
the phenomenon
in retail
retail
140
Ian
Ayres has
great depth
phenomenon of
of discrimination
discrimination in
car
negotiations. See Ian Ayres, Fair
Fair Driving:
Gender and
and Race Discrimination
Retail Car
car negotiations.
Driving: Gender
Discrimination in Retail
Negotiations, 104
HARV. L.
L. REV.
REV. 817
FurtherEvidence
ro4 HARV.
817 (1991);
(1991); Ian
Ian Ayres, Further
Evidence of Discrimination
Discrimination in
Negotiations,
New Car
Cause, 94 MICH.
(1995).
New
Car Negotiations
Negotiations and
and Estimates
A'stimates of
of Its Cause,
MICH. L. REv. 109
109 (1995).
141
"Culture"
difficult to
141
"Culture" is
is difficult
to define,
define, because
because its meaning is dependent
dependent on context. Stuart
Hall,
art Hall, aa pioneer
pioneer of
of cultural studies, provides a simplified definition
definition of
of the term
term as it
it is
used
used in this Article:
Article:
In
years, and
and in
In recent
recent years,
in aa more 'social
'social science'
science' context, the word 'culture'
'culture' is
used
'way of life'
used to refer
refer to whatever is distinctive
distinctive about the
the 'way
life' of a people,
community,
community, nation
nation or
or social group. This has come to be known
known as
as the 'an'anthropological'
thropological' definition. Alternatively, the word can be used
used to describe
the
society-which is like the
the 'shared
'shared values'
values' of a group or of society-which
the anthropological
cal definition,
definition, only
only with a more sociological
sociological emphasis....
emphasis ....
What
'cultural turn'
What has
has come
come to be called
called the 'cultural
turn' in the social and
and human
human
sciences
sciences .
. .
. ..has
has tended
tended to
to emphasize
emphasize the
the importance
importance of meaning
meaning to the
definition
definition of
of culture.
culture. Culture
Culture ...
... is not so
so much a set
set of
of things-novels
things-novels and
and
paintings
paintings or
or TV
TV programmes
programmes and
and comics-as
comics-as aa process,
process, a set of
of practices.
practices.
Primarily,
Primarily, culture
culture is
is concerned
concerned with
with the
the production
production and
and the exchange
exchange of
of
meanings-the
meaning'-between the members
a
meanings-the 'giving
'giving and
and taking
taking of
ofmeaning'-between
members of
ofa
society
or group.
society or
group. To
To say
say that
that two people
people belong
belong to
to the
the same
same culture
culture is
is to
say that
that they interpret
interpret the world
world in roughly
roughly the
the same ways
ways and
and can
can express
themselves,
and feelings
their thoughts
thoughts and
feelings about
about the world, in ways
ways which
which will
will
themselves, their
be understood
depends on its participants
understood by each other. Thus culture depends
participants interpreting
terpreting meaningfully
meaningfully what
what is happening
happening around
around them,
them, and
and 'making
'making
sense'
sense' of the world, in broadly
broadly similar ways.
ways.
Stuart
REPRESENTATIONS AND
Stuart Hall,
Hall, Introduction
Introduction to
to REPRESENTATION:
REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL
CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS
AND SIGNIFYING
SIGNIFVING
PRACTICES,
PRACflCES, supra
supra note
note 54,
54, at
at 1,
1, 2.
142
142 MALLOY,
MALLOY, supra
supra note
note 10,
ro, at
at 2-3
2-3 (citing
(citing ISRAEL
ISRAEL M.
M. KIRZNER,
KIRZN~:R, THE
THE MEANING
MEANING OF
OF MARKET
MARKET
PROCESS
1-54
(1992)).
PROCESS I-54 (1992)).
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macy to the dynamic nature of market choice, which is grounded in
43
disincentives.1143
and disincentives.
how decision makers interpret incentives and
reinterpretive turn that emphasizes
emphasizes the indeindeTaking the Peircian reinterpretive
of meaning, Malloy emphasizes creativity as the linchpin of
of
terminacy of
wealth formation because it is "grounded in an
an environment
environment of potentiality, of discontinuity, and indeterminacy"144-i.e.,
indeterminacy"144-i.e., because it recognizes the shifting nature of interpretive
interpretive processes. Yet, because
Peircian semiotics also teaches that the interpretation
interpretation of meaning,
histhough indeterminate, is limited by communal, experiential, and hisconstructs of meaning, the semiotic creative process is intorical constructs
formed by "an ethical environment
environment of social responsibility" that is
is
14 5
evolving.
constantly
145
Malloy also challenges
challenges the way in which the discourse of law and
and
146
understanding of market choice. 146
economics creates a certain understanding
He
exposes, in theoretical terms, a near-universal
near-universal commonsense
commonsense underunderstanding:
standing: that market actors
actors are not necessarily rational and objective,
objective,
pseudo-scientific,
that they may not always make choices based on pseudo-scientific,
cost-benefit
what
cost-benefit analyses, and that they may not necessarily agree on what
47 Although
constitutes
constitutes a cost or a benefit. 1147
Although market choice may be informed in part by a cold cost-benefit
cost-benefit analysis, it is more significantly
informed
experiences as participants
informed by "our experiences
participants in dynamic networks
48
and patterns
patterns of social intercourse.'
intercourse."148
Simply stated, if deals that are
efficient
in
terms
of
the
bottom
line
are
not always fair to the individuefficient
als and communities
communities they
they affect, why should the bottom
bottom line matter
matter
more than what
fair?
what is fair?
Malloy
Malloy does not claim that efficiency
efficiency analysis
analysis has no role to play
interpretation of the market, or that other methods should rein the interpretation
1499 After
place
efficiency analysis. 14
place efficiency
Mter all, the concepts
concepts associated
associated with
with
traditional
significant space within legal
traditional law and economics
economics occupy
occupy significant
discourse. Rather, Malloy
efficiency analysis should not
Malloy claims that efficiency
not
have
a
dominant
role
in
the
study
of
market
theory
and
the
exchange
have
market theory
1 50
process. 150
Malloy's
Malloy's semiotic
semiotic model of law and market
market economy,
economy, together
together
with critical
critical race interpretations
interpretations of what the law means for people
people of
of
color, guides
guides this Article's
Article's critique
critique of the existing
existing models of
of contractual good
good faith. It is not the Article's
Article's objective
objective to propose a replace143
143
144
144
145
145
146
146

147
147

148

148

149
149
150
150

See
See id. at
at 2-4.
2-4.
Id.
Id. at
at 33 (citations
(citations omitted).
omitted).
Id.
Id.
See
See id.
id. at
at 3-4.
3-4.
See
11 and
See id.
id. at
at 57-77;
57-77; supra
supra note
note 11
and accompanying
accompanying text.
MALLOY, supra note 10, at 4.
MALLOY, supra note 10, at 4.
See
See id.
id. at
at 3.
3.
See
See id.
id.
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ment for the current excluder analysis model of good faith, but rather
rather
to suggest a justifiable
justifiable addition
addition to its meaning.
III
CRITICAL
FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS
CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THEORY: FOUNDATIONAL

A.

History and Guiding Principles

5 1 scholar,
LatCrit1l51
Francisco Valdes, a notable
notable critical race and LatCrit
52
has aptly termed critical race theory "social justice scholarship."
scholarship."' 152
As
screen
such, critical race
race theory provides an important additional screen
through which to filter the doctrine of good faith. Although
Although critical
race scholarship originated in and continues
continues to grow primarily
primarily out of
of
the legal academy, it is interdisciplinary
interdisciplinary insofar as the disciplines from
which it draws are concerned
concerned with sociopolitical
sociopolitical and socioeconomic
socioeconomic
15
3
racial inequality.153
inequality.
Thus, there is no single, unifying
unifying methodology
154 In
for engaging in critical race analysis. 154
fact, this lack of a single
155
methodology
methodology is one of critical race theory's
theory'S enduring
enduring features.
features. 155
Critical race theory emerged in the 1980s
1980s as a response by progressive scholars
scholars of color to the critical legal studies (CLS) move15 6 The CLS movement originated in the late
ment.
1970s as a
ment.156

151
Although it
it is
is difficult
difficult to
to define
define singularly LatCrit theory, Valdes
151 Although
Valdes has defined it
generally as "the emerging
examines critically
generally
emerging field of legal
legal scholarship
scholarship that examines
critically the social and
legal positioning
positioning of Latinas/os, especially Latinas/os within the United States, to help recForeword:
tify the shortcomings of existing
existing social and legal conditions."
conditions." Francisco
Francisco Valdes, Foreword:
Under Construction-LatCrit
Construction-LatCritConsciousness,
Consciousness, Community,
Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1089
Under
n.2 (1997),
(1997), 10
L.J. 1,3
1, 3 n.2 (1998);
(1998); see also Iglesias,
supra note 124
RAZA LJ.
Iglesias, supra
124 (reconceptualiz(reconceptualiz10 LA RAZA
ing the notion
notion of "community" and its role in the LatCrit movement).
152 Francisco
Valdes, Afterword:
Sexual Orientation
Queer Legal
Theory: MajoritarMajoritar152
Francisco Valdes,
Afterword: Beyond
Beyond Sexual
Orientation in
in Queer
Legal Theory:
ianism,
and Responsibility
Legal Scholars
ian
ism, Multidimensionality,
Multidimensionality, and
Responsibility in Social Justice
Justice Scholarship
Scholarship or Legal
Scholars as
Cultural Warriors,
Warriors, 75 DENV.
DENY. U. L. REv.
REV. 1409
1409 passim
(1998).
Cultural
passim (1998).
153
suggest that
153
I1 suggest
that the
the vast
vast body
body of
of critical
critical race scholarship incorporates
incorporates and
and synthesizes
political philosophy, science, sociology,
sociology, critical
critical legal studies, feminist theory,
aspects of political
cultural and ethnic
ethnic studies, semiotics, literary studies, postmodernfeminist legal theory, cultural
ism, poststructuralism,
poststructuralism, and postcolonialism.
postcolonialism. This list, I am certain, is nowhere
nowhere near
near
complete.
complete.
154 See
See Chantal
Chantal Thomas,
Thomas, Critical
CriticalRace Theory and Postcolonial
154
Postcolonial Development
Droelopment Theory: ObservaObscroations on Methodology,
Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV.
tions
REV. 1195
1195 (2000) (identifying
(identifying four strands of critical methodology
have been deployed
deployed by some critical race scholars).
odology that have
155
See Introduction
to CRITICAL
CRrncAL RACE
RACE THEORY:
THE CUTI"ING
CUrrING EDGE,
155
See
Introduction to
THEORV: Tm:
EDGE, at xiii, xiv-xv (Richard Delgado
1995) [hereinafter
[hereinafter CUTI"ING
CU-rINc. EDGE];
EDGE];Introduction
Delgado ed., 1995)
Introduction to CRrTCAL
CRITICAL RACE
RACE THEORY:
THEORV:
THE KEv
KEY WRITINGS THAT
T1E MOVEMENT,
(Kimberl6 Crenshaw
THE
THAT FORMED
FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, at xiii, xiii (Kimberle
Crenshaw et al.
al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter
[hereinafter KEY
K),."¥ WRITINGS].
156
discussion of
of critical
race theory
is inin11'6 An
An excellent
excellent discussion
of the
the historical
historical development
development of
critical race
theory is
cluded
CriticalRace Theory: The Key Writings,
cluded in the introduction
introduction to Critical
Writings, one of two critical race
CUTT7INc. EDGE,
EDCE, supra
supra note 155;
theory readers published in 1995. See CUlTING
155; KEY
KEv WRrrINGS,
WRITINGS, supra
supra
note 155,
155, at xix-xxvii. These two readers are of particular importance because
because they were
compiled
compiled and edited
edited by some of the founders
founders of and key contributors to critical
critical race
scholarship.
scholarship.
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derivative
1930s
derivative of Legal Realism, 157
157 whose followers in the 1920s and 1930s
158
and
law and its application
oflaw
application as overly formalistic I 58 and
criticized the rule of
criticized
system
objectivity' 5 9 a legal system
as cloaking in the myths of neutrality and objectivityl59
16°
1
that in reality was driven by policy, economics, and politics.
politics. 160
The
Realists sometimes manifested this critique in the form of "rule skepticism," which recognized
appear to
recognized that legal rules are "not what they appear
16
be."161
be."
' In more concrete terms, the Realists argued that the formaliscreated an illusion of certainty
certainty that
tic notion of the rule of law created
masked the unspoken social and political assumptions guiding
guiding much
much
judicial decision making. 162 The exposure
exposure of this illusion of certainty
See KEY
WRITINGS, supra
note 155,
at xvii-xxvii;
xvii-xxvii; ROBERTO
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
MANGABEIRA UNGER,
See
KEY WRITINGS,
supra note
155, at
UNGER, THE
THE
(1983).
(1983).
158 See
See UNGER,
UNGER, supra
157, at
at 1.
1. In
In The
The Critical
Legal Studies
Studies Movement,
Movement, Unger
was
158
supra note
note 157,
Critical Legal
Unger was
careful
careful to define
define that which
which he critiqued. Of "formalism" he wrote:
...is a commitment
commitment to, and therefore
Formalism ...
therefore also a belief in the possibility of,
of, a method of legal
open-ended dislegal justification that contrasts with open-ended
putes about
about the basic terms of social
social life, disputes
disputes that people call
conflicts fall far short of the
ideological, philosophical, or visionary. Such conflicts
inference and argument
closely guarded canon
canon of inference
argument that the formalist claims
claims
impersonal purposes, policies,
policies, and
and
for legal analysis. This formalism holds impersonal
components of legal reasoning.
principles to be indispensable
indispensable components
157
157

CRITICAL
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
STUDIES MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT 1-2

[d.
Id.
159
159

See
"objectivism," Unger
See id.
id. at 1-2. Of "objectivism."
Unger wrote:
materials-the system
system
Objectivism
Objectivism is the belief that the authoritative
authoritative legal materials-the
of statutes, cases, and
and accepted
accepted legal ideas-embody
ideas-embody and sustain
sustain a defensihuman association. They display, though
though always imperfectly,
ble scheme of human
Alternatively they show the results of practical
intelligible moral order. Alternatively
an intelligible
life-constraints such
constraints upon social life-constraints
constraints
such as those of economic
economic efficonstant human desires, have a normaciency-that, taken
taken together
together with constant
tive force. The laws
laws are not merely
merely the outcome
outcome of contingent
contingent power
power
practical pressures lacking in rightful authority.
struggles or of practical
Id. at 2.
[d.
160
160
161
161

See
at 1-4.
1-4.
See id.
id. at
Brian
INTRODUCTION 29-30
MARK
PHILOSOPHY OF
OF LAw:
LAw: AN
MARK TEBBIT,
TEBBIT, PHILOSOPHY
AN INTRODUCTION
29-30 (2000);
(2000); see
see also
also Brian

Leiter, Rethinking Legal
Legal Realism: Toward a NaturalizedJurisprudence,
NaturalizedJurisprudence,76 TEX. L. REv.
REv. 267, 275
based
(1997) (noting that "the Core Claim of Legal
(1997)
Legal Realism is that judges
judges reach
reach decisions
decisions based
on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case").
case").
162 See
See TEBBIT,
supra note
161, at 26-29. As Justice Holmes famously observed:
162
TEBBlT, supra
note 161,
What constitutes
constitutes the law? You will
will find some text writers telling you that it
is something
something different
different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts
or England,
England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction
deduction from princimay or may not coinnot, which mayor
ples
ples of ethics or admitted axioms or what not,
cide
cide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man
we shall
shall find that he does not care
care two straws for the axioms or deductions,
but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts
Massachusetts or English
English courts
courts are
prophecies of what the
likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The
The prophecies
courts
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law.
(1897). Karl Llewellyn,
Law, 10 HARV. L. REv.
O.W. Holmes,Jr., The Path
Path of the Law,
REV. 457, 460-61 (1897).
Llewellyn,
commercial law
among the most important
important and well known of the Realists, also argued that commercial
developed into its modern,
stabilized state not because it embodied and formalistically
developed
modern, stahilized
particularized social and economic
enacted
enacted a set of legal rules, but because particularized
economic circumstances
circumstances
compelled
compelled the judicial creation
creation of a body of law that developed into a coherent
coherent doctrine.
Legal Scholarship,
Bush: From
From Legal Realism to Critical
CriticalLegal
'Round and
and 'Round
'Round the Bramble
Bramble Bush:
See Note, 'Round
Scholarship,
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led to Realist pronouncements
pronouncements of the indeterminate
indeterminate nature of the
163
law. 163
Critical legal scholars
scholars (crits) pushed the Realist critique
critique of fordeconstruction
malism and objectivity
objectivity to its outer limits through their deconstruction
law,164
of the law,
164 whereby they described the law not only as political, but
also as so indeterminate
indeterminate that no rational
rational normative structure
structure could be
16 5
165
it. Further, through their methodology
imposed upon it.
methodology of delegitimation, a process by which they destabilized
destabilized the legitimacy
legitimacy of basic
1 66
and
legal
order,
the
crits
argued
generally that the
legal concepts
concepts
order,166
generally
law not only is not objective and not neutral, but that it is indetermi1 67
68
nate, political, ideological,
ideological,167
and hegemonic.
hegemonic. 168
For example,
example, Ro95 HARV.
HARV. L. REV.
1671-73 (1982)
(1982) (discussing Karl Llewellyn,
On Warranty
REV. 1669, 1671-73
Llewellyn, On
Warranty of Quality,
Quality,
and Society (pts. 1 &
2), 36 COLUM. L. REV.
37 COLUM.
COLUM. L. REV.
(1937)).
& 2),
REv. 699 (1936),
(1936),37
REV. 341 (1937)).
163
See TEBBIT,
supra note
note 161,
161, at
163
See
TEBBIT, sujJTa
at 26-32.
26-32.
164
The
practice of
deconstruction, itself
itself an
outgrowth of
an outgrowth
poststructuralism, "disman"disman164
The practice
of deconstruction,
of poststructuralism,
tle[s] the structures of meaning so as to expose
expose the premises
premises on
on which they are built and to
tIers]
reveal the concepts
concepts of objectivity
objectivity and linguistic autonomy as constructs ....
.... Deconstructive
critical
.. ."
."KEy CONCEPTS IN CULTURAL THEORY
relations ..
critical practices
practices seek to identify power relations
108, 109
& Peter Sedgwick
Sedgwick eds.,
supra note 54 (discussing
109 (Andrew Edgar &
eds., 1999); see also supra
(discussing this
Article's use of the related
"discourse").
related term "discourse").
165
See, e.g.,
e.g., Fiss,
Fiss, supra
note 65,
9-10; see
also UNGER,
118-19 (ac165
See,
supra note
65, at
at 9-10;
see also
UNGER, supra
supra note 157, at 118-19
knowledging
... between the reach of our
our
suggests a "formidable gap ...
knowledging that his view of CLS suggests
intellectual
commitments and the many severe constraints
our
intellectual and
and political
political commitments
constraints upon our
situation").
situation") .
166
For
example of such
166
For an
an example
such an analysis in a particular
particular context, see the discussion
discussion of
of
antidiscrimination law, infra
infra Part III.A.I.
Alan David Freeman's critique of antidiscrimination
III.A.1.
167
understanding of
of the
the term
term "ideology"
inadequate with
with respect
to
167 The
The common
common understanding
"ideology" is
is inadequate
respect to
critical theory and this Article. Because
ideology
embodies
the
ideas
of
the
dominant
Because ideology
dominant class,
its definition
definition suggests that
our
...is determined
our understanding
understanding and knowledge
knowledge of the world ...
determined by political
and certain ways of seeing the
cal interests. There are certain beliefs, and
world, that will be in the interests of the dominant class (but
(but not in the
interests
interests of subordinate classes).
classes). For example,
example, it was in the interests of the
dominant
dominant class in feudalism to believe
believe in the divine right of kings....
kings .... The
The
dominant
dominant class is able to propagate its ideas throughout
throughout society due to its
control
communication and education
control of various forms of communication
education (such as the
mass media, the church
church and schools).
schools).
KEY
CULTURAL THEORY,
KEy CONCEPTS IN
IN CULTURAL
THEORY, supra
supra note 164, at 190 (emphasis omitted). Yet, ideology does not necessarily
necessarily dictate that subordinate
subordinate classes exist obliviously in a state
shared
state of shared
id. This essentially
evolved
false consciousness. See id.
essentially Marxist, class-based
class-based view of ideology
ideology evolved
through
the efforts
through the
efforts of those like sociologist Karl Mannheim, whose work postulated
postulated the
simultaneous coexistence
coexistence of multiple ideologies-multiple
simultaneous
ideologies-multiple systems framing how different
different
people
within a society and different people from different societies understand the world
world
people within
and
another. See
to one
See id.
id. at
at 190-91.
190-91. Antonio Gramsci
and relate
relate to
one another.
Gramsci further developed the notion of ideology
id. at 164-65;
164-65; infra
infra note 168.
ideology through his theory of hegemony. See id.
1118 The term "hegemony" was developed
168
developed primarily
primarily by the Italian
Italian neo-Marxist
neo-Marxist Antonio
Gramsci
Gramsci in the early twentieth century
century "to explain the control
control of the dominant
dominant class in
in
contemporary capitalism."
IN CULTURAL
sufra note
contemporary
capitalism." KEY
KEy CONCEPTS
CONCEPTS IN
CULTURAL THEORY,
THEORY, sujJTa
note 164, at 164 (emphasis omitted).
phasis
omitted). Gramsci's theory of hegemony explains that, because
because the dominant class
"cannot maintain control simply through the use of violence or force," it must implement
"cannot
maintain control simply through the use of violence or force," it must implement
other
cultural and sociopolitical
sociopolitical apparatuses based on consent. See id.
other cultural
id. at 164-65.
164-65. The
consent-based apparatuses
apparatuses and institutions used at various
consent-based
various levels in society to disseminate
the
dominant ideology
include civil
jurisprudence, education,
education, the church,
the dominant
ideology include
civil rights
rights jurisprudence,
church, the me-
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Mangabeira Unger
berto Mangabeira
Unger has rejected
rejected both the law and economics
characterizes as addressing
movement (which he characterizes
addressing the private domain
and "serv[ing] the political right") and the rights and principles
principles movement (which he characterizes
characterizes as addressing the public domain and
and
serving "the liberal center") as mere "re'statements
and
"restatements of objectivism and
69
formalism." 169
formalism."1
Although certain scholars of color in the late 1970s
1970s and early
1980s aligned
themselves with the crits'
aligned themselves
crits' deconstructionist
deconstructionist and delegitimizing agenda, they became
became dissatisfied with the crits' failure to acknowledge, and to locate
locate centrally, White supremacy and a
hegemony within critimeaningful critique of racial power
power and racial hegemony
70 Thus, critical race theory developed over time
cal legal discourse.
discourse.'17o
developed
conscious intervention on the left,"171
left," 171 that is,
in order
order to effect a "race conscious
on the critical
critical legal
legal studies movement itself. These scholars,
scholars, or "race
crits," sought to interrogate "how law was a constitutive element
element of
of
race itself," and to "uncover ...
...how law constructed
constructedrace."172
race."'17 2 Uncoverconstruction of race meant writing not only about
ing the legal construction
about consti73
tutional antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination and civil rights jurisprudence,1
but also
jurisprudence, 173
74
about other areas of law such as immigration,174
immigration,
the Japanese
Japanese AmeriAmeridia, and
and family. See id.
id. at 164. Although
Although Gramsci's theory of hegemony depends on consent, the transmission
transmission of the dominant ideology
ideology is not simply imposed
imposed on duped classes
classes of
of
nonelites; rather, the messages embedded in the dominant
dominant ideology
ideology are negotiated between the classes in their
their transmission.
transmission. See id.
id. at 164-65. In the field of cultural studies,
studies,
"facilitated
hegemony has been especially significant because it has "facilitated
Gramsci's theory of hegemony
and
analysis of the ways in which subordinate
subordinate groups actively respond to and resist political and
economic domination. The subordinate
economic
subordinate groups
groups need
need not then be seen merely as the pasideology." Id.
Id. at 165 (emphasis
(emphasis omitted).
omitted).
sive dupes of the dominant class and its ideology."
169
UNGER,
157, at
at 12.
characterizes the
rights and
and principles
169
UNGER, supra
supra note
note 157,
12. Unger
Unger also
also characterizes
the rights
principles
symptomatic
movement and the law and economics
economics movement as "the most influential
influential and symptomatic
legal theories in America
] at the margin of high power."
America today," whose advocates
advocates "stand[ 1
Id.
Id.
WRITINGS, supra
note 155,
at xxii-xxiii.
xxii-xxiii.
170 KEY
KEY WRITINGS,
supra note
155, at
171
at
xxii.
171 Id.
Id. at xxii.
172
at xxv.
172 Id.
Id. at
xxv.
173
See, e.g.,
BELL, AND
AND WE
ARE NOT
SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST
QUEST FOR
RACIAL
173
See,
e.g., DERRICK
DERRICK BELL,
WE ARE
NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE
FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE
(1987);
Derrick
A.
Bell,
Jr.,
Brown
v.
Board
of
Education
and
the
Interest-Convergence
JUSTICE (1987); Derrick
Bell,Jr., Brown
Education
Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980);
(1980); Kimberl6
Dilemma,
KimberIe Williams
Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
Transformationand Legitimation
Legitimation in
in Antidiscrimination
trenchment:
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988);
Scholar:Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
(1988); Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Imperial Scholar:
Literature,
132 U. PA. L. REv.
REV. 561 (1984); Alan David Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial
Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination
Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination
AntidiscriminationLaw: A Critical
CriticalReview of Supreme
Supreme Court
Court Doctrine,
Through
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978).
(1978).
174
See, e.g.,
IAN F.
F. HANEY
By LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
174
See,
e.g., IAN
HANEY LOPEZ,
L6PEZ, WHITE
WHITE BY
(1996); Elvia
LatCrit Theory, International
InternationalHuman
Culture, and
and the
(1996);
Elvia R. Arriola, LatCrit
Human Rights,
Rights, Popular
Popular Culture,
Faces
Kateri
Faces of Despair
Despair in INS Raids,
Raids, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
INTER-AM. L. REV.
REv. 245 (1996-97);
(1996-97); Tanya Katerf
Herndndez,
and Class
Hernandez, The Construction
Construction of Race and
Class Buffers in the Structure
Structure of Immigration
Immigration Controls
Controls
and Laws,
Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731 (1997);
(1997); Kevin R. Johnson, Race,
Race, the Immigration
and
Immigration Laws,
Laws, and
Domestic Race Relations:
Relations: A "Magic
"Magic Mirror"
Darkness, 73 IND.
1111I (1998);
(1998);
Mirror" into the Heart
Heart of
of Darkness,
IND. L.J.
LJ. 111
Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles,
Chronicles, My Grandfather's
Immigration Law: The Slave
Grandfather's Stories,
Stories, and Immigration
Traders
Chronicle as Racial
History, 34 ST. LOUIS
Louis U. LJ.
L.J. 425 (1990).
(1990).
Traders Chronicle
Racial History,
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5 criminal justice,' 76 hate
can internment,
internment,17
175
criminal justice, 176
speech and hate crimes, I177
77
178
affirmative
action,
affirmative action,178
and even the ways in which biographies
biographies of Su179
ideology. 179
racial ideology.
hegemonic racial
and hegemonic
race and
preme
preme Courtjustices
Court justices construct
construct race
Moreover, because the race crits, unlike their crit predecessors,
predecessors, did
not view
ineffective vehicle for progresview legal reform as a doomed and ineffective
sive change, they set out to translate, proactively and pragmatically,
their theoretical
theoretical discoveries into a program for the elimination of ra180
cial subordination.
subordination. 180
Although critical race scholarship
scholarship employs no single methodology, some unifying
themes
and
concepts
unifying
concepts have developed over the past
past
twenty-five
twenty-five years. First, critical race theory seeks
seeks to expose the entrenchment
continued subtrenchment of White
White supremacy and the reality of the continued
ordination of people
people of color in the United States (and throughout
throughout
t8 2
81
I81
law. 182
rule
the
with
relationship
its
to
unravel
and
),
the world'
world
with the rule of
of law.
More specifically, race crits examine
examine how racial power constitutes and
and
reproduces itself through the apparatuses
apparatuses of law and culture.
reproduces
culture. Second,
race crits are not satisfied with merely naming and understanding
their observations
observations and discoveries;
discoveries; they also are committed to transbetween law and hegemonic
hegemonic racial power in
in
forming the relationship
relationship between
8 3order to destabilize that power.'
power. 183
Third, like critical
critical legal scholars,
race crits continue
continue to reject notions of objectivity and neutrality
neutrality in the
law, and the idea that legal scholarship
scholarship can and should be so charac84
terized. 1184
Thus, race crits frequently
frequently and self-consciously situate
situate their
work in a specific
specific cultural, historical, institutional, and political
political con-

175
See, e.g.,
EIK K.
K. YAMAMOTO
ET AL.,
RACE, RIGHTS
LAW AND
AND THE
175
See,
e.g., ERIK
YAMAMOTO ET
AL., RACE,
RIGHTS AND
AND REPARATION:
REPARATION: LAw
THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
(2001).
JAPANESE
INTERNMENT (2001).
176
See, e.g.,
e.g., Paul
Paul Butler,
Butler, Racially
Racially BasedJury
BasedJury Nullification:
Black Power
in the
the Criminal
CriminalJustice
176
See,
Nullification: Black
Power in
Justice
System, 105
YALE
LJ.
677
(1995);
AngelaJ.
and Race: The Power
105
Angela]. Davis, Prosecution
Prosecution and
Power and
and Privilege
Privilege
of
FORD-IAM L. REV. 13 (1998);
of Discretion,
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
(1998); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense:
Toward a Normative
Normative Conception
Reasonableness, 81 MINN.
(1996); Tracey L.
Toward
Conception of Reasonableness,
MINN. L. REV.
REV. 367 (1996);
Meares, Social
Social Organization
Organization and
and Drug
Drug Law Enforcement,
Enforcement, 35 AM.
AM. CRIM.
CRIM. L. REV.
REV. 191 (1998).
(1998).
177
See,
MARl J.
ET AI..,
AL., WORDS
WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY,
177
See, e.g.,
e.g.; MARl
J. MATSUDA
MATSUDA ET
WORDS THAT
THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, AsAsSAUL rIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
(1993); Charles
I1l, If
If He Hollers
SAULTIVE
FIRST AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT (1993);
Charles R. Lawrence III,
Hollers
Let
Racist Speech on Campus,
Campus, 1990
Let Him Go: Regulating
Regulating Racist
1990 DUKE
DUKE L.J.
LJ. 431.
178 See,
Richard Delgado,
Delgado, Ten
Against Affirmative
Action-How Valid?,
Valid?, 50
178
See, e.g.,
e.g., Richard
Ten Arguments
Arguments Against
Affirmative Action-How
50
AtA. L. REv.
REV. 135 (1998);
Critique of "Our
"Our Constitution
Constitution Is Color-Blind",
Color-Blind", 44
ALA.
(1998); Neil
Neil Gotanda, A
A Critique
STAN. L. REV.
Neither Black nor White:
and Affirmative
STAN.
REV. 11 (1991);
(1991); Frank
Frank H. Wu,
Wu, Neither
W'hite: Asian Americans and
Action, 15
THIRD WORLD
]5 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J.
LJ. 225 (1995).
(1995).
179 See
Sumi Cho,
Redeeming W'hiteness
Whiteness in
in the
the Shadow
Warren, Brown,
Brown,
179
See Sumi
Cho, Redeeming
Shadow of
of Internment:
Internment: Earl
tarl Warren,
and a Theory of Racial
Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REv.
REV. 73 (1998),
(1998), 19 B.C. THIRD
73
Racial Redemption,
THIRD WORLD L.J.
LJ. 73
(1998).
(1998).

180
See
KEY WRITINGS,
WRITINGS, supra
supra note
note 155,
xxxii.
180
See Kc'Y
155, at
at xiii-xvi,
xiii-xvi, xxxii.
181
See,
e.g.,
GLOBAL
CRITICAL
RACE
FEMINISM:
AN
INTERNATIONAL
181 See, e.g., GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER
READER

(Adrien KathKath(Adrien
erine Wing ed., 2000) (anthologizing writings on women's
women's legal rights around the world).
world).
182
See
CUTING EDGE,
EDGE, supra
note 155,
155, passim;
passim; KEy
KEY WRITINGS,
155, at
182
See CU'ITING
supra note
WRITINGS, supra
supra note
note 155,
at xiii.
xiii.
183 See
WRITINGS, supra
supra note
Crenshaw, supra
1349-69.
183
See KEY
KEy WRITINGS,
note 155,
155, at
at xiii;
xiii; Crenshaw,
supra note
note 173,
173, at
at 1349-69.
184
See
WRITINGS, supra
supra note
note
184
See KEY
KEY WRITINGS,

155,
supra note
173, at
1336-49.
155, at
at xiii;
xiii; Crenshaw,
Crenshaw, supra
note 173,
at 1336-49.
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185 In furtherance of their subversion of the notions of objectivity
text. 185
furtherance
subversion
and neutrality, race crits sometimes
sometimes deploy unorthodox rhetorical
strategies in their scholarship, such
such as the use of narrative,
narrative, to effect a
186
contextual
deconstruction
of
the
notion
of
objectivity.
Fourth, critcontextual deconstruction
186
simultaneously expresses
both a profound appreciaical race theory simultaneously
expresses both
tion for and a deep dissatisfaction with traditional civil rights
I877 The central
jurisprudence.
jurisprudence. 18
central proposition
proposition underlying this aspect of
critical
critical race scholarship is that racism and racist acts are not extraordinary in nature, but rather are quite ordinary.188
ordinary. 88 Because
Because conventional
civil rights jurisprudence,
antidiscrimination law, aims
jurisprudence, in the form of antidiscrimination
1 89
to prevent and remedy only extraordinary
extraordinary forms of racism,
racism,189
race
crits have argued that antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law is complicit
complicit in, and in
endurance of racial hegemonic
it
fact necessary
necessary to, the endurance
hegemonic power, because it
19
does little to reckon
pervasiveness of racism.
racism.'190
reckon with the pervasiveness
In effecting
effecting
this particular critique of conventional
conventional civil rights and antidiscrimination law, race crits have adopted and extended critical legal scholar
scholar
Alan David Freeman's
Freeman's "perpetrator-victim"
"perpetrator-victim" critique of antidiscrimination law, which is described in more detail below.

1.

Perpetrator-VictimCritique
Critique of Antidiscrimination
Overview: The Perpetrator-Victim
Antidiscrimination
Law
Law

perpetrator-victim
In 1978, Alan David Freeman
Freeman introduced his perpetrator-victim
antidiscrimination law, which
critique of traditional
traditional antidiscrimination
which asserted that
that the
then-existing antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination jurisprudence
effectively
legitimized
jurisprudence effectively legitimized
racial discrimination
discrimination because it developed
developed from a perpetrator, as op9°
perspective.' 191
Freeman
fundamental,
posed to a victim, perspective.
Freeman identified a fundamental,
positional
difference
between
the
perpetrator
and
victim
perspectives
positional difference between
perpetrator
on discrimination:
discrimination: the victim perspective
discrimination as a set
set
perspective views discrimination
of sociopolitical conditions imposed on the victim as a "member of a
perpetual underdass,"192
underclass,"1' 9 2 while the perpetrator
perpetrator perspective
perpetual
perspective sees discrimination
"not
as
conditions,
but
as
actions,
or
series of actions, incrimination
19 3
flicted on the victim by the perpetrator."193
perpetrator."
in
Thus, argued Freeman, in
185
185

See,
e.g., CUTrING
supra note
note 155,
155, at
at 1-36;
1-36; KEY
KEY WRITINGS,
WRITINGS, supra
supra note
note 155,
155, at
See, e.g.,
CUTTING EDGE,
EDGE, supra
at

supra note 173,
173, at 1369-87.
1369-87.
xxi-xxii; Crenshaw,
Crenshaw, supra
186 See,
e.g., CUTTING
CUTTING EDGE,
EDGE, supra
37-96.
186
See, e.g.,
supra note.
note. 155,
155, at
at 37-96.
187 See,
e.g., KEY
supra note
note 155,
155, at
at xiv,
5-57.
187
See, e.g.,
KEY WRITINGS,
WRITINGS, supra
xiv, 5-57.
188 See
id. at
xiv.
188
See id.
at xiv.
189 See
Eric K.
K Yamamoto,
Yamamoto, Critical
CriticalRace
Race Theary
Theory and
189
See Eric
Race Praxis:
Praxis: Race
and Political
Political Lauyering
Lawyering in
in PostPostCivil Rights America,
America, 95 MICH.
REV.821, 840 (1997)
"antidiscrimination law's
Civil
MICH. L. REV.
(1997) (criticizing
(criticizing "antidiscrimination
failure to address
cultural discrimination
discrimination and
and institutional
institutional racism").
racism").
failure
address cultural
190 See,
e.g., RICHARD
RICHARD DELGADO
DELGADO &JEAN
STEFANCIC, FAILED
FAILED REVOLUTIONS:
REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL
190
See, e.g.,
&JEAN STEFANCIC,
SOCIAL REFORM
REFORM
IMAGINATION passim
(1994); Bell,
supra note 173; Yamamoto,
AND THE LIMITS OF
OF LEGAL
LEGAL IMAGINATION
passim (1994);
Bell, supra
supra note 189,
189, at 847-48, 867-70.
191 See
Freeman, supra
173, at
1052-57.
191
See Freeman,
supra note
note 173,
at 1052-57.
192
Id.
at 1052-53.
1052-53.
192
[d. at
193 Id.
193
[d. at 1053.
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approaching the problem of racial discrimination, the victim perspective tends to focus more broadly on eliminating
eliminating the conditions
conditions enabling the continued
existence
of
racial
subordination,
continued
subordination, whereas
whereas the
perpetrator
"neutraliz[ing] the
perpetrator perspective focuses more narrowly on "neutraliz[ing]
94 and
inappropriate conduct
conduct of the perpetrator,"'
inappropriate
perpetrator,"194
pays little attention
attention
195
to the "overall life situation
of
the
victim
class."'
situation
class."195
Freeman further argued
argued that antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law was "hopelessly embedded
embedded in the perpetrator
perspective."' 96 Because
perpetrator perspective."196
Because antidiscrimination
crimination law required victims to identify a discrete
discrete set of acts or
or
conduct
conduct constituting
constituting a violation on the perpetrator's
perpetrator's part before it
remedy, 197 antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law was "ultimately
would provide any remedy,197
indifferent
to
the
condition
of
the
victim."' 198 Further, because the anindifferent
condition
victim."198
tidiscrimination
tidiscrimination remedy focused solely on specific violations, it left no
room for consideration
consideration of the systemic conditions
conditions of racial
subordination.
subordination. 199
199
Charles Lawrence
perpetrator-victim criLawrence developed
developed Freeman's perpetrator-victim
tique further when he challenged
challenged the doctrine of discriminatory
discriminatory pur20°
Washington v. Davis,
which
pose set forth by the Supreme Court in Washington
Davis,20o
which
requires plaintiffs
to
demonstrate
discriminatory
plaintiffs
discriminatory intent
intent in their consti2t
tutional challenges to facially neutral laws. 20J
1 In critiquing Davis,
Davis, Lawrence identified the problem
problem of "unconscious racism," arguing that
the dichotomy
between intentional, unconstidichotomy articulated
articulated by the Court between
discrimination and unintentional, constitutional
tutional discrimination
constitutional discriminaLawrence further predicted that, in light of
of
tion was a false one.2t2022 Lawrence
194
194
195
195
196
196

Id.;
see id.
id. at 1053-57.
[d.; see
Id.
[d. at 1053.

Id.
[d.
See id.
id. at 1053-57.
Id.
1054 (emphasis
(emphasis added).
More specifically,
Freeman wrote:
[d. at
at 1054
added). More
specifically, Freeman
wrote:
antidiscrimination law is hopelessly
In its core concept of the "violation," antidiscrimination
embedded in the perpetrator
embedded
perpetrator perspective.
perspective. Its central tenet, the "antidiscrimination principle," is the prohibition
race-dependent decisions that
prohibition of race-dependent
disadvantage members
been
disadvantage
members of minority
minority groups, and its principal task has been
to select from the maze of human behaviors those
tbose particular
particular practices
practices that
violate
violate the principle, outlaw the identified
identified practices, and neutralize their
their
Antidiscrimination law has thus been ultimately indifferent
indifferent
specific effects. Antidiscrimination
to the condition of the victim; its demands are satisfied
satisfied if it can be said that
the "violation" has been remedied.
remedied.
The
presupposes a world composed
The perpetrator perspective
perspective presupposes
composed of atomistic individuals whose actions are outside of and apart from the social fabric and
without historical
historical continuity. From
From this perspective,
perspective, the
tbe law views racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon,
phenomenon, but merely
merely as the misguided conduct of particular actors.
Id. at 1053-54 (footnotes
omitted).
[d.
(footnotes omitted).
199 See
See id.
id. at
at 1053-57.
199
1053-57.
200
426 U.S.
U.S. 229,
240-41 (1976).
200
426
229, 240-41
(1976).
20l
See Charles
Lawrence Ill,
Ego, and
and Equal
with UnUn201 See
Charles R.
R. Lawrence
III, The
The Id,
Jd, the
the t.go,
Equal Protection:
Protection: Reckoning
Reckoning with
conscious Racism,
Racism, 39 STAN.
(1987) (citing Hunter
v. Undenvood,471
Underwood, 471
conscious
STAN. L. REv.
REV. 317, 318 &
& n.2 (1987)
Hunter 11.
(1985)).
U.S. 222 (1985)).
202
Id. at
at 321-22.
321-22.
202 [d.
197
197
198
198
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historically contextualized culture of racism within which we have
the historically
all been socialized, both as
as victims and/or as
as perpetrators
perpetrators on some
some
all
level-the Davis
ununconscious or conscious level-the
Davis Court's disregard for unconscious racism would in fact develop
develop into one of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination
conscious
20 3
law's greatest failings. 203
Lawrence's and Freeman's cautionary
law's
Both Lawrence's
arguments about the future of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law ultimately
arguments
turned out to be prophetic.
2.

Overview: The Expansive
and Restrictive
Restrictive Visions of Equality
Equality
Expansive and

KimberM
Kimberle Crenshaw has also critiqued traditional civil rights dis20 4
course from a critical race perspective. 204
Crenshaw articulates the
difference between
between the expansive and restrictive
restrictive views of the goals of
of
difference
antidiscrimination law by comparing
comparing her view with that of Thomas
antidiscrimination
Sowell, a conservative,
conservative, African
African American, law and economics
20 5 The expansive
scholar.
view, which
scholar.205
which is associated with the critical
race movement,
stresses equality
Afriequality as a result,
result, and looks to real consequences
consequences for Mrican-Americans.
antidiscrimination law
can-Americans. It interprets the objective
objective of antidiscrimination
as the eradication
eradicationof the substantive
substantive conditions
subordination
conditions of Black subordination
and attempts to enlist the institutional power
furpower of the courts to fur6
appression.20
of racial
effects of
eradicatingthe
ther the national goal of eradicating
the effects
racial oppression.
206
The restrictive view, on the other hand,
treats equality as a process, downplaying
down playing the significance
significance of actual
outcomes. The primary objective
objective of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law, according to this vision, is to prevent future wrongdoing rather
rather than
than to
redress
redress present
present manifestations
manifestations of past injustice. "Wrongdoing,"
moreover, is seen primarily
primarily as isolated
isolated actions against
against individuals
rather
rather than as a societal policy against
against an entire
entire group. Nor does
the restrictive view contemplate
contemplate the courts playing a role in redressing harms from America's
America's racist past, as opposed
opposed to merely
merely policing society
proscribed discriminatory
society to eliminate
eliminate a narrow
narrow set of proscribed
discriminatory
practices
In sum,
restrictive view
practices...... . . In
sum, the
the restrictive
view seeks
seeks to
to proscribe only
certain kinds of
subordinating acts, and
then only when other
of subordinating
and
other inter20 7
ests are not overly
overly burdened.
burdened. 207
Consequently,
Consequently, the adoption
adoption of
of the restrictive
restrictive view
view (and similarly, the
perpetrator
perspective)
in
civil
rights
discourse
perpetrator perspective)
civil
discourse is not historically, sosoSee
id. at
See id.
at 322,
322, 344-55.
344-55.
See
173.
See Crenshaw,
Crenshaw, supra
supra note
note 173.
205
See
122, at
205
See id.
id. at
at 1339-49;
1339-49; see
see also
also Audain,
Audain, supra
supra note
note 122,
at 764
764 n.295
n.295 (criticizing
(criticizing Sowell's
Sowell's
views
and culture
views on
on the
the role
role of
of race
race and
culture in
in determining
determining the
the success
success of particular
particular groups in
society).
society) .
206
supra note 14,
206 Crenshaw,
Crenshaw, supra
supra note
note 173,
173, at
at 1341
1341 (emphasis
(emphasis added); see alsoYouNG,
also YOUNG, supra
14,
at
at 99 (arguing
(arguing that
that injustice
injustice should be
be conceptualized
conceptualized primarily
primarily in
in terms of oppression
oppression and
and
domination).
domination) .
207
207 Crenshaw,
Crenshaw, supra
supra note
note 173,
173, at
at 1342
1342 (footnote
(footnote omitted)
omitted) (citing
(citing DERRICK
DERRICK A. BELL,
BELL, JR.,
JR.,
RACE,
RACE, RACISM
RACISM AND
AND AMERICAN
AMERICAN LAw
LAw §§ 1.12,
1.12, at
at 41
41 (2d
(2d ed. 1980).
1980).
203
203
204

204
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cially, politically, or culturally contextualized, and does not address
20 8
adequately the day-to-day problems
adequately
problems of subordinated classes. 208
Crenexpansive view is rooted fundashaw's argument for adoption of the expansive
mentally
interpretation of
of
mentally in her assertion that the neoconservative
neoconservative interpretation
sociopolitical power structures
sociopolitical
structures is ahistorical
ahistorical because it assumes the ab0 9 In
hegemonic racial power and subordination.
sence in society of hegemonic
subordination. 2209
In
her critique of the restrictive
restrictive view of equality, Crenshaw does not suggest that the restrictive
restrictive view should be eliminated
eliminated altogether. Rather,
she argues that, because equal
equal process
process is inexorably
inexorably and complexly
linked with equal results, the expansive
expansive view must also inform the
2 1°
goals of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law.
law. 2lO
Unfortunately, it appears that civil rights discourse has moved increasingly
of
creasingly toward an exclusive adoption
adoption of the restrictive view of
become further embedded in the perpetrator
perpetrator perperequality, and has become
spective. 22111I This Article suggests that Crenshaw's
Crenshaw's expansive equality
antidiscrimination law should be applied to substantive
approach to antidiscrimination
areas of the law beyond the scope
scope of civil rights and antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination
law doctrine, and that such applications
applications should seek
seek to eliminate
eliminate the
conditions of racial subordination, rather than remedy
remedy singularly
egregious
egregious acts of racism. Specifically, this Article's primary objective
objective is
to argue for the incorporation
into
contract
law's
doctrine
of good
incorporation
contract
good
perspective of expansive
expansive equality.
faith the victim perspective
208 See
id. at
1342-46; see
see also
a/soJoE
R. FEAGIN
LIVING WITH
WITH RACISM:
208
See id.
at 1342-46;
JOE R.
FEAGIN &
& MELVIN
MELVIN P.
P. SIKES,
SIKES, LIVING
RACISM: THE
THE
BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS
MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE vi-x, 15-18
15-18 (1994)
(1994) (rebutting the notion that discrimination no longer
longer exists, and describing
describing discrimination confronting
confronting middle-class
middle-class African
African
Americans).
Americans).
209
See
Crenshaw, supra
173, at
at 1344-46.
1344-46. "[T]
"[T]o0 believe
... that
209
See Crenshaw,
supra note
note 173,
believe ...
that color-blind
color-blind polipolicies represent
ensuring a racially equitable socirepresent the only legitimate and effective means of ensuring
'proper role'
role' for law, but also
ety, one would have to assume not only that there
there is only one 'proper
that such
Id. at 1344.
such a racially equitable society already exists."
exists." Id.
1344.
210
See
1342-44.
210
See id.
id. at
at 1342-44.
211I
See
supra Part
Part III.A.1
perpetrator perspective
perspective of
of racial
discrimina21
See supra
III.A.l (criticizing
(criticizing the
the perpetrator
racial discrimination, which views discrimination as a discrete set of acts inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator, and arguing that antidiscrimination law's focus on intentional
intentional discrimination
discrimination is a
manifestation
the perpetrator
perpetrator perspective).
proposition is
is supported
supported by a cursory
This proposition
of the
perspective). This
manifestation of
review of the familiar McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting
framework imposed
McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework
imposed upon plaintiffs who bring
Act
bring claims of intentional
intentional discrimination under
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
amended). See McDonnell Douglas
of 1964,
2000e-17 (2000) (as amended).
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05
(1973). A Title VII
802-05 (1973).
vn plaintiff
plaintiff must establish
establish her prima
facie case by showing that she belongs to a protected class traditionally
discriminated
traditionally discriminated
against in the workplace,
workplace, that she was adequately qualified,
qualified, but
but despite her qualification,
she received adverse treatment, and that
that similarly situated, non-protected employees
employees did
not receive similar treatment. See id.
id. at 802. The employer-defendant
employer-defendant in turn may rebut
rebut
plaintiff's prima facie case simply by producing
plaintiff's
producing some legally sufficient
sufficient evidence
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
nondiscriminatory reason
reason for the adverse
adverse treatment. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine,
production,
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).
(1981). If the employer
employer meets this burden
burden of production,
then
then the plaintiff
plaintiff must show by a preponderance
preponderance of evidence that the legitimate
legitimate reasons
offered by the employer are mere pretext. Id.
Id. at 255-56; McDonnell
McDonnell Douglas,
Douglas, 411 U.S. at
804-05.
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A Critical Race Critique of
of the
the Economic
Economic Model
A

A critical race assessment
assessment of
of the
the economic
economic model of
of good
good faith
A
assessment overlaps with
with many points
points of Malloy's general critique
critique of
assessment
law
and
economics.
First
and
foremost,
both
critical
race
theory
and
law and economics. First and foremost, both critical race theory and
law and market economy theory
theory take issue with the primacy of effi12
ciency in conventi?nal
conventional economic
economic analyses
analyses of the law.2212
Malloy, of
ciency
2
13
course, does so from a market perspective,213
perspective,
race scholcourse,
while critical race
14
ars do so from
from an
an equality perspective.2214
That is, critical race scholars
economics scholars for
for excessively focusing on
on an
an atatcritique law and economics
conception of
of individual choice, and for fundamentally
fundamentally "misomistic conception
perceiv[ing] the essence of racism"215
racism"2 1 5 as aa perpetrator's
perpetrator's "idiosyncratic
perceiv[ing]
2 16
'taste"'
'taste"'216 that may impact efficiency positively or negatively, rather
2 7
subordination. 217
of subordination.
than as a systemic condition of
Critical race scholars
scholars also take issue with economists' criticisms of
himself
critical race theory as overtly political, as evidenced by Posner himself
labeling some influential race crits as members of the "lunatic
fringe."2 18 Although
characterization of critical
fringe."218
Although I object to Posner's characterization
race scholars, race crits do not dispute that their work is politically
19
Rather, they dispute claims that law and economics is neusituated.2219
tral
tral and objective, or that the discourse of law and economics
economics is somehow less political
than
the
discourse
of
critical
race
theory. Critical
political
race
theory
and
law
and
economics
race
economics simply map two related political
terrains through two distinct lenses of interpretation.
interpretation. Critical race
theory interprets and maps the enabling structures
structures of hegemonic
hegemonic racial power
(one
of
which
is
the
systemic
power
systemic denial
denial to subordinated
subordinated peoples of
opportunities to engage in exchange
of opportunities
exchange processes),
processes), while
while law and
ples
economics interprets and maps the enabling
foreconomics
enabling structures
structures of wealth formation
in
a
free
market.
Race
crits
explicitly
map
their
terrain
from
mation in a free market. Race crits explicitly
their terrain from
particularized
particularized political
political and
and cultural
cultural positions,
positions, while
while law
law and
and economSee
accompanying text.
See supra
supra notes
notes 126,
126, 142-50
142-50 and
and accompanying
text.
213
See
supra
notes
142-50
and
accompanying
213 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
text.
214
See,
The Economics
214
See, e.g.,
e.g., Richard
Richard Delgado,
Delgado, Rodrigo's
Rodrigo's Second
Second Chronicle:
Chronicle: The
Economics and
and Politics
Politics of
of
Race,
91
MICH.
L.
REV.
1183
(1993)
(reviewing
EPSTEIN,
supra
Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993) (reviewing EpSTEIN, supra note
note 121);
121); see also Audain,
Audain,
supra
supra note
note 122
122 (arguing
(arguing that
that law
law and
and economics
economics scholars
scholars have
have disregarded
disregarded the
the analytical
analytical
importance
importance of
of culture).
culture).
215
215 Delgado,
Delgado, supra
supra note
note 214,
214, at
at 1195.
1195.
216
Id.
at
1188.
216
Id. at 1188.
217
217 See
See supra
supra Part
Part III.A.
llI.A. Malloy
Malloy similarly
similarly critiques
critiques the
the conventional
conventional economic
economic focus
focus on
on
the
atomistic
individual,
as
demonstrated
by
his
argument
the atomistic individual, as demonstrated by his argument that
that wealth
wealth formation
formation isis ininformed
formed by
by both
both cost-benefit
cost-benefit analysis
analysis and
and individuals'
individuals' membership
membership in
in a community.
community. See
See
supra
supra notes
notes 142-50
142-50 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
.
218
40 (book
218 Richard
Richard A.
A. Posner,
Posner, The
The Skin
Skin Trade,
Trade, NEw
NEW REPUBLIC,
REpUBLIC, Oct.
Oct. 13,
13, 1997,
1997, at
at 40,
40,40
(book
review)
review) ("Every
("Every intellectual
intellectual movement
movement has
has aa lunatic
lunatic fringe.
fringe. Radical
Radical legal
legal egalitarianism
egalitarianism is
is
distinguished
distinguished by
by having
having aa rational
rational fringe
fringe and
and aa lunatic
lunatic core.
core. The
The latter
latter isis constituted
constituted by
by the
the
critical
critical race
race theorists
theorists and
and the
the other
other legal
legal academics
academics who
who have
have swallowed
swallowed postmodernism
postmodernism
hook,
.. .").
").
hook, line,
line, and
and sinker.
sinker ...
219
See,
219
See, e.g.,
e.g., Crenshaw,
Crenshaw, supra
supra note
note 173,
173, at
at 1342-44,
1342-44, 1384-87.
1384-87.
212
212
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ics scholars map theirs using the powerful
powerful and predictive
of
predictive "science" of
economics. But, as Malloy
Malloy has argued from a market
market theory perspececonomics and objective, by locating the discourse in the science
science of economics
impact
tivity, law and economics scholars misunderstand not only the impact
of racial subordination
subordination on the market and the exchange
exchange process, but
indeterminate qualities of
of
more fundamentally, the reinterpretive
reinterpretive and indeterminate
22
in general.
exchange process in
the market and the exchange
general,2200
In spite of those critiques, it appears that law and economics, as a
general
general discourse, may inaccurately
inaccurately be perceived
perceived as more objective
and less political
proliferation
political than critical race theory. The relative proliferation
concentrations at the
of law and economics programs,
programs, centers, and concentrations
"top twenty"
schools in
in the
the United
States, 22' as compared
"top
twenty" law
law schools
United States,221
compared with the
presence
of
only
one
concentration
in
critical
race
theory at a major
presence
concentration
critical
major
2222 But despite
perception is widespread.22
law school, suggests that this perception
the fact that race crits and law and economics
economics scholars are extremely
critical
movements have acknowlcritical of one another, members
members of both movements
edged that the actualization
actualization of different
different notions of
ofjustice
justice may require
application of different
the application
different legal theories to various kinds of real-life
problems. For example, Posner notes that
there is more to notions ofjustice
of justice than a concern
concern with efficiency. It
is not obviously inefficient
inefficient to allow suicide pacts; to allow private
is
discrimination on racial, religious, or sexual grounds; to permit killdiscrimination
weakest passenger in the lifeboat in circuming and eating the weakest
stances
of
genuine
desperation; to force people to give selfselfstances
incriminating
testimony;
to
flog
prisoners;
to
allow
babies
to
be
sold
incriminating testimony;
prisoners;
sold
See sutml
supra notes
notes 142-50
142-50 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
text.
See
The
"top
twenty"
refer
to
those
schools
ranked
recent edition
edition
The "top twenty" refer to those schools ranked as
as such
such by
by the
the most
most recent
of the U.S. News & World Report's annual "Best
"Best Colleges
Colleges and Graduate
Graduate Programs" issue.
See America's Best Graduate
Graduate Schools
Schools 2003:
2003: Law Schools, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/
grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrankbrief.php. Of the law schools ranked in the top twenty,
grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrank_brief.php.
thirteen
thirteen of them have law and economics
economics programs
programs or centers:
centers: Yale, Stanford,
Stanford, Harvard,
Harvard,
Columbia, Cornell,
University of Chicago, UniverCornell, Vanderbilt, University
University of Pennsylvania, University
sity of Michigan, University of Virginia, University
University of California
California at Berkeley
Berkeley (Boalt Hall),
Hall),
Georgetown, and University of Southern
California). This research
Southern California).
research was compiled by
Georgetown,
searching the websites
websites of the top twenty law schools.
As Elizabeth Iglesias has noted:
Those who master the dominant
dominant language reap the rewards of assimilation. . . . Law and economics aficionados get hired by elite law schools,
appointed to the federal bench, recruited
recruited for high-level policy-making
policy-making positions and published
published in prestigious law journals
journals at higher rates than exponents of any of the major
major strains of critical legal discourse. By contrast,
legal scholars
... are channeled
scholars working to
to articulate
articulate critical
critical perspectives
perspectives ...
channeled
into the "interesting
"interesting visitor" circuit, cast as "too political" for judicial appointment and "too abstract
pointment
abstract and theoretical" for the nitty-gritty of policy- .
making.
supra note 124, at 655-56
Iglesias, supra
655-56 (footnote omitted).
222
The University
University of
of California
California at
Los Angeles
Angeles is
is the
the only
only top
top twenty
twenty law
law school
school with
222
The
at Los
with aa
http://wwwl.law.uc1a.edu/-crs/incritical race theory
theory program. See CRS@UCLAW, at http://wwwl.law.ucla.edu/-crs/in2002).
dex.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2002).

220
221
221

220
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for adoption; to allow the use of deadly force in defense of a pure
blackmail; or to give convicted felons a
property interest;
legalize blackmail;
property
interest; to legalize
choice between
between imprisonment and participation
participation in dangerous medof
ical experiments. Yet all these things offend the sense of justice of
modern Americans,
Americans, and all are to a greater
greater or lesser (usually
... to explain some
some
greater) extent illegal. An effort will be made ...
there is
is
be; there
of these prohibitions
prohibitions in economic
economic terms, but most cannot be;
than economics,
economics, a point
more to justice
justice than
point the reader should keep in mind
mind
this book.223
in this
in evaluating normative statements
statements in
book. 223
acknowledged the signifsignifSimilarly, other scholars of race and law have acknowledged
icance
icance of the (post-)law
(post-) law and economics
economics movement, as well as the need
need
24
area.2224
that area.
in that
for continued
continued work in
of
economic analysis of
substantively engage
As critical race scholars substantively
engage economic
interaction of
of
carefully the interaction
the law, it becomes
becomes crucial
crucial to examine carefully
interpretive lenses in modem
modern legal discourse. Accordthese distinct interpretive
ingly, the remaining
remaining sections
sections of this Article focus on a synthesis of
of
scholarship
critical
critical race
race theory and Malloy's
Malloy's law and market
market economy
economy scholarship
in the context of the doctrine of contractual
contractual good faith. The theoretisurrounding the doctrine of good faith provides
cal debate
debate surrounding
provides an approinteraction of critical
critical and
priate doctrinal
doctrinal context for examining the interaction
and
economic analysis, because that debate has historically pitted
economic
pitted ecoopportunities approach)
nomic analysis
analysis (e.g., Burton's forgone opportunities
approach)
excluder
against independent
independent conceptions
conceptions of justice
justice (e.g.,
(e.g., Summers's
Summers's excluder
theoretical distinction
analysis). Moreover, the theoretical
analysis).
distinction between
between economy
economy and
and
justice is often elided in contract law because contract disputes are
particularly susceptible to economic
particularly
economic analyses. But is this susceptibility
convenience, or do economic analyses
merely a function of convenience,
analyses in contract disputes
disputes yield the fairest results? Is it true, as Malloy
Malloy has asserted,
2 25
"[t]he market
that "[t]he
market does not care about fairness"?
fairness"?225
Because I am not an economist, I will not answer for the economists. However, the remaining
remaining sections of this Article argue that considerations of fairness should be accounted
accounted for explicitly
explicitly in the
amenability of such
such
analysis of contract
contract cases, despite
despite the apparent amenability
true
in
cases
that
analysis.
This
is
especially
cases to purely
economic
purely economic
22 6
and particularly
in
commercial contracts,226
contracts,
do not involve purely
purely commercial
particularly in
cases involving employment contracts.
contracts. In giving due consideration
consideration to
fairness
fairness concerns, it is not necessary
necessary to forgo entirely the law and ecosupra note
note 49,
supra
49, §§ 2.3,
2.3, at
at 30-31
30-31 (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
53 U.
U. MIAMI
MIAMI L.
L. REV.
REV. 973
973
Bratton,
Law
and
Economics
of Anglish
English Only,
See,
e.g.,
William
See, e.g., William Bratton, Law and Economics of
Only, 53
inefficiency of English-only language
(1999) (arguing that economic
economic analysis reveals the inefficiency
language
(1999)
laws).
laws).
225
MALLOY, supra
supra note
at 32.
32.
225
MALLOY,
note 60,
60, at
to
appropriate to
to apply
apply an
226
This is
not to
to say
say that
that it
it is
226
This
is not
is always
always appropriate
an economic
economic analysis
analysis to
justice-centered apcommercial cases; in such cases, distinct applications of economic and justice-centered
commercial
proaches
proaches to good faith will not always yield equally equitable
equitable results.
223
223
224
224

POSNER,
POSNER,
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nomics goals of efficiency and wealth maximization. But it is possible
to give primacy
primacy in contract disputes to expansive notions
notions of equality
because doing so will lead ultimately to more productive, creative, and
22 7 More
dynamic interactions
interactions between contracting
contracting parties. 227
dynamic
interactions will create an expanding
expanding network of exchange that,
that, in
turn, will drive and reallocate the formation of wealth and economic
opportunity and effect a more equitable allocation of access to these
exchange processes. The remaining
remaining sections of this Article also argue
conventional antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law has not done enough to
that conventional
combat racial subordination.
subordination.
IV
CASES INVOLVING
INVOLVING GOOD FAITH AND RACIAL
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT:
CONTEXT: CRITIQUE
CRITIQUE
IN THE AT-WII.L
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT

OF THE
THE CASE
CASE
OF

LAW
LAw

This Part develops an expansive equality perspective
perspective on the doctrine of good faith by analyzing
analyzing cases arising
arising in the context
context of at-will
employment
agreements.
Specifically,
the
analysis
focuses
on cases in
employment agreements.
the,analysis
which at-will employees
employees attempt to bring claims
claims against their employers for breach
breach of the implied covenant
covenant of good faith under factual
circumstances that also give rise to statutory discrimination
circumstances
discrimination claims
under state or federal civil rights legislation. Most courts have held
that the availability
availability of statutory
statutory civil rights remedies precludes plaintiffs from bringing
bringing common law claims for breach
breach of the duty of good
good
faith based
based on the same conduct. This Part analyzes
analyzes the reasoning
reasoning
behind these
these decisions
decisions from a critical race
race perspective. It
It then argues
that the courts
courts have relied too heavily on civil rights law to remedy
cognizable forms of discrimination,
discrimination, and that they have
have employed the
the
doctrine of good faith primarily
primarily to protect the economic
economic interests
interests of
of
parties rather than to ensure
contracting process.
ensure fairness in the contracting

A.
A.

The Basics of At-Will Employment
Employment
Plaintiffs
interconnected discrimination
Plaintiffs who bring interconnected
discrimination claims
claims and
and
contractual
claims
for
breach
of
good
faith
generally
contractual claims
generally do so in the employment context,
ployment
context, after
after they have received
received adverse
adverse treatment
treatment at the
228
hands
hands of their employers. 228 These good
good faith claims are premised
premised on
on
the contractual
nature
of
the
employer-employee
relationship,
contractual
employer-employee relationship, while
while
227
See
227
See supra
supra notes
notes 142-50
142-50 and
and accompanying
accompanying text;
text; see
see also
also Ian
Ian R.
R. MacNeil,
MacNeil, Relational
Relational
Contract:
What
We
Do
and
Do
Not
Know,
1985
Wis.
L.
REV.
483,
525
(surveying
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS.
483,
(surveying the behavioral,
behavioral,
legal,
legal, and
and scholarly
scholarly dimensions
dimensions of relational
relational contract
contract law and
and arguing that acquisition
acquisition of a
"greater knowledge of essential human social patterns" is required to fully understand dis"greater knowledge of essential human social patterns" is required to fully understand discrete
exchanges).
crete contractual
contractual exchanges).
228
228 Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs have,
have, however,
however, brought
brought breach
breach of good
good faith and
and discrimination
discrimination claims
together
together in
in other
other contexts.
contexts. See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Ruiz
Ruiz v.
v. A.B. Chance
Chance Co.,
Co., 234 F.3d
F.3d 654 (Fed.
(Fed. Cir.
Cir. 2000)
(termination
(termination of
of distributor
distributor agreement);
agreement); Reid
Reid v.v. Key Bank
Bank of
of S. Me.,
Me., Inc.,
Inc., 821
821 F.2d
F.2d 9 (1st
(1st
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fedthe discrimination
discrimination claims are brought as alleged violations of fed23
0
229
23U
229
or state
civil rights statutes. Moreover, because these cases
eral
relationships, courts frequently refuse
refuse to
involve at-will employment relationships,
recognize good faith and other common law claims, whether based in
contract or tort,231
tort,23 1 reasoning that both the employer and the emcontract
ployee are free to terminate the at-will relationship
relationship at any time upon
32
reason. 2232
for no
proper notice, for any reason
reason or for
no reason.
However, some courts have established
established narrow, categorical
categorical exceptions to the at-will employment
employment doctrine. 233 In Wagenseller
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Scottsdale
Memorial
delineated three
Supreme Court
Court of Arizona
Arizona delineated
Memorial Hospital,
Hospital, the Supreme
general categories
categories of exceptions to the rule that an employer
employer may terminate an at-will employee
employee for any reason
reason or no reason: the public
implied-in-fact employment
employment contract exception,
policy exception,
exception, the implied-in-fact
2344 The public
and the good faith and fair dealing
dealing exception.23
public policy
exception
employee
exception dictates that an employer may not terminate an employee
for any reason that would violate "public policy articulated
articulated by constitulaw." 2 35 The implied-in-fact
implied-in-fact employtional, statutory, or decisional law."235
ment contract
contract exception
operates
to
restrict
at-will termination
exception
termination in
& Co., 26 S.W.3d
Cir. 1987) (termination
(tennination of credit
credit agreement);
agreement); Woods v. Herman Walldorf
Walldorf &
S.W.3d
868 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (commercial
(commercial leasing).
229
Plaintiffs alleging
alleging federal
federal civil
civil rights
claims usually
usually bring
bring suit
suit pursuant
pursuant to
to Title
VII
229 Plaintiffs
rights claims
Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000),
1964,42
(2000), or § 1981 of the
the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
e.g.,
U.S.c. § 1981 (2000) (as amended).
amended). See, e.g.,
Byers v. City of AlbuquerSmithKline Beecham,
Beecham, Inc., 958 F.
(10th Cir. 1998)
que, 150 F.3d 1271 (10th
1998) (Title VII);Jordon
VII);Jordon v. SmithKIine
Supp. 1012
1981).
1012 (E.D.
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (Title VII and § 1981).
230
Servs., Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr.
Rptr. 2d 427 (Ct.
230
See, e.g., Spellman
Spellman v. Sec., Annuities & Ins. Servs.,
App. 1992).
1992).
231
See infra
IV.B.
231 See
infra Part
Part IV.B.
rule that
that at-will
at-will employment
Many courts
the general
232
232 Many
courts acknowledge
acknowledge the
general rule
employment is
is terminable
terminable
exceptions to that rule, including an
upon notice for any or no reason, but recognize
recognize exceptions
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., E.I.
E.!. DuPont de Nemours
Nemours & Co.
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 437-38
437-38 (Del. 1996);
199!:i); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp.,
Hosp., 710
710
1985), superseded
superseded by ARIZ. REV. STAT.
STAT. ANN.
1030-33, 1036-40
1036-40 (Ariz. 1985),
ANN. § 23-1501
P.2d 1025, 1030-33,
Chromcraft Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1396, 1406-07
(West 2002). But see, e.g., Dandridge
Dandridge v. Chromcraft
1406-07
(N.D. Miss. 1996)
Mississippi law does not recognize
recognize an implied
obligation of
(noting that Mississippi
implied obligation
of
1996) (noting
good faith and fair dealing
dealing in at-will employment agreements); Rios v. Tex. Commerce
Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 814-16
814-16 (Tex. App. 1996) (noting that "neither the
recognized an implied
[Texas] legislature nor the supreme court
[Texasllegislature
court [of
[of Texas]
Texasl has recognized
implied covenant
covenant
relationships").
of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships").
233
Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1030-40. Although
Although Wagenseller
Wagenseller was subsequently
233 See,
See, e.g., Wagenseller,
superseded by statute,
statute, the Supreme Court of Arizona's
Arizona's discussion
discussion of the good faith and fair
fair
employment contract
contract is useful for this Article's analysis.
exception to an at-will employment
dealing exception
Moreover,
several jurisdictions. See, e.g., Martin MarWagenseller has been cited
cited favorably in several
Moreover, Wagenseller
ietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Colo. 1992); Wholey
Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 802
A.2d 482, 488 (Md. 2002).
2002).
234 Wagenseller,
710 P.2d
at 1031.
234
Wagenseller, 710
P.2d at
1031.
1994),
v. Beebe
Beebe Rubber
Rubber Co.,
Co., 316
A.2d 549
549 (N.H.
(N.H. 1994),
1031-36 (discussing
235 Id.
235
Id. at
at 1031-36
(discussing Monge
Monge v.
316 A.2d
articulated a public policy/good
exception to the at-will employment docpolicy/good faith exception
which articulated
employment
trine).
excellent discussion of the public policy
policy exception
exception to the at-will employment
trine). For an excellent
Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public
PublicPolicy
Policy t.xception
Exception to the EmplayEmploydoctrine, see Christopher
Application, 68 TuL.
TUL. L. REV.
REv. 1583
ment-At-Will Doctrine:
Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies
Inconsistencies in Application,
1583 (1994).
(1994).
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supplemental statements
statements indicases in which the parties' conduct or supplemental
cate that the parties have agreed to limit their rights to terminate the
relationship. 2 36 Finally, the good faith and fair dealing
dealing
employment relationship,236
"a [contractual]
[contractual] duty imposed by law where the
the
exception establishes "a
silent,"237 which "requires that neither party do anyanycontract itself is silent,"237
thing that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of
of
agreement."2 38 As one might expect from its use of this lantheir agreement."238
guage, the Wagenseller
Wagenseller court cited section 205 of the Restatement
Restatement (Sec2 3399 at the outset
ond)
of
Contracts
of
its
discussion
of
the good faith
ond)
Contracts2
exception,
jurisexception, and also noted that the good faith duty acts in some juris24
dictions as the basis for a tort claim. 240
" The court then summarized
summarized
recognized the good faith
the conflict between jurisdictions that have recognized
exception
to
the
at-will
doctrine
not. 24 1
exception
and those that have not.241
Wagenseller court stated, in terms echoing
The Wagenseller
echoing Burton's forgone
242
opportunities
analysis,
opportunities analysis,242
that the courts that rejected the good faith
exception
exception were motivated
motivated primarily
primarily by "the concern that to [recognize
exception] would place undue restrictions on management
management
the exception]
nize the
and would infringe the employer's 'legitimate
'legitimate exercise
exercise of management discretion.
"' 2 4" Although the Wagenseller
Wagenseller court did not sustain
sustain
discretion."'243
the plaintiffs
plaintiff's good faith claim in the case before it, the court did not
not
categorically
recognize good faith claims in the at-will emcategorically refuse to recognize
244
ployment
Instead,
ployment context. 244
Instead, the court crafted a good faith exception modeled
modeled on the economic
approach to good faith, stating:
economic approach
We do ...
...recognize
recognize an implied
implied covenant
covenant of good faith and
and fair
fair
dealing in the employment-at-will
employment-at-will contract, although that covenant
covenant
does not
duty for
for the employer
does
not create
create aa duty
employer to terminate
terminate the employee
employee
only
for good
good cause. The
covenant does not protect the employee
only for
The covenant
employee
from aa "no
benefit
from
"no cause"
cause" termination
termination because
because tenure
tenure was
was never
never aa benefit
inherent in
agreement. The
The covenant
covenant does protect an
inherent
in the
the at-will
at-will agreement.
an
employee
from
a
discharge
based
on
an
employer's
desire
to
avoid
employee
discharge
avoid
the payment
payment of benefits already
already earned
earned by the employee, such as the
236 See
Wagenseller, 710
710 P.2d
In many
cases, the
most significant
significant sources
sources of
of
236
See Wagenseller,
P.2d at
at 1036-38.
1036-38. In
many cases,
the most
extrinsic
evidence
are
the
employment
policy
manuals
distributed
to
extrinsic evidence
employment
to employees;
employees; indeed,
indeed,
the
Wagenseller court
the Wagenseller
court referred
referred to
to the
the implied-in-fact
implied-in-fact contract
contract exception
exception as the
the "personnel
"personnel
policy manual
manual exception."
exception." See id.
id. at 1036.
1036.
237
Id. at
237 Jd.
at 1036.
1036.
238
Id. at
1038 (citing
Traders &
238 Jd.
at 1038
(citing Comunale
Comunale v.
v. Traders
& Gen.
Gen. Ins.
Ins. Co.,
Co., 328
328 P.2d
P.2d 198,
198, 200
200 (Cal.
(Cal.
1958)
and Fortune
Fortune v.
v. Nat'l
Nat'l Cash
Cash Register
Register Co.,
Co., 364
364 N.E.2d
N.E.2d 1251,
1251, 1257
1257 (Mass.
(Mass. 1977)).
1977)).
1958) and
239
(Second) of
model of
239 The
The Restatement
Restatement (Second)
of Contracts
Contracts adopted
adopted the
the excluder
excluder analysis
analysis model
of good
good
faith. See supra
supra notes
notes 44-47 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
240
Wagenseller, 710
P.2d at
240
Wagenseller,
710 P.2d
at 1038;
1038; see
see infra
infra Part
Part IV.B.2.
IV.B.2.
241
See
Wagenseller,
710
P.2d
at
1039-40.
241
See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1039-40.
242
See
242
See supra
supra Part
Part I.A.1.
I.A.l.
243
Wagenseller,
1039 (quoting
243
Wagenseller, 710
710 P.2d
P.2d at
at 1039
(quoting Pugh
Pugh v.
v. See's
See's Candies,
Candies, Inc.,
Inc., 171
171 Cal.
Cal. Rptr.
Rptr.
917,
928 (Ct.
Inc. 88 P.3d
917,928
(Ct. App.
App. 1981),
1981), overruled
ovenuled on
on other
other grounds
grounds by
by Guz
Guz v.
v. Bechtel
Bechtel Nat'l,
Nat'l, Inc.
P.3d 1089
1089
(Cal.
(Cal. 2000)).
2000)).
244
See
244
See id.
id. at
at 1040-41.
1040-4l.
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Register Co., 364
Fortune [v.
[v. National
Cash Register
sales commissions in Fortune
National Cash
364
1971)], but not the tenure required to earn
1251 (Mass. 1971)],
N.E.2d 1251
earn the
[v. American
American Airlines,
Inc.,
Cleary [v.
pension and retirement
retirement benefits in Cleary
Airlines, Inc.,
168
right
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980)].
1980)]. Thus, plaintiff here has a right
employment agreeto receive the benefits that were a part of her employment
ment with defendant
defendant Hospital. To the extent, however, that the
benefits represent a claim
claim for prospective
prospective employment, her claim
claim
must fail. The terminable-at-will
terminable-at-will contract
contract between her and the Hospital made
made no promise
promise of continued
continued employment. To the contrary,
it was, by its nature, subject to termination by either party at any
time, subject only to the legal prohibition that she could not be
24 5
fired for reasons which
which contravene
contravene public
public policy.
policy.~4fi
Wagenseller opinion is
Although the reasoning set forth in the Wagenseller
both thorough
thorough and sensible, and has guided many courts in their anal246
doctrine,~46 this Article takes issue
issue
yses of the exceptions to the at-will doctrine,
with the Wagenseller
court's
analysis
of
the
public
policy
exception
as
Wagenseller
analysis
separation
theoretically
theoretically distinct from the good faith exception. This separation
dominance of the economic
of the
the two exceptions
exceptions is a result of the dominance
economic
2 47
analysis
Wagenseller
analysis of the doctrine
doctrine of good faith.
faith.~47 Contrary to the Wagenseller
court's
court's position, the public policy and good faith exceptions
exceptions are often
often
in
impossible
separate from an analytic
impossible to separate
analytic perspective. Moreover, in
some circumstances,
circumstances, an expansive
expansive equality approach to good faith
(Second) of Contracts
Contracts may
consistent with the spirit of the Restatement (Second)
consistent
exceptions as interrelated
interrelated
actually necessitate
necessitate an analysis of the two exceptions
explicate this point, it is necessary
phenomena. In order
order to explicate
necessary to examine briefly the law controlling preclusion of common
common law contract
contract
antidiscrimination
remedies.
and tort claims by statutory
statutory antidiscrimination
Preclusion
Preclusion of Common Law Contract and Tort Claims by
Antidiscrimination Statutes:
Antidiscrimination
Statutes: The Alternate
Alternate Remedies
Doctrine
Doctrine

B.

1.

Positions
Opposing Positions
Opposing

Although cases in which
which courts have employed the public policy
exception
exception to limit the at-will employment doctrine usually involve conduct that is either "statutorily sanctioned" or "in furtherance of public
248
policy,"
policy,"248
it cannot
cannot seriously be questioned that federal and state statutory and constitutional
constitutional prohibitions
prohibitions against
against discrimination
discrimination embody
mandated public policy
contemplated by this excepthe sort of clearly mandated
policy contemplated
249 However, in cases in which plaintiffs
plaintiffs
tion to the at-will doctrine. 249
245
245

Id.
Jd.

246
246

note 233.
233.
See
supra note
See supra
See
supra Part
Part I.B.
See supra
LB.
See
Pennington, supra
supra note
note 235,
at 1596-1622.
1596-1622.
See Pennington,
235, at
1992) (holding
(holding
Inc., 833
833 P.2d
1218, 1225
1225 (Okla.
See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Tate
Tate v.
v. Browning-Ferris,
Browning-Ferris, Inc.,
P.2d 1218,
(Okla. 1992)

247
~4 7
248
248
249
~49

mandate of public policy and
that racially motivated discharge or retaliation offends a clear mandate
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have brought state common law claims, which may include claims of
of
discontractual or tortious breach of good faith, in conjunction with discrimination claims, courts have divided
divided on the issue of whether the
crimination
availability of a statutory civil rights remedy precludes common law
law
claims and remedies based on the same factual allegations.
claims
Although some commentators
commentators and courts have used the language
2511
of "preemption" to describe this controversy,
controversy,250
the use of this term
requires
requires some clarification. Many of the relevant cases involve the
"preemption" of state
state common
common law
law claims
claims by
by statutory
statutory schemes, rather
rather
"preemption" of
than the more common issue of preemption
preemption of state law claims by
25 1
of
federal law under the Supremacy Clause.
Clause.25
I As the Supreme Court of
Kansas explained
explained in Flenker
v.
Willamette
Industries,
Inc.,
this
controversy
}7enkerv.
Industries,
is more accurately
accurately described as one involving
involving the "alternate remedies
"preclusion. 2 5- 2 In Flenker,
Fenker,the
doctrine," or as it is sometimes called, "preclusion."252
the
employee-plaintiff
brought
a
common
law
tort
action
for
wrongful
disemployee-plaintiff
wrongful
charge, alleging that he had been terminated
terminated in retaliation for filing
Occupational Safety
complaints under the Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act
Act
(OSHA), and that the termination
termination violated the public policy excep(OSHA),
tion to the at-will employment doctrine.225[,3" After reviewing
reviewing and comparing the remedies available under the relevant
relevant section
section of OSHA and
and
the state common law tort claim, the Flenker
Flenker court
court held that, because
the discretion
the
discretion to bring a retaliatory discharge
discharge claim under OSHA lay
solely with the Department
and
Secretary
Department and Secretary of Labor, OSHA did not
not
254
provide an adequate
adequate alternate
alternate remedy.
remedy.254
Thus, the court refused
refused to
bar the plaintiff's state tort claim
claim for retaliatory
retaliatory wrongful discharge,
on the ground that OSHA provided
provided an inadequate
inadequate alternate
remedy.255
The
F/enker court
The Flenker
court did
did assert in dicta, however, that Title VII was
was
distinguishable from OSHA in that Title VII would preclude a state
common law claim because,
because, unlike OSHA,
OSHA, Title VII gives
gives an aggrieved
aggrieved
person
permission
to
bring
a
private
action
in
the
event
that
the
Equal
person
action
Employment
Employment Opportunity
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) refuses to pursue
pursue the
constitutes
constitutes tortious breach
breach of contract);
contract); Payne
Payne v.
v. Rozendaal,
Rozendaal, 520 A.2d
A.2d 586, 590 (Vt. 1986)
1986)
(recognizing
"clear and
and compelling
compelling public
public policy
policy against age
age discrimination").
discrimination").
(recognizing aa "clear
250
See,
250
See, e.g.,
e.g., Gottling
Gottling v.
v. P.R.
P.R. Inc.,
Inc., 61
61 P.3d
P.3d 989
989 (Utah
(Utah 2002).
2002).
251
See,
e.g.,
Peatros
v.
Bank
of
Am.
NT
&
SA,
990
539, 552-53
552-53 (Cal.
251 See, e.g., Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 990 P.2d
P.2d 539,
(Cal. 2000)
2000) (hold(holding
plaintiff's California
California Fair
ing that
that plaintiffs
Fair Employment
Employment and
and Housing
Housing Act
Act claim
claim was preempted
preempted by
federal
schemes conflicted);
federal statute
statute to
to the
the extent
extent that
that the state and federal
federal statutory
statutory schemes
conflicted); see also
Kimberly
Annotation, Pre-emption
Kimberly C.
C. Simmons,
Simmons, Annotation,
Pre-emption of
of Wrongful
Wrongful Discharge
Discharge Cause of
ofAction by
lry Civil
Rights
Laws, 21 A.L.R.5th
A.L.R.5th 1 (1994)
(1994) (surveying
(surveying case
case law on preemption
preemption of common
common law
Rights Laws,
wrongful
wrongful discharge
discharge claims
claims by statutory
statutory antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination statutes).
statutes).
252
See Flenker
252 See
Flenker v.
v. Willamette
Willamette Indus.,
Indus., Inc.,
Inc., 967
967 P.2d
P.2d 295,
295, 299-300
299-300 (Kan.
(Kan. 1998).
1998).
253
See
id.
at
298.
253 See id. at 298.
254
254 See
See id.
id. at
at 302-03.
302-03.
255
See
id.
at
255 See id. at 301-03.
301-03.
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complaint. 256 In support
support of this conclusion, the Flenker
Flenkercourt
Polcourt cited Polson v. Davis,257
Davis,257 which held that the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination
Discrimination
(KAAD) provided an "adequate
(KAAD)
"adequate and exclusive state remedy for violations of the public
public policy enunciated
enunciated therein," thereby precluding
precluding the
258
plaintiff's
plaintiffs state
state law retaliatory
retaliatory wrongful
wrongful discharge
discharge claim. 258
This Article takes issue, from a critical race perspective, with the general proposition that the availability
availability of federal or state statutory
antidiscrimination
precludes plaintiffs from bringing state
antidiscrimination remedies
remedies precludes
common
common law claims based on the same allegedly discriminatory
.
conduct.
Polson court, in precluding
common law claim,
The Polson
precluding the plaintiffs common
expressly
expressly refused to adopt the reasoning of Wynn v. Boeing Military
Military
25 9 a case that had originated in
Airplane Co.,
the
same
federal
district
CO.,259
originated
district
2
6
0
260
as Polson.
Polson.
In Wynn, the plaintiff sued the Boeing
Boeing Military
Military Airplane
Airplane
employment discrimination
discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of
of
Co. for employment
U.S.C. § 1981,261
prohibits racial discrimination
discrimination in the con42 U.S.c.
1981,261 which prohibits
262
tracting process. 262
In his complaint, Wynn also asserted that Boeing
Boeing
had breached
covenant of good faith and fair dealing
breached the implied covenant
dealing by
263 Because
discriminatory manner. 263
treating him in a discriminatory
Because Kansas recogdoctrine, 26 4
employment
at-will
the
on
nizes public policy limitations
limitations
at-will employment doctrine,264
and in light of clear public policy against racial discrimination, the
district
district judge allowed plaintiff
plaintiff to proceed with his breach
breach of good
good
that "[ifn
faith claim, stating that"
[i) n absence
absence of a specific
specific contractual
contractual provision, an employer
employer may terminate
terminate an employee at will for any reason
reason or
or
265
reason."
discriminatoryreason."265
for no reason, but not for
for a discriminatory
Moreover,
Moreover, the court rejected
rejected Boeing's argument that the availability of remedies under federal
federal civil rights statutes precluded
precluded Wynn's
Wynn's
extend
assertion of a common law good faith claim, and declined to extend
Murphy, Tarr
Riberglass, that the Age Discrimination
the holding of Murphy,
Tarr v. Riberglass,
Discrimination
in Employment
Employment Act provides the exclusive
exclusive remedy for complaints of
of
2 66
discrimination law.
race discrimination
age discrimination, into the context of race
law. 266
"lt] his Court is unwilling to engraft
engraft [an
Rather, the court
court stated
stated that "[t]his
[an
See
id. at
at 303.
303.
See id.
895
705 (lOth
(10th Cir.
1990).
895 F.2d
F.2d 705
Cir. 1990).
258
Id.
258
[d. at
at 709-10.
709-10.
259
595 F.
Supp. 727
727 (D.
(D. Kan.
Kan. 1984).
259
595
F. Supp.
1984).
260 See
895 F.2d
F.2d at
709-10; see
HCA Health
Health Servs.
Servs. of
Inc., No.
91260
See Poison,
Polson, 895
at 709-10;
see Ridge
Ridge v.
v. HCA
of Kan.,
Kan., Inc.,
No. 911280-PFK, 1992 WL 363686, at *7
*7 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1992)
1992) (declining to follow Wynn in light
light
1280-PFK,
of the Tenth Circuit's
Circuit's decision
decision in Poison).
Polson).
261
See
Wynn, 595
595 F.
Supp. at
728.
261
See Wynn,
F. Supp.
at 728.
262 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981
1981 (2000).
(2000).
262
42 U.S.C.
263
See
Wynn,
595
F.
Supp.
728-29.
263 See Wynn, 595 F. Supp. at
at 728-29.
264
Id.
729 (citing
Murphy v.
City of
of Topeka-Shawnee
Topeka-Shawnee County
Dep't of
of Labor
Servs.,
264
[d. at
at 729
(citing Murphy
v. City
County Dep't
Labor Servs.,
630 P.2d 186, 192 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981».
1981)).
265
Id.
at 728-29.
728-29.
265
Id. at
266
Id.
at
729 (citing
Murphy, Tarr
Riberglass, Civil
Civil Action
No. 83-4234
83-4234 (D.
Kan.
266 Id. at 729
(citing Murphy,
Tarr v.
v. Riberglass,
Action No.
(D. Kan.
8, 1984)).
Feb. 8,1984».
256
256

257
257
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" ' 26 7
remedy provision]
provision] onto
onto the
the law
law of race
race discrimination.
discrimination."267
exclusive remedy
Addressing more
more squarely
squarely the issue
issue of
of whether
whether the
the federal civil
civil rights
Addressing
statutes
provided plaintiff
plaintiff an
an adequate
adequate alternate
alternate remedy, the court
court asstatutes provided
serted that
that Wynn's
Wynn's good
good faith claim
claim was not coterminous
coterminous with
with his fedserted
that even
even the
the Kansas
Kansas statutory
statutory scheme
scheme
statutory remedies,
remedies, noting that
eral statutory
268
268
Thus, the court
differed
differed from federal
federal antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law.
court reof
VIl plaintiffs
plaintiffs exclusive
exclusive avenues
avenues of
fused "to make § 1981 and Title VII
relief. "269
"2()9
relief.
The
The Wynn court's
court's recognition
recognition of
of two
two important
important but ostensibly
ostensibly obobreveals a critical
critical understanding
understanding of the
the nature
nature of racial
vious points reveals
vious
subordination.
court acknowledged
acknowledged explicitly
explicitly that Wynn's
Wynn's
subordination. First, the court
good faith claim
claim was
was directly
directly related to a public
public policy
policy against discrimalleged failure to act in good faith arose out
ination because
because Boeing's
Boeing's alleged
out
discrimination
of the same
same set
set of facts that gave
gave rise to his potential
potential discrimination
70 As the
claims.2270
court implied, however, this is not to say that the two
equivalent; each
each may require a distinct
distinct legal analysis
analysis of the
claims are equivalent;
7 1 Second, in refusfacts and provide
provide remedies
remedies of a different
different nature. 2271
Second,
of
ing to engraft an exclusive
exclusive remedy provision into
into the federal law of
discrimination, the Wynn court
court recognized
recognized implicitly the limitarace discrimination,
federal civil rights remedies, as well as the onerous
onerous burden
burden
tions of federal
refused to recognize federal
plaintiffs must carry in such cases,
cases, when it refused
27 2
claims as the exclusive
exclusive remedies
remedies for unlawful racial discrimination.
discrimination. 272
The problem
problem with making
making federal civil rights statutes a plaintiff's
plaintiffs ex2733 Under staturelief is difficult to obtain. 27
clusive remedy is that such relief
articulation of a
tory antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law, the defendant's mere articulation
plaintiffs termination
termination requires the
legitimate business
business reason for the plaintiffs
plaintiff to demonstrate
demonstrate that the defendant's reasons are a mere pre274
text for discrimination,
discrimination,274
a rather difficult
difficult task.
Thus, a critical reading of the Wynn court's opinion transforms
theoretical
theoretical critiques
critiques of conventional
conventional civil rights jurisprudence
jurisprudence into
broader
need
for
the
practice. The opinion addresses
addresses
broader remedies
outside of traditional civil rights jurisprudence
jurisprudence in order to deal more

267
268
269
269
270
270

Id.
fd.
Id.
fd.
Id.
fd.

[v. City
squarely within
within the
ambit of
Murphy [v.
See id.
id. at
at 729-30
729-30 ("Wynn's
("Wynn's case
case fits
fits squarely
Sefl
the ambit
of Murphy
City of
of
1981)]:
Services, 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)
Department of Labor
Labor Services,
County Department
Topeka-Shawnee County
Topeka-Shawnee
1: a
impermissible consideration
discharge based on the impermissible
consideration of race is prohibited by the public
policy of Kansas.").
Kansas.").
and accompanying
accompanying text.
text.
729; supra
supra notes
notes 268-69
271
See id.
id. at
at 729;
271
See
268-69 and
provide remereme("The Kansas
Kansas common
common law
law action
action may
may provide
272 See
See Wynn,
Wynn, 595
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 729
729 ("The
272
595 F.
under federal law and does not have requisites
requisites that the federal law
dies not available under
possesses.")..
possesses.")
273 Sell,
See, e.g.,
e.g., sujJTa
supra note 211 (discussing
(discussing the McDonnell
McDonnell Douglas
Douglas burden-shifting
burden-shifting frame273
cases).
work in Title VII cases).
note 211.
211.
See sujJTa
supra note
274 See
274
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effectively with the material conditions of racial subordination
subordination by exeffectively
panding
the
scope
of
the
implied
duty
of
good
faith
in the at-will
panding
at-will employment
ployment relationship. A critical
critical reading of the opinion also reveals
an implicit recognition
recognition of the perpetrator-victim
perpetrator-victim critique of civil rights
jurisprudence,
of
jurisprudence, and begins to address the broader
broader social problem of
racial
subordination
through
the
expansion
of
the
efficiency-modeled
racial subordination
efficiency-modeled
"perfect
contracting world."
Wynn decision
decision thus opens the door
"perfect contracting
world.'~ The
The l1Ynn
door
to an expansive equality approach to the doctrine of good faith.
rejected by the Tenth CirAlthough the Wynn
l1Ynn court's holding was rejected
275
intercuit in Poison,
Poison,275
and has not been widely followed, its significant
significant interdevelopment of both good faith and at-will
vention in the development
employment
employment jurisprudence
jurisprudence has support in other jurisdictions. 276 Yet,
Wynn approach, the implied
implied
even in cases in which courts follow the l1Ynn
duty of good faith is still used primarily as an instrument
effect
instrument to effect
27 7
efficiency.
In
order
to
develop
the
expansive
equality
perspective,
efficiency.277
expansive equality
examines two analogous
the next section examines
analogous cases consistent
consistent with Wynn.
l1Ynn.

2.

Cases: Rojo and
and Tate
Analogous Positive
Positive Cases:
California:Rojo v. Kliger
Kliger
a. California:

2 78 the Supreme Court
In Rojo v. Kliger,
Kliger,278
Supreme
of California
California held that the
Employment and Housing
(FEHA),279
California Fair Employment
Housing Act (FEHA)
,279 California's
California's
antidiscrimination statute, did not preclude
preclude state common
antidiscrimination
common law claims
28 0
employment discrimination.
relating to employment
discrimination. 28o
The Rojo plaintiffs, Emma
Rojo and Teresa Maloney, who were former medical assistants to the
the
defendant
defendant Dr. Erwin Kliger, alleged that they were compelled
compelled to leave
employment due to Dr. Kliger's "sexually harassing remarks and
their employment
2 1l
demands for sexual favors."
favors."281
Subsequently, Rojo and Maloney
Maloney sued
sued
Dr. Kliger and his medical
corporation,
asserting
statutory
claims
for
medical
for
sexual harassment in violation of FEHA, as well as common law tort
intentional infliction of emotional
emotional distress and wrongful
claims for intentional
28 2
discharge in contravention
of
public
policy.
Although Rojo involved
involved
contravention
policy.282
allegations of discrimination based
based on sex as opposed to race, and the
plaintiffs did not allege a breach of the duty of good faith, the court's
reasoning is instructive
instructive for purposes
purposes of this Article, because it can be
275
275
276
276

See
Poison v.
Davis, 895
895 F.2d
705, 709-10
709-10 (10th
Cir. 1990).
1990).
See Polson
v. Davis,
F.2d 705,
(10th Cir.
See,
e.g., Savage
Savage v.
Holiday Inn
Inn Corp.,
Supp. 311
311 (D.
1985); High
High v.
v.
See, e.g.,
v. Holiday
Corp., 603
603 F.
F. Supp.
(D. Nev.
Nev. 1985);
1984).
Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246
1246 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
277 See
Part I.B.
277
See supra
supra Part
LB.
278 801
801 P.2d
373 (Cal.
(Cal. 1990).
1990).
278
P.2d 373
279
CAL. GOV'T
12900-12996 (West
(West 1992
1992 &
279 CAL.
Gov'T CODE
CODE §§
§§ 12900-12996
& Supp.
Supp. 2003).
2003).
280 See
Rojo, 801
801 P.2d
P.2d at
376-83. The
The court
court also
also addressed
issue of
of whether
whether
280
See Rojo,
at 376-83.
addressed the
the related
related issue
the employees were required to exhaust the administrative process under the FEHA
FEHA before
bringing common
common law causes of action,
question negatively. See
bringing
action. The court answered
answered this question
id.
id. at 383-88,
383-88. However, the court's analysis
analysis of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
281
Id.
281
[d. at
at 375.
375.
282 See
id.
282
See id.
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used to address
address more broadly the elimination
elimination of other forms of iden283
tity-group based subordination. 283
The inconsistency
inconsistency of California's
California's lower courts on the particular
particular
issue of whether
whether the FEHA precluded common law claims, such as
those of the Rojo plaintiffs, was reflected in the procedural
procedural history of
of
the case itself. The trial court granted Dr. Kliger summary
judgment
summary judgment
based in part on the exclusive alternate remedy doctrine
doctrine and the
claims, 284 but the Court of
FEHA's preclusion
preclusion of state common law claims,284
Appeals reversed, holding that the FEHA did not preempt
preempt or preclude the common law claims that were related
employment
related to the employment
2855 Mfirming
Affirming the Court of Appeals,
discrimination facts. 28
Appeals, the California
California
FEHA
Supreme Court
Court in Rojo relied primarily
primarily on the language of the FEHA
itself:
itself:
"The provisions
provisions of
this part
part shall
be construed
"The
of this
shall be
construed liberally
liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing contained in this
part shall be deemed
deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the Civil
Rights Law or of any other law of this state relating
relating to discrimination
discrimination
of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age."

because
because
physical
physical

explained in State Personnel
As we explained
Personnel Bd. v. Fair
Fair Employment & HousHousing Comm
Commn....
meant to supplement, not suping
'n, ... :
: "The FEHA was meant
supplanted by, existing antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination remedies,
plant or be supplanted
remedies, in
opportunity to vindicate
order to give employees
employees the maximum opportunity
vindicate
....
their civil rights against
against discrimination
discrimination ....
""
By expressly
expressly disclaiming a purpose to repeal other applicable
applicable
....
Legislature has manifested an intent to
state laws ...
, we believe
believe the Legislature
amplify, not abrogate, an employee's
employee's common law remedies for injuries relating to employment
employment discrimination.
discrimination. Had
Had the Legislature
Legislature
SO.286
do SO.286
to do
knew how
plainly knew
it plainly
intended otherwise,
intended
otherwise, it
how to

Thus, the court concluded
concluded that "[t]he
"[t]he meaning
meaning of the FEHA is
clear ..... .. [T]he FEHA ...
... expressly
clear.
expressly disclaims
disclaims any intent to repeal
laws." 28 7 Moreover, the common law of Califorother applicable state laws."287
nia "provides any number
number of remedial theories to compensate
compensate for in2 88 and a failure
juries 'relating
'relating to discrimination,"'
to bring such
discrimination,"'288
28"3 For
group identity
and identity
formation, see
Devon W.
W. Carbado
Carbado &
2H3
For discussions
discussions on
on group
identity and
identity formation,
see Devon
&
Mitu
Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000); Devon
& Mitu
Mitu Gulati, Conversations
Devon W. Carbado
Carbado &
Mitu
Gulati, Working
Working Identity,
REV. 1259 (2000) (hereinafter
(hereinafter Carbado
Carbado &
& Gulati,
Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
Working
Identity]. Carbado
Carbado and
explores how cultural
expectations and conWorking Identity].
and Gulati's
Gulati's work explores
cultural expectations
structs of performative
performative identity in the workplace, in turn based on stereotypes
stereotypes and racial or
or
sexual scripting, impact employment discrimination
sexual
discrimination discourse.
284
See Rojo,
801 P.2d
P.2d at
at 375.
375.
2H4 See
Raja, 801
285
See id.
id. at
375-76.
2Hf> See
at 375-76.
286
Id. at
(quoting CAL.
CAL. GOV'T
GOV'T CODE
CODE §
§ 12993(a)
1992) (emphasis
(emphasis added)
added)
286
Id.
at 377-78
377-78 (quoting
12993(a) (West
(West 1992)
and State Pers.
Bd. v. Fair
Comm 'n, 703 P.2d 354, 359 (Cal. 1985».
1985)).
Per·s. Bd.
Fair Employment & Hous.
Hous. Comm'n,
287
Id. at
at 377,
377, 383.
383.
287
Id.
288
Id. at
at 377
377 (quoting
(quoting CAL.
GOV'T CODE
12993(a) (emphasis
(emphasis added».
added)).
2RH Id.
CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 12993(a)
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emotional distress and
related claims, such as Rojo's and Maloney's emotional
and
tortious
tortious discharge claims, would reflect
reflect the irresponsibility
irresponsibility and ineptinept2899
case. 28
such aa case.
handling such
attorney handling
ness of the attorney

One
arguments deserves a more deOne of the defendant's particular arguments
tailed discussion,
discussion, because the court's response
response to that argument is relevant to the analysis of the exclusive
exclusive alternate
alternate remedies
remedies doctrine
90 Kliger argued
discussed
fightdiscussed earlier in this Article.2290
Kliger argued that the "new rightexclusive
remedy"
rule
of
statutory
construction
exclusive
construction and the "preexisting
right-cumulative
right-cumulative remedies" doctrine supported the inference
inference that the
the
California
California legislature
legislature intended in enacting the FEHA to cover the en29 1
tire field of employment
fight-exclusive
employment discrimination.
discrimination. 291
The new right-exclusive
remedy
rule
requires
that
"where
a
statute
creates
a
right
that did not
remedy
requires
creates
not
exist at common law and provides
comprehensive and detailed reprovides a comprehensive
medial scheme for its enforcement, the statutory remedy is exclu292
sive."
In contrast, the preexisting
fight-cumulative remedies
sive."292
preexisting right-cumulative
doctrine dictates that "where a statutory remedy
remedy is provided for a preconsidered
generally considered
existing common law right, the newer remedy is generally
to be cumulative, and the older remedy may be pursued
at
the plainpursued
29 3
election."
tiffs election."293
In its first line of reasoning, the court summarily dismissed the
constructive doctrines, because "the pertinent
pertinent
applicability of these constructive
language of the FEHA is plain and its meaning unmistakable:
unmistakable: the act
act
expressly disclaims any
intent
to
repeal
other
state
laws
relating
to
disany
29 4 The
crimination, legislative
legislative or otherwise."
otherwise."294
court then went on to
attack the defendant's
defendant's argument
argument on its merits, criticizing the defenmisapplication of the doctrines. The court held that the cordant's misapplication
application of the doctrines simply established
rect application
established that the scope
scope of
of
categories expressly
its
the FEHA was limited to the categories
expressly enumerated
enumerated in its
discrimination only on those specified
specified
provisions, thus barring discrimination
289 Id.
Kliger advanced
advanced additional
interpretive challenges
challenges to
to the
continued validity
289
[d. Kliger
additional interpretive
the continued
validity of
of
common law claims in light of the provisions
provisions of the FEHA, but the Rojo court remained
remained
unpersuaded.
id. at 378 (rejecting defendant's
defendant's argument
un persuaded. See id.
argument that use of the term "repeal"
in
12993(a) of
of the
FEHA revealed
legislative intent to preserve
in section
section 12993(a)
the FEHA
revealed legislative
preserve only statutory, not
common law, remedial theories); id.
defendant's argument that the
id. at 378-81 (rejecting
(rejecting defendant's
the
statement in section 12993(c)
12993(c) of the California Legislature's
Legislature's intent to "occupy the field of
of
regulation of discrimination
expressed an intent
supersede all preexistpreexistregulation
discrimination in employment" expressed
intent to supersede
ing
state law
law except
except for
12993(c)).
ing state
for a particular
particular civil
civil code section referenced
referenced in section 12993(c)).
290 See
Part IV.B.1.
290
See supra
supra Part
IV.B.l.
291
291
292
292

Rojo,
P.2d at
at 381.
381.
Rojo, 801
801 P.2d
Id.
[d.

Id.
[d.
294
Id.
further criticized
criticized Strauss
Strauss v.
v. A.L.
A.L. Randall
Co., 194
194 Cal.
Cal. Rptr.
520 (Ct.
(Ct.
294
[d. The
The court
court further
Randall Co.,
Rptr. 520
App.
1983),
and
its
progeny
"needlessly"
applying
for
the new
new right-exclusive
right-exclusive remedy rule
rule
App. 1983), and its progeny
interpretation to the FEHA to preclude
of interpretation
preclude common
common law wrongful
wrongful discharge claims in violation of public policy, in light of the FEHA's
FEHA's express disclaimer of any intent
intent to preclude
preclude
other state law claims. Rojo, 801 P.2d at 383.
293
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295 In
In support
support of
of this
this holding,
holding, the
the court
court noted
noted that
that "we
"we have
have
grounds. 295
long recognized
recognized that
that the
the common
common law
law provides
provides a variety
variety of
of means
means inlong
dependent of
of the
the FEHA
FEHA ...
... to
to redress
redress injuries
injuries arising
arising from
from discrimidiscrimidependent
296
nation in
in employment."
employment."296
nation
Although the
the Rojo
Rojo court's
court's opinion
opinion bolsters
bolsters this
this Article's
Article's position
position
Although
that federal
federal and
and state
state antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination statutes
statutes do
do not
not and should
should
that
not preclude
preclude common
common law
law claims
claims based
based on
on related
related facts, the
the Rojo
Rojo opinopinthe
FEHA
of
interpretation
on
statutory
reliance
ion's
almost
singular
reliance
statutory
interpretation
FEHA
ion's almost singular
reveals a reluctance,
reluctance, either
either conscious
conscious or unconscious,
unconscious, to confront
confront a
reveals
harder question:
question: Why
Why do plaintiffs
plaintiffs need access
access to multiple
multiple theories of
of
harder
redress if civil
civil rights statutes
statutes provide
provide specific
specific remedies
remedies for discriminadiscriminaredress
tion? As suggested above, plaintiffs
plaintiffs need
need this
this access
access because
because of the
the
tion?
way legal
legal and
and nonlegal
nonlegal actors
actors have
have come
come to conceptualize
conceptualize discrimination as singularly
singularly egregious
egregious acts
acts of
of racism
racism perpetrated
perpetrated by bad
bad actors
tion
intend to inflict the subordinating
subordinating consequences
consequences of their actions,
who intend
2977
subordination. 29
rather than as a set
set of systemic
systemic conditions
conditions of
of subordination.
rather
The Rojo court's 1990
1990 decision
decision that the FEHA does
does not bar rediscrimination
to
extended
been
lated common law
law claims
claims has since
since
extended
discrimination
lated
299
298
298
based on race
and age.
Moreover, other
other states, such as
Moreover,
based
Oklahoma, have
have followed California's
California's lead in this regard.
Oklahoma,

b.

Oklahoma: Tate v. Browning-Ferris,
Browning-Ferris, Inc.
Oklahoma:

Inc., 30 0 the Supreme
Browning-Ferris, Inc.,30o
Supreme Court
Court of Oklahoma
Oklahoma
In Tate v. Browning-Ferris,
addressed the following question certified
certified by the U.S. District Court
Court
addressed
for the Western District of Oklahoma:
"Where an at-will employee
employee terminated by a private employer
employer
files suit alleging facts that, if true, violate state and federal statutes
employment discrimination, can the emproviding remedies for employment
ployee-plaintiff state a tort cause of action based on the same facts,
ployee-plaintiff
exception to the at-will termination
pursuant to the public policy exception
termination
Burk
Supreme Court in Burk
rule, recently recognized
recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme
1989)?"31
v. K-Mart, 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989)?"301

affirmative, "noting that
The Tate
Tate court answered this question in the affirmative,
The
the federal statute violated does not preempt state law and holding
295
295
296
296
297
297
298
298
299
299
300
300

801 P.2d
P.2d at
at 381.
381.
See Rojo,
Rojo, 801
See
Id.
[d.
III.A.
supra Part
Part IIl.A.
See supra
See
1991).
(Ct. App.
App. 1991).
Cal. Rptr.
Rptr. 143
143 (Ct.
Pers., 285
285 Cal.
Temp. Pers.,
v. Alfano
Alfano Temp.
See, e.g.,
e.g., Carmichael
Carmichael v.
See,
1997).
1157 (Cal.
(Cal. 1997).
Court, 941
941 P.2d
P.2d 1157
v. Superior
Superior Court,
See, e.g.,
e.g.,
Stevenson v.
See,
Stevenson

1992).
(Okla. 1992).
P.2d 1218
1218 (Okla.
833 P.2d
833
policy
the public
public policy
adopted the
of Oklahoma
Oklahoma adopted
Supreme Court
Court of
In Rurh,
Burk, the
the Supreme
Id. at
at 1220.
1220. In
[d.
1989).
28 (Okla. 1989).
24, 28
rule. 770
770 P.2d 24,
termination rule.
at-will-employment termination
tort exception
exception to the at-wiII-employment
of good
good faith
faith
an implied
implied covenant of
refused to
to impose an
although it refused
noted that
that although
The Rurh
Burk court
court noted
The
tort
policy tort
public policy
of the public
recognition of
id. at
at 27, recognition
to terminate, id.
decision to
on
on an employer's decision
and
the employee
employee and
of society,
society, the
the competing
competing interests of
served "to
"to accommodate the
exception served
id. at 28.
employer," id.
the employer,"
the
301
301
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prothat the applicable state statute neither explicitly nor implicitly prodiscrimination." 30 2
employment-related discrimination."302
vides an exclusive remedy for employment-related
Tate, aa Black male, had been employed at BrownThe plaintiff in Tate,
ing-Ferris, Inc. as a driver, but was demoted to "driver's helper," allegso that a less qualified and less senior White employee could be
edly so
promoted to Tate's driver position. 330033 Tate also alleged that he had
subjected to harassment and intimidation while employed at
been subjected
Browning-Ferris,
discrimination claim with the EEOC,
Browning-Ferris, and he filed a discrimination
04
males.3304
Black males.
against Black
charging Browning-Ferris with discrimination against
Tate was later terminated, and he subsequently filed another EEOC
complaint charging Browning-Ferris
Browning-Ferris with racially motivated wrongful
30 5
first EEOC
for the filing of the first
retaliation
discharge in
EEOC complaint.
complaint. 305
When the EEOC issued Tate a right-to-sue
right-to-sue letter, he brought an action
action
in federal
federal court against Browning-Ferris, asserting violations of Title
in
Title
VII in addition to state tort claims for wrongful discharge in contrapolicy. 30 6
vention of public policy.306
The Tate court first addressed
preliminary question
addressed the preliminary
question of
of
Oklahoma's antidiscrimination
whether Oklahoma's
antidiscrimination statute
statute is preempted
preempted by Title
Title
VII, which provides
ifthey actuprovides that "state laws will be preempted
preempted only if
actu30 7 Concluding
ally conflict with federal
law."
that
Title
jederallaw."307 Concluding
VII does not preemployment discrimination
noted
empt Oklahoma's
Oklahoma's employment
discrimination laws, the court noted
two well-settled
well-settled principles
principles established by the U.S. Supreme
Supreme Court in
308 First,
California Federal
Savings &
& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra.
Guerra.308
Tate
California
Federal Savings
the Tate
court referenced
the
Supreme
Court's
interpretation
in
Guerra
of
Tireferenced
interpretation
Guerra
tle VII's limited preemption
preemption provisions
provisions as "explicit
"explicit disclaimers
disclaimers of any
federal intent categorically
'occupy the
categorically to preempt
preempt state
state law or to 'occupy
the
field'
employment discrimination."309
discrimination."' 30 9 Second, the Tate court noted
field' of
of employment
that, under Guerra,
Guerra, Title
Title VII acts as a floor, rather than as a ceiling,
with
fedwith respect
respect to
to the scope
scope of protection
protection that may be
be provided
provided by fed"
10
Moreover,
noted
eral or state antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law. 3310
Moreover, the court
court noted
Tate's
inadequacy of both Title VII and
Tate's own assertions about
about the inadequacy
Oklahoma's
statutes
as
remedies
for
racial discrimination:
Oklahoma's
remedies
discrimination: these statutory schemes,
schemes, Tate claimed,
claimed, not only
only failed to make him whole, they
31
also failed to deter
deter discriminatory
discriminatory practices.
practices. 31 I
302
302

Tate, 833
at 1220
Tate,
833 P.2d
P.2d at
1220 (emphasis
(emphasis omitted).
omitted).
Id.
at
1221
n.9.
Id. at 1221 n.9.
Id.
& n.9.
Id. at
at 1221
1221 &
n.9.
Id.
Id.
306
Id.
306
Id.
307
§§ 2000e-7,
307 Id.
Id. at
at 1222
1222 (citing
(citing 42
42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§
2000e-7, 2000h-4
2000h-4 (2000)).
(2000)).
308
Id.
& nn.13-14
308
Id. at
at 1122-23
1122-23 &
nn.13-14 (citing
(citing Cal.
Cal. Fed.
Fed. Sav.
Say. &
& Loan
Loan Ass'n
Ass'n v.
v. Guerra,
Guerra, 479
479 U.S.
U.S.
272, 281, 285 (1987)).
272,281,285
(1987)).
309
309 Id.
Id. at
at 1222
1222 &
& n.13
n.13 (quoting
(quoting Guerra,
Guerra, 479
479 U.S.
U.S. at
at 281).
281).
310
Id.
at
1222-23
&
1223
n.14
(citing
Guerra,
479
310
Id. at 1222-23 & 1223 n.14 (citing Guerra, 479 U.S.
U.S. at
at 285).
285).

303
304
304
305
305
303

311
31 1

See
See id. at
at 1223.
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Returning
Returning to
to the
the more
more relevant
relevant question
question of
of whether
whether the state
state antidiscrimination
precluded plaintiffs
plaintiffs from bringing
bringing tortious
tidiscrimination statutes
statutes precluded
wrongful
based on racially
racially motivated
motivated discrimination,
discrimination,
wrongful discharge
discharge claims
claims based
the Tate court
court acknowledged
acknowledged that the
the courts
courts of
of various states
states were
were dithe
3 12
Some
vided on
on this issue.
issue.,m
Some states
states simply
simply precluded
precluded state
state common
common
vided
313 Others relaw claims
claims based
based on statutory
statutory exclusive
exclusive remedy
remedy theories. 313
preclude all state claims, but, employing
employing narrow
narrow applications
fused to preclude
fused
employment doctrine, limthe public policy
policy exception
exception to the at-will employment
of the
ited the
the availability
availability of common law
law tort actions
actions to those circumstances
circumstances
in which
which wrongful
wrongful discharges
discharges in contravention
contravention of public policy "would
"would
'3
14
other
courts
otherwise
unvindicated by a civil remedy.
remedy."314 Still
otherwise go unvindicated
held that state common
common law
law claims supplemented rather than sup"the
planted
planted the goals
goals of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination statutes, reasoning
reasoning that
that "the
discrimination
future
common-law
tort
action's
availability
deter
discrimination
deter
may
availability
common-law
3 15
and combat entrenched
entrenched existing illegal employment
employment practices."
practices."315
ultimately followed
The Tate court ultimately
followed the approach
approach of this third catOklahoma antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination statute
egory of cases, holding that the Oklahoma
did not preclude
preclude Tate from asserting a claim for tortious wrongful
discharge in violation of the public policy against racial discriminadischarge
tion, or for unlawful
unlawful retaliation
retaliation in response
response to a racial
racial discrimination
discrimination
316
3In
Rojo, the Tate
Tate
California Supreme Court did in Raja,
complaint.
As the California
court applied
applied conventional
conventional canons
canons of statutory
statutory interpretation to supcourt
Oklahoma statute was
port its
its conclusion,
conclusion, noting in particular that the Oklahoma
3 17 Further,
construed liberally to further its general
general purposes."
purposes."317
"to be construed
enacting the
the court expressly rejected the argument
argument that, by enacting
the
Oklahoma
Oklahoma statute, the legislature had intended the statute
statute to occupy
the entire field of not only employment
employment discrimination, but also all
employer/employee
employer/employee regulations:
That conclusion
conclusion would be far from sound. Regulation of discrimination
places it
nation lies in many legal domains. Since the Act's purpose places
source
in pari materia
materia with Title
Title VII, which was not meant to be the sole source
construction
redress for employment
of redress
employment discrimination,
discrimination, a reasonable construction
would be that the remedies provided by our Act are not exclusive.
even
indicate a legislative
legislative intent to even
There is nothing in the Act to indicate
of legally reguenter, much less completely occupy, the entire arena oflegally
relationship. 3 18
employer/employee relationship.318
lated employer/employee

312
313
313
314
314
315
315

See id.
id. at
at 1223
1223 n.21.
n.21.
See
text.
and accompanying
accompanying text.
Id.; see
see supra
supra notes
notes 291-92
291-92 and
[d.;
Tate,
Tate, 833 P.2d at 1223 n.21.
Id. Notably, among the cases the Tate court cited for this proposition is Wagenseller
Wagenseller
[d.
STAT.
1985), superseded
superseded by ARIZ.
Scottsdale Memorial
Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985),
v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hospital,
ARIZ. REv. STAT.
(discussing
ANN. § 23-1501 (West 2002).
ANN.
2002). See supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text (discussing
Wagenseller)..
Wagenseller)
316
Tate, 833
833 P.2d at 1230-31.
1230-31.
31n
Tate,
Id. at 1228
1228 &
& n.54.
317 [d.
318
Id. at
at 1229
1229 (footnote
(footnote omitted).
omitted).
318
[d.
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Finally, the Tate court invoked the Oklahoma
Oklahoma Constitution's
Constitution's mandate
3 19
discrimination remedies."
against "dichotomous division of discrimination
remedies."319

c.

Tying Up Rojo and
and Tate

The Rojo and Tate courts reached a desirable conclusion
conclusion by refusantidiscrimination claims as precluding to construe state or federal antidiscrimination
discharge in
ing or preempting
preempting state common
common law claims of wrongful discharge
contravention
discrimination. Moreover, alcontravention of a public policy
policy against discrimination.
though
reasoning
though both Rojo and Tate presented
presented a solid first line of reasoning
language of the statutes themselves and rooted in the
guided by the language
application of well-established
statutory interpretation,
well-established canons of statutory
interpretation, the
Tate court's reasoning
reasoning is more consistent
consistent with the theoretical
theoretical approach advocated in this Article.
First, in a turn consistent with the critical race critique
critique of antidis320 )
crimination
it320)
crimination statutes, the Tate court (like the Wynn court before
before it
explicitly recognized
recognized Tate's assertions
assertions that the remedies provided by
antidiscrimination
statutes
antidiscrimination statutes were inadequate to provide the relief
relief
sought, assertions that can be read to express a dissatisfaction
dissatisfaction with
with the
traditional
perpetrator perspective
conventional civil rights juristraditional perpetrator
perspective of conventional
21 Although
prudence.
prudence. 321
the Tate court
court did not explicitly adopt or extrapolate broader principles
principles from Tate's assertions, the court's early
reference
of
reference to them arguably implies
implies that Tate's
Tate's assertions-those
assertions-those of
3 22
-had
the "victim" in the language
language of Freeman 322
-had some impact on the
the
court's
court's analysis and decision.
The Tate
Tate court also expressly stated that the regulation of discrimination lay in "many legal domains."323
domains." 32 3 This statement
statement is significant
significant
not only because
because it potentially broadens
the
conventional
legal
underbroadens
conventional
understanding
discrimination as a function of particular
standing of discrimination
particular egregious
egregious acts or
or
conduct, but also because it recognizes
recognizes the complex ways in which
which
systemic conditions of subordination
subordination manifest
manifest themselves in the workplace. An employee may not be able to point to a single actionable
actionable
incident
incident of blatant discrimination, such as the pervasive use of humiliating racial epithets in his presence or the expressed
expressed refusal to promote him because
because of his race, but that will not diminish the inequality
of his situation. He understands,
understands, for example, that he will be held to
an implicitly higher
higher standard
standard in the review process
process relative to other,
similarly situated
situated White employees; that his work will be scrutinized
scrutinized
much more carefully
and
critically
than
that
of
his
White
carefully
critically
White counter319
319
320
320

Id.
at 1229-30
1229-30 &
& 1230
1230 n.65
(emphasis omitted)
(citing OKLA.
OKLA. CONST.
CONST. art.
art. V,
V, §§ 46).
ld. at
n.65 (emphasis
omitted) (citing
46).
See
supra
notes
259-76
and
accompanying
text
(discussing
Wynn
v.
Boeing
Military
See supra notes 259-76 and accompanying text (discussing Wynn v. Boeing Military

1984)).
Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984)).
321
See
notes 191-99
191-99 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
321
See supra
supra notes
text.
322
See
notes 191-98
and accompanying
accompanying text.
322
See supra
supra notes
191-98 and
text.
323
Tate, 833
P.2d at
at 1229.
323
Tate,
833 P.2d
1229.
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parts; and that he will have to calculate more scrupulously the risk of
work-related decisio'ns
decisions because of this enhanced
enhanced scrutiny, while his
his work-related
White colleagues
colleagues will have
have given similar decisions little or no
24
and professional
thought.3324
The psychic, emotional, intellectual, and
worktolls that attach to these kinds of precautionary
precautionary practices in the workplace are severely burdensome, yet they are generally
ignored
by
angenerally ignored
3325
2
The significance of the Tate
Tate court's reasoning
reasoning
tidiscrimination law. 5 ,The
is that,
that, although it makes no explicit reference to these issues, it seems
recognize implicitly that discrimination, from a victim's perspective,
to recognize
involves much more than conventional
conventional civil rights law contemplates.
remedies must remain available to plaintiffs.
Thus, other remedies
The contours of those other remedies, however, were limited in
both Rojo and Tate
Tate to tortious wrongful
wrongful discharge claims, and did not
extend to contractual claims for breach
breach of the duty of good faith. In
Bakken v. North-American
Corp.3 26 and Bennett
Bennett v. Beiersdoif,
Beiersdorf, Inc.,
North' American Coal
Coal Corp.326
Inc.,
3 27 federal courts
however,
in
the
districts
of
North
Dakota
and
Conhowever,327
courts
Dakota
necticut, each applying the law of its respective state, expressly stated
that public policies against discrimination
discrimination based on gender or race
cannot
implied
cannot support an at-will employee's claim for breach
breach of the implied
covenant
of
good
faith
and
fair
dealing.
Similarly,
the Supreme Court
covenant
Court
of California
National, Inc.
Inc. has expressly limited the
California in Guz v. Bechtel National,
use of good faith claims to combat age discrimination
discrimination in the at-will
328
328
context.
employment
employment context.

3.

Analogous Negative Cases:
Cases: Contractual
Claims
Analogous
Contractual Good Faith
Faith Claims
a.

Bakken
Bakken v. North
North American Coal
Coal Corp.

The Bakken
Bakken case, although
although not involving racial discrimination,
discrimination, is
an
discrimination case. The plaintiff
an analogous
analogous sex discrimination
plaintiff brought
brought an action
action
against her former employer alleging sex discrimination
violation
discrimination in violation
of Title
Title VII, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal329
award of
faith sufficient
sufficient tojustify
ing, and bad faith
to justify an
an award
of punitive
punitive damages.
damages. 329
Bakken
Bakken began working as a secretary
secretary for North American Coal in Feb33
330
ruary
1977.
0
Over
the
next
ruary 1977.
Over
next two
two years she received
received salary increases,
increases,
and was promoted
to
the
position
promoted
position of technical
technical assistant in October
October
331 A
1979._331
changed to research
1979.
A few months later, her title was changed
research technician, and she continued
continued to receive steady
steady and
and substantial
substantial raises over
over
324
324
325
325
426
326
327
327

328
328
329
329
330
330

331
331

See
& Gulati,
Working Identity,
See Carbado
Carbado &
Gu1ati, Working
Identity, supra
supra note
note 283,
283, at
at 1263-66,
1263-66, 1279-98.
1279-98.
See
See id.
id. at
at 1276-98.
1276-98.
See
1015, 1023
See 641
641 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 1015,
1023 (D.N.D.
(D.N.D. 1986).
1986).
See
(D. Conn.
See 889
889 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 46,
46, 49
49 (D.
Conn. 1995).
1995).
See8
See 8 P.3d
P.3d 1089,
1089, 1109-12
1109-12 (Cal.
(Cal. 2000).
2000).
Bakken,
Bakken, 641
641 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1017.
1017.
Id.
Id. at
at 1016.
1016.
Id.
Id.
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discrimination suit against
the next few years. 332 Bakken filed a sex discrimination
against
North American
American Coal alleging that her salary
salary was less than that of a
male employee in her department, even though
though theirjob
their job responsibili333
In addition, she alleged that, alties were essentially the same.
though she submitted a request for a transfer to Cleveland when her
her
opportunity to transfer
transfer
department was relocated,
relocated, she was denied the opportunity
because North American
American Coal's president disliked women and had
instructed Bakken's
Bakken's supervisors to discourage
discourage her from transfer34
Bakken
ring. 3334
Bakken sought another
another position with North American
American Coal in
in
335 Bakken
Cleveland, but another woman was hired for that position. 335
Bakken
then filed a complaint with the North Dakota Department
Labor
Department of Labor
3336
36
alleging sex discrimination.
discrimination.
Shortly thereafter, Bakken's superviinformed her that her position as research technician
sors informed
technician was to be
3377 She was subdepartment moved to Cleveland. 33
eliminated when her department
sequently offered another, apparently lesser position at North Amerikeypunch operator; however, she declined
can Coal as a secretary
secretary and keypunch
declined
8
338
the offer. 33
At the time she was offered this position, one of her supervisors told her that she would not receive her promised severance
severance
pay unless she agreed to abandon her claim with the Department
Department of
of
Labor.33g
Labor.339
The court sustained
sustained Bakken's Title VII sex discrimination
discrimination claim
claim
contractual good faith claim, but dismissed the claim for puand her contractual
nitive damages under both the Title VII and the contractual
contractual good
3340
40 Because
recognized an
faith theories.
Because North Dakota had not yet recognized
an
action for breach of the implied covenant
covenant of good faith in the context
context
of at-will employment, the court first determined
Supreme
determined that the Supreme
Court of North Dakota
would
recognize
such
an
action
only
if the
Dakota
recognize
341
341
covenant
covenant is implied in fact in an employment arrangement.
The
court then held that Bakken had presented genuine issues of material
332
333
333
334
334
335
336
336 .
337
337
338
339
339

Id.
[d.
Id.
[d.

id. at 1016-17.
1016-17.
See id.
Id.
1017.
[d. at 1017.
Id.
[d.

Id.
[d.
Id.
[d.
Id.
[d.
340 See
See id.
at 1018-19,
1018-19, 1022-23.
1022-23. The
asserted that
that North
would recognize
recognize
340
id. at
The court
court asserted
North Dakota
Dakota would
the implied
covenant
of
good
faith
only
as
an
implied-in-fact
contract
term,
not
as a term
implied
only
implied-in-fact contract
implied
implied in law. Id.
[d. at 1022. Thus, although the court refused
refused to grant
grant summary
summary judgment
judgment
against
against Bakken on this claim, it noted
noted that she would ultimately need to support this claim
proof of representations
representations by North American
American Coal sufficient
sufficient to establish an implied-inwith proof
fact duty of good
id. at 1022-23.
good faith. See id.
341
Id. at
at 1020,
1022. However,
However, the
Supreme Court
Court of
of North
North Dakota
Dakota later
later rejected
the
341
[d.
1020, 1022.
the Supreme
rejected the

Bakken court's analysis
analysis and held that at-will employment contracts
contracts do not contain an implied
plied covenant of good
good faith and
and fair dealing. See Hillesland
Hillesland v. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n, 407
1987).
N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.
(N.D. 1987).
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fact regarding whether North American
American Coal had, through its conduct, objectively
objectively manifested
to
Bakken
that "she had job security
manifested
security and
and
'3 42
fairly.
would be treated
"342
Significantly, however, the court also suggested that a contractual
contractual
good faith claim, as opposed
opposed to a tort claim alleging violation
violation of public policy, "cannot rest solely on an alleged
alleged violation
violation of a public policy
discrimination. '34" The court discussed
against discrimination."34!1
discussed the exclusive
exclusive alternate
remedy doctrine, stating that
[m]ost courts that have considered
considered the question
question have held that the
presence
presence of a statutory remedy for violation of an anti-discrimination statute precludes a common law action based on violation
violation of a
public policy against discrimination.
discrimination. Those courts have generally
held that the remedy scheme
anti-discrimination
scheme provided
provided in an anti-discrimination
intended to define the exclusive remedy
statute is
is intended
remedy against discrimination. Other considerations
considerations include use of a public policy exception to circumvent
circumvent an anti-discrimination
procedural and
anti-discrimination statute's procedural
3 44
remedial
remedial limitations. 344
Thus, the Bakken court refused to permit contractual
contractual good faith claims
to rest solely on alleged
alleged violations of public policy, and seems to have
condemned implicitly such claims
condemned
claims as attempts to circumvent conventional civil rights law.

b.

Bennett v. Beiersdorf, Inc.

The plaintiff in Bennett,
Bennett, an African
Mrican American
American woman, sued her
former employer and supervisor, asserting state law claims for breach
breach
of
of the covenant
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent infliction
infliction of
emotional distress, and tortious interference
interference with a contract, as well as
discrimination on the basis of race.345
race.3 45 Bea Title VII claim alleging discrimination
cause her good faith claim was factually related to the Title VII claim,
Bennett argued that, under Connecticut law, the defendants had
mandated
breached the covenant of good faith in violation of a clearly mandated
public policy prohibiting
employment
discrimination
on
the
basis of
prohibiting employment discrimination
346
race. 34fi
Despite the public
public policy against discrimination, the court
dismissed Bennett's good
good faith claim.
[I]
[I]tt is
is not sufficient simply to point to an important public policypolicya
bringinga claim for
covenant of good
good faith
a plaintiff
plaintiff bringing
for violation
violation of the covenant
faith and
fair
dealingmust also
also establish
that she does
does not otherwise
an adequate
fair dealing
establish that
othenuise have an
adequate
vindicatingthat public
public policy. For example, the public policy
means of vindicating
claim
against age discrimination in employment cannot
cannot justify a claim
based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because there
342
342
343
343
344
344
-345
345

346
346

Bakken, 641
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1022-23.
1022-23.
Bakken,
641 F.
id. at 1023.
See id.
Id. (citation
(citation omitted).
omitted).
[d.
See 889
F. Supp.
46, 48-49, 51
51 (D.
(D. Conn. 1995).
1995).
See
889 F.
Supp. 46,
See id.
id. at
49.
See
at 49.
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are already sufficient statutory
statutory remedies. As with age discriminastatutory remedies
discrimination in employment
employment
remedies for race
race discrimination
tion, the statutory
are sufficiently
sufficiently well developed to preclude
independent cause of
of
preclude an independent
action. Indeed, plaintiff's complaint alleges violations of both state
discrimination in employand federal statutes dealing
dealing with race discrimination
[good
Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted
ment. Defendants'
granted as to the [good
3 47
claim], with prejudice.
faith claim],
prejudice. 347

Aside from providing, in essence, a restatement of the exclusive alternate remedy
remedy doctrine, the Bennett court offered
offered no reasoning in support of its dismissal of Bennett's
Bennett's good faith claim.
c.

A Special
Special Case:
Case: Guz v. Bechtel
Bechtel National, Inc.

The reasoning
California in Guz v. Bechreasoning of the Supreme
Supreme Court of California
3348
48
is only
tenuously related to that used by the Bakken
National,Inc.
tel National,
Inc.
only.tenuously
Bakken
and Bennett courts
courts to bar contractual
contractual good faith claims. Yet it warrants
Supreme Court of California's
discussion because the Supreme
California's decision in Guz
employment doctrine
began to limit the erosion of the at-will employment
doctrine by exindependent recovery for breach of the implied covebarring independent
pressly barring
violation
nant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of the alleged
alleged violation
349
349
of a clear
public
policy
against
age
discrimination.
clear
discrimination.
Guz, a twenty-two year employee
employee of Bechtel
Bechtel National, Inc.,
Inc., was
terminated at the age of forty-nine, when his work unit was eliminated
terminated
eliminated
350
Bechtel office. 350
and its responsibilities
responsibilities reassigned.to
reassigned. to another
another Bechtel
Guz
1971 and he readministrative assistant in 1971
was originally
originally hired
hired as an administrative
351
two decades.
next two
ceived numerous
numerous raises and promotions
promotions over
over the
the next
decades. 351
supervisor for
At the time of his discharge,
discharge, he was the financial reports
reports supervisor
for
352
352
1992, a new
In 1992,
management information unit.
Bechtel's in-house management
became dissatisfied with the inefficient performpresident of Bechtel became
53
After considering
ance of Guz's work unit.3353
Mter
considering different proposed busithe
new
ness and budget
plans,
budget
new president
president decided to transfer
transfer the
unit's work responsibilities to a similar work group in one of Bechtel's
Bechtel's
4
354
Bechtel
transferred only the two
regional offices. 35
Bechtel retained
retained and transferred
youngest
youngest employees
employees of Guz's unit to the regional office,
office, while
while Guz
off,
and
their
responsibilities
older
employees
were
laid
and the other
other
employees
off,
Id.
[d. (emphasis added) (citations
(citations omitted).
omitted).
88 P.3d
P.3d 1089
(Cal. 2000).
\089 (Cal.
2000).
349
The
case abrogated,
abrogated, in part, the California
decision in Walker
349
The Guz case
California appellate court's decision
Cross, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184
1992), a case in which the court permitted
v. Blue Cross,
184 (Ct. App. 1992),
permitted
covenant of good
plaintiff
plaintiff to bring an action alleging a claim for breach
breach of the implied covenant
good
faith and fair dealing that was related to the plaintiff's
plaintiffs FEHA claims for race, sex, and
and
1111-12.
physical
physical handicap discrimination. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1111-12.
350
Guz, 8 P.3d at 1095-96.
350
351
Id.
351
[d. at 1095.
Id.
352
352
[d.
353
353
See id.
id. at 1096.
354
354
See id.
id. at 1096-97.
347
347

348
348

em
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355 Guz was laid
assumed by current employees
employees at the regional office. 355
laid
off and placed
placed on temporary holding status for six months, pending
56 During
reassignment to another position at Bechtel.3356
possible reassignment
that
time, three other
positions
became
available
in
the
group
that
asother
sumed
employees aged
sumed Guz's duties, but they were
were filled by other employees
aged
57
forty-two,
forty-two, fifty-two, and thirty-eight.3357
Guz obtained
obtained no other position
position
with Bechtel during those six months, and Bechtel subsequently
subsequently ter58
3358
employment.
his
minated
Following his termination, Guz sued Bechtel, asserting claims of
of
discrimination in violation of the FEHA, breach of an implied
age discrimination
implied
contract to be terminated
terminated only for good cause, and breach
breach of the im359
Guz's good faith
plied covenant
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
dealing.35!J
claim was based
based solely on his allegations that, assuming the employment relationship had been at-will, Bechtel violated
violated its own personnel
terminated him without giving him an opportunity
policies when it terminated
opportunity to
improve
performance, failed to use objective
objective criteria
criteria when selectimprove his performance,
ing him for layoff, and failed to consider
consider him for other
other open
open positions
36
°
360
for which
which he was qualified. 1 In essence,
essence, Guz argued implicitly that
that
Bechtel
Bechtel violated
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
dealing
by refusing to use objective
criteria-other than age-in evaluating
evaluating
objective criteria-other
him as a candidate for layoffs and for other positions with Bechtel.
The Supreme Court of California
California flatly rejected
rejected the availability of
of
a good faith claim under these circumstances,
circumstances, not on preemption
preemption
grounds, but because Guz had attempted
attempted to use the duty of good faith
to "impose substantive terms and conditions
conditions beyond
beyond those to which
which
''
36
the contract parties
agreed. ' The court further explained
parties actually agreed."361
explained
that:
The covenant
covenant of
of good
good faith
faith and
and fair
fair dealing, implied
The
implied by law in every
contract, exists merely
merely to prevent
prevent one contracting
contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits of the

agreement actually
actually made.
agreement
made. The covenant
covenant thus cannot
cannot""'be
'be endowed
endowed
with an existence
with
existence independent
independent of its contractual
contractual underpinnings."'
underpinnings.'"
It cannot
cannot impose substantive
contracting parsubstantive duties or limits on the contracting
ties beyond
their
beyond those incorporated
incorporated in the specific
specific terms of their
agreement.

Id.
fd. at 1097.
Id.
fd.
357
Id.
Apparently, Guz
conceded in
the course
litigation that he never specifi357
fd. Apparently,
Guz conceded
in the
course of the litigation
wanted
cally applied
applied for these positions, but he insisted that he had made it known that he wanted
to stay at Bechtel. fd.
Id.
358
Id.
358
fd.
359
Id. at 1094, 1112.
1112.
359
fd.
360
Id. at
1109-10.
360
fd.
at 1109-10.
361
ld.
at
361
!tL
at 1110.
1110.
355
355

356
356
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...Precisely because
employer
...
because employment
employment at will allows the employer
employer
freedom to terminate the relationship as it chooses,
chooses,. the employer
contractual rights merely
does not frustrate the employee's contractual
merely by doing
doing
362

SO.362
SO.

retreated to a more rigid application
Thus, the court
court retreated
application of the at-will
employment doctrine
doctrine and rejected categorically
categorically the good faith exceptermination rule.
tion to the at-will termination
The Guz court's
court's reasoning, however, is more persuasive than that
reaching similar results, because
because
of the Bakken and Bennett courts in reaching
certain termination
Guz's good faith allegations pointed to certain
termination proce363 If Guz had explicitly
Bechtel had not agreed. 363
dures to which
which he and Bechtel
Bechtel had inappropriately
alleged that Bechtel
inappropriately considered
considered his age in refusing to reassign him to other positions and in selecting
selecting him for layoff,
layoff,
3 64
Rojo.of
light
in
so,
Perhaps
different?
been
have
result
the
would
different? Perhaps so, in light of Rojo.364

d.

Critique of the Negative
Cases
Critique
Negative Cases

It is unclear whether Guz could have saved
saved his good faith claim
claim by
employment actions were
alleging explicitly
explicitly that Bechtel's
Bechtel's negative employment
motivated by improper consideration
consideration of Guz's age. Such allegations,
however, were at least implicit in his charge that Bechtel failed to use
objective criteria
criteria in its decision making. Nonetheless, the discussion
discussion
conditions to which the
of good faith in Guz focused narrowly on the conditions
the
parties agreed,365
agreed, 365 despite,
despite, or perhaps
perhaps because
because of,
of, California's
California's adop3666
tion of the Restatement (Second)
(Second) of Contracts
Contracts approach
approach to good faith.36
Such a narrow approach
approach may be attributable
attributable to the California courts'
courts'
concerns that the doctrine of good faith leads to the theoretical
concerns
theoretical conflation of contract
tort.367 Indeed,
contract and tort.367
Indeed, the doctrine
doctrine of good
good faith
implicate Grant
prediction
raises concerns that implicate
Grant Gilmore's infamous prediction
368
law. 368
into tort
its absorption
regarding the "death of contract" by
regarding
by its
absorption into
tort law.
This Article, however, takes issue with contractual
conceptions of
contractual conceptions
of
traditional economic
good faith, because traditional
economic analysis is pervasive in contract theory. Thus, the dominant
dominant conception
conception of good faith in contract
contract
369
economic analysis. 369
law derives
derives almost exclusively from economic
However,
because a system of effective
effective private agreements
agreements is critical to the proId.
omitted).
[d. (citations
(citations omitted).
See
id. at
at 1109-lO
1109-10 (describing
(describing Guz's
Guz's allegations
that Bechtel
Bechtel failed
failed to
to follow
own
See id.
allegations that
follow its
its own
personnel
policies);
supra
notes
361-62
and
accompanying
text.
personnel policies); supra
and accompanying
364
See
364
See supra
supra Part
Part IV.B.2.a.
IV.B.2.a.
365
See
Guz, 88 P.3d
at 1109-lO.
1109-10.
365
See Guz,
P.3d at
366
See,
v. Interactive
Interactive Data
Corp., 765
P.2d 373,
389-90 (Cal.
366
See, e.g.,
e.g., Foley
Foley v.
Data Corp.,
765 P.2d
373, 389-90
(Cal. 1988)
1988) (citing
(citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(1981)).
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF
OF CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS § 205 (1981».
367
See,
e.g., id.
id. at
at 393-94.
393-94.
367
See, e.g.,
368
See
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-112 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
368
See GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-112 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
362
362

363
363

broader
contracts is collapsing into the law of torts).
torts). The broader
1974) (arguing that the law of contracts
theoretical
Gilmore's book is beyond the scope of this Article.
theoretical question raised by Gilmore's
369
See
369
See supra
supra Part
Part I.B.
LB.
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cess of wealth formation, Malloy's
Malloy's law and market economy theory
plays a crucial role in this Article's analysis. Malloy's theory asserts
that wealth formation depends
depends at least as much upon creativity, disefficiency. 3 v
covery, and social responsibility
responsibility as it does upon
upon efficiency.370
exception
The narrow economic approach to the good faith exception
categorical analysis of exceptions
exceptions to
makes sense in the context of a categorical
compartmentalization of the
doctrine.3 7' This compartmentalization
the at-will employment doctrine.37I
exceptions directs courts to separate
separate completely
completely the questions of what
what
3 72
Yet, if the
constitutes good faith and what constitutes public policy.
policy.372
duty of good faith reflects "community standards of decency, fairness
37 3
or reasonableness,"
reasonableness,"373
and public policy also reflects social conceptions of fairness and equity, why should these two aspects of the conseparated in theory or doctrine?
tractual employment relationship
relationship be separated
The separation of good faith and public policy
policy derives from the domicourts' use of the
nance of economic
economic analysis of contract
contract law and the courts'
doctrine of good faith to advance
advance purely economic analyses. That is,
in cases in which courts use the excluder analysis of good faith to
efficiency 374 and define the duty of good faith as one that
bring about efficiency374
"exists
merely
contracting party
party from unfairly frustrat"exists merely to
to prevent
prevent one
one contracting
actually
ing the other
other party's right to receive
receive the benefits of the agreement
agreement actually
'3 75
made,
made,"375
they dilute the duty's primary equitable
equitable purpose:
purpose: to serve the
76
in a way that reflects "community standards of deends of justice
justice3376
challenges that
reasonableness. ' 377 This Article challenges
cency, fairness or reasonableness."377
approach to the doctrine
practice and advocates an expansive
expansive equality approach
independent noof good
good faith, an approach
approach that takes into account
account independent
tions of justice
justice and fairness.
The reasoning of courts holding that good faith claims are pre378 is problematic
antidiscrimination statutes 378
cluded by state or federal antidiscrimination
problematic
because it ignores
ignores the difference in remedy available
available under different
different
on
theories of recovery
recovery simply because the respective claims are based on
370 See
supra Part
Part III.
370
See supra
I.
seen, for
371 This
This categorical
categorical analysis
can be
371
analysis can
be seen,
for

v. Scottsdale
Scottsdale Memoexample, in
Wagenseller v.
example,
in Wagenseller
Memorial Hospital,
supersededby ARIz.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501
rial
Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025
1025 (Ariz. 1985),
1985), superseded
23-1501 (West
2002).
2002). See supra notes 233-46 (discussing
(discussing Wagenseller).
Wagenseller).
372 This
This Article addresses the good faith exception
372
exception (rather than the public policy exception) because
because of its broad applicability
applicability to other aspects of contract law. Moreover, the
employment context
at-will employment
context seems to be the most obvious starting point
point for advocating an
an
expansive equality
equality approach to the duty
duty of good faith because good faith claims in this
employment
context are inextricably
inextricably related to discrimination claims. Thus, the at-will employment
context enables both a critique of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law and
and an integrative
integrative proposal
proposal for
confronting racial
racial subordination.
subordination.
373
RESTATEMENT
cmt. aa (1981);
(1981); see
373
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(SECOND) OF
OF CONTRACrs
CONTRACTS §§ 205
205 cmt.
see supra
supra Part I.A.
LA.
374 See supra
374
supra Part i.B.3.
I.B.3.
375 Guz
v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089,
1110 (Cal. 2000).
375
Guz v.
1089, 1110
376 See
text accompanying
accompanying notes
46-48.
376
See supra
supra text
notes 46-48.
377
RESTATEMENT
205 cmt.
cmt. a (1981).
(1981).
377
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(SECOND) OF
OF CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS § 205
378 See,
e.g.,
supra
Part IV.B.3.a-b
(discussing the
Barrett cases).
378
See, e.g.,
supra Part
IV.B.3.a-b (discussing
the Bakken
Bakken and
and Barrett
cases).
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the same set of facts. In many cases, however, it is the lawyer's
lawyer's obligation to present
present multiple
multiple theories of recovery. Moreover, the remedies
provided by bre2.ch
breach of good faith claims
claims and discrimination
discrimination claims
3 79
recognized implicitly,
are, as the Wynn court recognized
implicitly,379
often dramatically difdifferent, as are the respective burdens a plaintiff must carry in order to
380 The substantive and procedural
prevail.
procedural limitations
limitations on civil rights
prevai1. 380
remedies
approach to good
remedies drive the need for an expansive equality
equality approach
faith.
As discussed above, the plaintiffs burden in proving a civil rights
8'
claim can be quite onerous. 3381
For instance, the defendant
defendant in a Title
VII case can rebut the plaintiffs
plaintiff's prima
prima facie case merely
merely by articulating a legitimate
legitimate business
business reason for the challenged
challenged employment action, and the plaintiff faces significant difficulties in demonstrating
demonstrating
that the articulated
articulated justification
justification is purely pretextual.
pre textual.38
3822 The Title VII
burden-shifting
framework exemplifies
burden-shifting framework
exemplifies Freeman's perpetrator-victim
perpetrator-victim
3
8
3
383
critique
carry
critique
of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination law. By forcing the plaintiff
plaintiff to carry
such a heavy burden, the framework presumes that conditions
conditions of rasubordination no longer
cial subordination
longer exist. In short, the framework
framework privileges
the alleged perpetrators'
construct
of
reality
over
that of the victims.
perpetrators'
Perpetrators and victims perceive
Perpetrators
perceive reality very differently, and this difdif38 4
ference
ference in perception
perception is the red flag of continued racial
racial inequality.
inequality.384
This Article does not suggest that antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination statutes are
unnecessary or should be repealed, or that we as a society are not
unnecessary
indebted to past and current
current civil rights struggles. Our civil rights
continued protection,
protection, and civil rights laws
must, of course, receive continued
of
have at the very least attempted to eliminate direct and overt forms of
38 5
discrimination in the workplace. 385
discrimination
However, this Article identifies
strengthen its assault against racial subways in which the law should strengthen
ordination, in light of the inherent
inherent limitations
limitations of current civil rights
laws. That body of law does not reckon with the pervasiveness
pervasiveness of unconscious
conscious racism, which is essential
essential to the reproduction
reproduction of conditions
of subordination.
subordination.
The solution to this problem is not to import the Title VII standard into an analysis of contractual
contractual good faith claims. Such a propoperpetrator perspective
perspective into the
sal would simply embed the existing perpetrator
doctrine of good faith. It is beyond
beyond the scope of this Article to formuSee supra
272-74 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
See
supra notes
notes 272-74
See,
note 211
(discussing the
Douglas burden-shifting
burden-shifting frameSee, e.g.,
e.g., supra
supra note
211 (discussing
the McDonnell
McDonnell Douglas
framecases).
work in Title VII cases).
381
See supra
381
See
supra note
note 211.
211.
382 See
See supra
382
supra note
note 211.
211.
383 See
See supra
and accompanying
accompanying text.
383
supra notes
notes 191-99
191-99 and
text.
384
Feagin and
and Sikes
Sikes have
have also
of racial
in the
the modern
modern
384 Feagin
also observed
observed conditions
conditions of
racial inequality
inequality in
sociocultural landscape. See FEAGIN
FE.AGIN &
sociocultural
& SIES,
SIKES, supra
supra note 208, at vi-x, 15-18.
385
See supra
385
See
supra Part
Part III.A.1.
III.A.I.
379
379
380
380
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late legal standards or bright-line
bright-line rules establishing what conduct constitutes good faith or bad faith. However, in analyzing the meaning of
of
good faith and fair dealing, courts should be permitted
permitted to take into
prejudice and the conditions
account plailitiffs'
plarf'1tiffs' perceptions
perceptions of racial prejudice
of racial subordination.
Such
a
shift
in
focus is necessary
necessary not only
subordination.
because society should be committed to the elimination of racial subordination,
ordination, but also because
because the ways in which we "do business" will be
be
38 6
affected
If the docaffected positively by social equality and responsibility.
responsibility.386
trine of good faith functions to produce the conditions of a perfect
perfect
contracting environment,387
environment, 3 7 why should it be concerned
contracting
concerned solely with
ensuring
exchange transactions
ensuring the most efficient conditions,
conditions, when exchange
and wealth formation
are
driven
more by creativity and discovery
formation
discovery than
than
388
efficiency?388
by efficiency?
3899 require reThe current
current models of the doctrine of good faith 38
construction.
because of the legal comconstruction. These models exist in part because
partmentalization
remedies for racial subordination into the realm
partmentalization of remedies
realm
of antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination jurisprudence,
jurisprudence, which constructs civil rights law,
inaccurately, as the exclusive and adequate
adequate solution to problems
problems of
of
subordination.
subordination. Accordingly, courts are generally unwilling to consider race
substantive areas of law, such as contract. Permitrace in other substantive
ting considerations
considerations of race in contract
contract law will not eliminate the
pervasiveness
of
the
perpetrator
perspective in antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination
pervasiveness
perpetrator perspective
3 90
3
9
law,
equality, 1 or conditions of unconscious
law,390 restricted notions of equality,391
3 92
racism.
expansive 'equality
equality approach to the doctrine of good
racism.392
An expansive
faith, however, uses good faith in an attempt to construct
construct a contracting environment
environment that reflects a societal commitment
commitment to ending
subordination.
subordination.

3186
This
is so
as Malloy
has noted,
and market
institutions ...
... vary
vary
386
This is
so because,
because, as
Malloy has
noted, "[1]egal
"[Ilegal and
market institutions
reference to the cultural-interpretive
cultural-interpretive framework in which they operate." ROBIN PAUL
PAUL
with reference
MALLOY,
LAW IN
IN A
A MARKET
MARKET CONTEXT:
TO USING
USING MARKET
MARKET CONCEPTS
IN
MALLOY, LAw
Cor·nEXT: AN
AN INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION TO
CONCEPTS IN
LEGAL
(forthcoming Dec. 2003) (manuscript at 14, on file with author). In
LEGAL REASONING
REASONING (forthcoming
turn, those cultural-interpretive
cultural-interpretive frameworks, themselves
themselves informed
informed by factors such as race,
gender, and class, are "used to shape markets, to segment markets,
markets, and to discriminate
discriminate
within and between
Id. (manuscript
understanding and applying
applying
between markets." [d.
(manuscript at 14-15). By understanding
interpretive law and market
approach, see supra
market economy approach,
supra Part II, "successful
"successful marMalloy's interpretive
ket economies
institutions that promote a
economies can be understood as being facilitated by legal institutions
concern for others-for third parties and for a public
advanced
concern
public interest
interest that is not always advanced
by the fragmented
fragmented pursuit
self-interest," MALLOY, supra
supra (manuscript
15).
pursuit of self-interest,"
(manuscript at 15).
387
See
Part I.B.3.
387
See supra
supra Part
I.B.3.
388
See
supra
note
127 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
388 See supra note 127
text.
3 89
See,
e.g., supra
Part IV.B.3.a-c
Bakken, Barrett,
Barrett, and
and Guz).
389
See, e.g.,
supra Part
IV.B.3.a-c (discussing
(discussing Bakken,
Guz).
390
See
supra
notes
191-99
and
accompanying
text.
390
See su/1ra notes 191-99
accompanying
'491
See
notes 204-10
and accompanying
accompanying text.
text.
391
See supra
supra notes
204- \0 and
392
See
supra
notes
200-03
and
accompanying
text.
392
See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
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V
V
CONTRACTUAL
THE EXPANSIVE-EQUALITY
EXPANSIVE-EQUALIlY APPROACH
APPROACH TO CONTRACTUAL

GOOD
SCHUSTER V. DEROCILI
DERoCiLi
GOOD FAITH: SCHUSTER

The Supreme
Supreme Court of Delaware
Delaware recently decided a case that ilexpansive equality approach
lustrates how an expansive
approach might function in practice. In Schuster
Schuster v. Derocili,
Derocili, the plaintiff alleged
employer
alleged that her employer
breached
breached its implied duty of good faith by discriminating against her
her
3
93
393
Schuster serves as a solid model for an exon the basis of gender.
pansive equality
equality approach because
because the court's reasoning demonstrates
cognizable
a commitment to the eradication
eradication of discrimination
discrimination against cognizable
identity groups.
The plaintiff, Linda Schuster, was hired by defendant CompliEnvironmental Inc. as a temporary
administrative assistant in
ance Environmental
temporary administrative
394
September 1997.
About a month later, she became
became a full-time emSeptember
ployee of Compliance
Compliance under a written employment
employment contract specify3955 Schuster
ing that the employment
worked
employment relationship was at-will. 39
Schuster worked
primarily
defendant Derocili, "the president and controlling shareprimarily for defendant
holder of Compliance."396
Compliance. 3 9 6 Shortly thereafter,
thereafter, Derocili allegedly beinappropriate sexual conduct
gan to engage in inappropriate
conduct directed at Schuster,
397 Schuster
including
including both sexual comments and physical advances. 397
Schuster
98 She
contended
rejected Derocili's advances.3398
contended that she repeatedly rejected
She
complained of this sexual conduct to two coworkers,
coworkers, and, upon councomplained
sel of a religious advisor, began
recording Derocili's conduct in ajourajourbegan recording
3 99
nal and rejecting his advances
advances more vigorously.
vigorously.399
December 1998, Derocili terminated
In December
terminated Schuster, citing substandard job performance,
performance, even though she had received
received several pay
raises and performance-based
performance-based bonuses from Compliance, including
including
one performance-based
performance-based bonus only a week prior to her termina40 0 Believing that she
tion. 40o
Believing
was actually terminated for refusing
refusing Derocili's advances,
Schuster filed a complaint
complaint with the Delaware
Delaware
advances, Schuster
4011 She also filed a lawsuit in state court alleging
Department of Labor. 4°
breach
breach of contract
contract based on violation of the implied
implied covenant
covenant of good
good
402
12 The trial court granted summary judgment
faith and fair dealing. 4°
judgment
to Derocili on the breach of contract claim, holding
holding that, because Delaware's
employment
discrimination
statute
provided an "elaborate
discrimination.
aware's
393
393
394
394

395

396
396
397
398
398
399
400
400

401
401
402
402

775 A.2d 1029, 1031-32
1031-32 (Del.
775
(Del. 2001).
2001).
Id. at 1031.
ld.
103l.
ld.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
at 1031-32.
1031-32.
ld. at
See id.
id.
See
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statutory remedy"
remedy" for
for sexual
sexual harassment,
harassment, Delaware
Delaware did
did not
not recognize
recognize
statutory
3
4403
common law
law claim
claim for
for sex
sex discrimination.
discrimination. 11 However,
However, the
the DepartDepartaa common
ment of
of Labor
Labor had
had already
already dismissed
dismissed Schuster's
Schuster's complaint
complaint under
under the
the
ment
4
40
404
statute.
antidiscrimination
Delaware
antidiscrimination
statute.
Delaware
On appeal,
appeal, the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court of
of Delaware
Delaware addressed
addressed two
two imporOn
questions relevant
relevant to this
this Article's
Article's discussion.
discussion. The
The court
court first extant questions
amined whether
whether "there
"there exists
exists a common
common law cause
cause of
of action
action for sexual
sexual
amined
harassment based
based upon
upon a breach
breach of
of the
the implied
implied covenant
covenant of good
good
harassment
in
doctrine
employment
faith
and
fair
dealing
exception
to
the
at-will
employment
doctrine
in
at-will
to
the
dealing exception
faith and
in which
which the termination
termination is alleged
alleged to have violated
violated a recogcases in
legally cognizable
cognizable public policy
policy exception
exception to at-will
at-will employnized, legally
''4° 5
legislature
Delaware
the
It
then
turned
to
whether
the
Delaware
legislature
ment."405
whether
to
turned
then
ment.
Statute
Employment
"intended...
"intended ... Delaware's
Delaware's Discrimination
Discrimination in Employment Statute [ I]] to
sole remedy
remedy for aa claim
claim of
of sexual
sexual harassment
harassment by
by a terminated
terminated
be the sole
40 6
employee."406
employee.
The Schuster court held that a common
common law
law good
good faith claim is
employment disvalid under
under such circumstances
circumstances and that Delaware's
Delaware's employment
crimination statute
statute does not provide
provide an exclusive
exclusive remedy, distinguishcrimination
4077 The
court had relied. 40
many cases upon which the lower
lower court
ing the many
40 8
and
lower court had
had relied
relied on Ayres v. Jacobs
Jacobs & Crumplar,
Crumplar, P.A.
P.A.408
and
lower
9
4°
supported the
Drainer v. O'Donnell,
O'Donnell,409
which, read
read together, arguably
arguably supported
the
1 which,
Drainer
position that Delaware's
antidiscrimination statute precluded
precluded
Delaware's antidiscrimination
position
10
Ayres, a case
Schuster's common
common law claim. 4410
case in which the plaintiff
plaintiff
Schuster's
his
court
brought a breach
of
good
claim
in
court
after
federal
state
faith
breach
statutory discrimination
relied on andiscrimination claims were dismissed, in turn relied
4 11
Hercules Inc.
Finch v.
other Delaware case, Finch
v. Hercules
Inc. 411
In Finch,
Finch, the U.S. District
District Court for the District of Delaware
Delaware predicted that the Delaware Supreme
Supreme Court would not recognize
recognize a comemployment doctrine
mon law public policy exception to the at-will employment
scheme
because the legislature had enacted "an elaborate
elaborate statutory scheme
'4 12
Schuster court
addressing the same public policy concerns.
concerns."412
The Schuster
in
Crothall-American, in
noted, however, that it had decided Merrill
Merrill v. Crothall-American,
which it recognized
the first time the good faith exception to the
recognized for the
Finch was deat-will employment
employment doctrine, in the same year that Finch
403
403
404
404

405
40fi
406
406
407
407
408
408
409
409
410
410
411
412
412

at
Id. at
Id.
at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
!d.

omitted).
marks omitted).
quotation marks
(internal quotation
1032-33 (internal
1032-33
1032.
1032.

Id,
!d.
id. at
at 1032-40.
1032-40.
See id.
See
1996).
Dec. 31,
31, 1996).
Ct. Dec.
Super. Ct.
(Del. Super.
769331 (Del.
WL 769331
1996 WL
96C-07-258-WTQ 1996
No. 96C-07-258-WTQ,
No.
28, 1995).
Ct. July 28,1995).
Super. Ct.July
(Del. Super.
WL 338700
338700 (Del.
1995 WL
No. 94C-08-062,
94C-08-062, 1995
No.
1034.
at 1034.
A.2d at
775 A.2d
Schuster, 775
See Schuster,
See

769331, at *12.
*12.
(D. Del.
Del. 1992);
1992); see
see Ayres,
Ayres, 1996
1996 WL 769331,
809, F. Supp.
Supp. 309
309 (D.
80Q.F.
312.
at 312.
F. Supp.
Supp. at
Fiich,809
809 F.
Finch,
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4 13
cided. 413
Moreover, in 1996 the court
court set forth in E.I.
E.l. DuPont
DuPont de
de
Nemours & Co.
Co. v. Pressman
PressmanDelaware's categorical
categorical approach
approach to the
Nemours
the doctrine of good faith, which
which included a category
category for violations
violations of public
41 4
policy.414
policy.
Drainer,the court similarly dismissed the plaintiffs common
In Drainer,
common
law sexual harassment claim because
because Delaware
Delaware had not recognized a
common
common law cause of action for employment discrimination,
discrimination, and sugremedy. 415
provided an
gested that the Delaware
Delaware statute
statute provided
an exclusive
exclusive remedy.415
4 16
v. ICIAmericas
Wright v.
The Drainer
Drainer court, however, had relied on
on Wright
ICI Americas Inc.,
Inc.,416
which involved an alleged violation
violation of a specific
specific provision
provision of the Dela41 7
violation. 417
that violation.
on that
only
based
claim
law
ware statute and a common
common
claim based only on
Schuster court distinguished
distinguished Drainer
Drainer and Wright,
Wright, noting
The Schuster
noting that
that
Schuster had not asserted a claim
claim arising directly from any specific
specific
provision of the Delaware
Delaware statute:

Schuster ...
. . . asserts a common
Schuster
common law claim for a breach of an
an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing derived from her concontract
tract of
oj employment. Therefore
Therefore we do not decide that a plaintiff may
discrimination
employment discrimination
assert a private cause of action for employment
based on sexual harassment
harassment on the theory
theory that the Delaware legislature "intended [such] remedies" under [a particular
particular statutory proviassert
sion]. We do today, for the first time, decide
sion].
decide that a person may assert
actionJor
for breach
breach of
covenant of
faith based
based upon
aa cause of
oj action
oj an implied covenant
ojgood Jaith
condone sexual adaa termination
termination alleged
alleged to have resulted
resulted from a refusal to condone
advances. This private
of action
actionflows directlyfrom Delaware's
Delaware'sclear
clearand
vances.
private cause oj
firmly rooted
rooted public
public policy to deter,
punish sexual harassment
harassmentin
deter, prevent and punish
418
workplace.418
the workplace.

.

Thus, the Schuster court synthesized the public
public policy
policy and good faith
exceptions
to
the
employment-at-will
doctrine.
exceptions
employment-at-will
Next, addressing
preclusion issue, the court noted that the
addressing the preclusion
Delaware
Delaware statute did not by its language
language proscribe related
related common
law claims:
While this Court will not "engraft
language which
"engraft upon a statute
statute language
which has
been
excluded therefrom
therefrom by the Legislature,"
Legislature," because of the
been clearly excluded
insidious
natureof
insidious nature
oj sexual harassment
harassment in the workplace,
workplace, we conclude
conclude that
the General
harassment in an exGeneral Assembly intended to combat sexual harassment
pansive rather
ratherthan
than restrictive
restrictivescheme. The statute in question
question does not
413
413

1992)).
1992)).
414
414

1996)).
1996)).
415
415

Schuster, 775
775 A.2d
A.2d at
1035 (citing
Merrill v.
Crothall-Am., Inc.,
606 A.2d
A.2d 96
96 (Del.
(Del.
Schuster,
at 1035
(citing Merrill
v. Crothall-Am.,
Inc., 606
Id. (citing
(citing E.!.
E.I. DuPont
de Nemours
& Co.
Co. v.
v. Pressman,
A.2d 436,
436, 441-44
441-44 (Del.
(Del.
[d.
DuPont de
Nemours &
Pressman, 679
679 A.2d
See
Drainer v.
v. O'Donnell,
O'Donnell, No.
No. 94GQ8-062,
94G-08-062, 1995
338700, at
*2 (Del.
1995 WL
WL 338700,
Super. Ct.
Ct.
See Drainer
at *2
(Del. Super.

1995).
1995).

See
id. (citing
(citing Wright
Wright v.
v. 1CI
ICI Americas
Americas Inc.,
813 F.
Supp. 1083,
1083, 1091
1091 (D.
(D. Del.
Del. 1993)).
1993)).
See id.
Inc., 813
F. Supp.
See
Wright, 813
813 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. at
at 1090-94.
See Wright,
1090-94.
418
775 A.2d
at 1036
1036 (first
in original)
original) (emphasis
(emphasis added)
added) (footnote
(footnote
418 Schuster,
Schuster, 775
A.2d at
(first alteration
alteration in
omitted).

416

416
417

417
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explicitly
explicitly state that the remedies
remedies contained within it are exclusive
exclusive to
all others, therefore, it is entirely
entirely consistent with the General Assembly's intention
intention to promote civilized conduct in the workplace to allow pripricauses of action
actionfor breach
breach of contract
contractbased upon termination solely
vate causes
caused
caused by a failure to respond to unwanted sexual advances by an
4 19
employer. 419
conventional interpretive
interpretive approach in
Although the court employed
employed a conventional
in
its analysis, it made clear that its reasoning and decision were consis2 0
standards. 4420
community standards.
with community
tent with the legislative intent and
and with
Derocili and Compliance
Compliance also argued
argued that Schuster
Schuster had failed to
satisfy the two-prong
two-prong test for breach
breach of the covenant of
of good faith and
42 1
fair dealing under the public policy category.
This two-pronged
two-pronged
category.421
test required, first, that Schuster
"assert
a
public
interest
recognized
Schuster
recognized
by some legislative, administrative
admi!listrative or judicial
judicial authority" and, second,
that she "occupy
"occupy a position
position with responsibility
responsibility for advancing or sustaining
interest."422 The first prong was not at issue in
taining that particular interest."422
in
423
423
the case.
Schuster's
argument
regarding
case.
Schuster's argument regarding the second prong, however, was particularly
particularly noteworthy. The court stated:
Schuster contends
because she was as [sic] an employee
contends that because
employee to
to
whom Derocili allegedly made sexual advances,
advances, she necessarily
necessarily occupied a position
position with responsibility
responsibility for advancing
advancing public policy condemning
that conduct.
that
conduct. She argues that if in fact the statutory remedy
remedy is not
not
exclusive,
exclusive, and there exists a private cause
cause of action in contract, then
if she cannot assert
assert the public policy designed to protect her by
asserting
imposasserting that common law cause of action, it would be legally impossible for
any
person
similarly
situated
to
enforce
the
public
policy
excepfor
person similarly situated
excep-'
tion asserted here. The common law private
private cause
cause of action would
would
42 4
meaningless. 424
be meaningless.
The court agreed
agreed with Schuster's reasoning
reasoning and reemphasized the significance
nificance of its holding as an effort to combat
combat sexual harassment
harassment in
in
the workplace.
Shuster
an alleged victim directly
Shuster [sic] is analleged
directly injured
injured by the alleged public policy breach. Accordingly,
standing..
Accordingly, she has standing
harassment in the workplace
. . . has
.* .
. .' Combating
Combating sexual
sexual harassment
workplace ...
nothing
company from pursuing
nothing to do with deterring or thwarting a company
its legitimate
legitimate business goals.
workplace is a systemic social
social problem
Sexual harassment
harassment in the 'workplace
problem
that involves a personal
personalassault
assault on the recipient.
recipient. Preventing
Preventingit is of immense
that
social value,
value, and
and combating
combating it promotes
public policy of this State.
social
promotes the public
State. As
419
420
421
422

423

424

Id. at
at 1037-38
1037-38
[d.
See id.
id.
See
See id.
id. at
at 1038.
1038.
See
Id.
[d.
[d.
Id.
Id. at
at 1038-39
1038-39
[d.

(emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
omitted).
(emphasis
added) (footnote

(emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
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unwelcomed sexual advances
such, the unfortunate
unfortunate recipient of unwe1comed
responsibility contemplated
contemplated by the public policy
holds a position
position of responsibility
4 25
exception. 425
Schuster is remarkable
demonstrates a nuanced underremarkable because it demonstrates
entrenchment of sexual subordination
subordination in the workstanding of the entrenchment
place. Moreover, this understanding
understanding applies by analogy
analogy to cases
involving other forms of subordination
subordination based
based on cognizable
cognizable identity
groups. Three
Three of the Schuster court's
court's conclusions are particularly helpful in illustrating the mechanics of an expansive
expansive equality
equality approach
approach to
good faith.
Schuster court acknowledged
First, as discussed
discussed above, the Schuster
acknowledged explicitly the interconnection
interconnection between
between the public
public policy and good faith exceptions to the at-will employment
employment doctrine. Although
ceptions
Although Delaware
Delaware has
recognized
tithe, 4 2 6 courts
courts in other jurecognized this interconnection
interconnection for some tirile,426
4 7
2
Moreover,
risdictions have often ignored
ignored or rejected it.
it. 427
Moreover, the court
court
refused
reason around the contractual
refused to reason
contractual nature of Schuster's
Schuster's claim by
recasting
... asserts
recasting it as a tortious breach
breach claim, noting that "Schuster ...
a common
common law claim for a breach of an implied covenant
covenant of good faith
employment."42 8 The court
and fair dealing
dealing derived
derived from her contract
contract of employment."428
expressed
Schuster's good faith claim on
on
expressed no need to further justify Schuster's
economic
economic terms, as other courts
courts have, presumably
presumably because
because the court
understood
understood that parties
parties to a contract are entitled to receive the benefits flowing from the terms of the contract
contract in a manner that conforms
429
with "community
standards
of
fairness,
decency or reasonableness."
"community standards
decency
reasonableness."429
After all, if courts
Mter
courts used the duty of good faith exclusively
exclusively as a device
device to
ensure adherence
adherence to contract terms, the doctrine
doctrine of good
good faith would
merely duplicate the standard breach
breach of contract
contract claim. In other
other
application of the doctrine
words, by infusing its application
doctrine of good faith with
notions of equality, the Schuster court breathed
breathed life back into the doctrine of good faith.
'
Second, in holding that the Delaware antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination statute
did not preclude Schuster's contractual good faith claims, the court
demonstrated
demonstrated both
both its ability to deconstruct the lower court's
court's analysis
and statutory
statutory interpretation,
interpretation, and a profound
profound understanding
understanding of the
the
pervasive,
pervasive, systemic nature of sexual subordination. Although
Although the
recognized that conditions of sexual subordination
subordination may be allecourt recognized
Id.
at 1039
1039 (emphasis
Id. at
(emphasis added).
added).
See,
e.g.,
Lord
v. Souder,
Souder, 748
393, 400
(Del. 2000)
See, e.g., Lord v.
748 A.2d
A.2d 393,
400 (Del.
2000) (recognizing
(recognizing termination
termination
that violates
termination); E.l.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours
violates public
public policy as a form of bad faith termination);
Nemours &
&
Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 441-44
1996) (same).
441-44 (Del. 1996)
427
See, e.g.,
e.g., Manuel
Manuel v.
v. lnt'l
Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F. Supp. 45, 50-51
427 See,
50-51 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (reasoning
employment context, the good
soning that, in the at-will
at-will employment
go~d faith exception
exception is distinct from
the public
public policy exception); supra
supra Part IV.B.3.
428
Schuster, 775
A.2d at
1036 (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
428 Schuster,
775 A.2d
at 1036
429
RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND)
OF
CONTRACTS
cmt. aa (1981).
429 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 205
205 cmt.
(19,81).
425
425
426
426
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viated in part
part by antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination laws, it ultimately
ultimately refused to limit
the struggle against inequality
inequality to that corner
corner of the law.
Third, the court's
court's approach
approach is particularly
particularly valuable
valuable because it
provided
combat sexual subordiprovided Schuster
~chuster a meaningful
meaningful legal tool to combat
nation in the workplace,
workplace, beyond the perpetrator-centered
perpetrator-centered antidiscrimination framework that had already failed her. Moreover,
because courts have used this tool-the implied
implied obligation of good
good
conditions of a perfect confaith-as a device for approximating
approximating the conditions
tracting environment, the Schuster
Schuster court effectively
incorporated a
effectively incorporated
commitment
conception of the perfect contracting
commitment to equality into its conception
environment.
Few courts since Schuster have addressed squarely the viability of
of
good faith claims under Delaware's construction
construction of the at-will employ4 11
Schatzman v. Martin
Dealership, Inc., the
ment doctrine. 430
In Schatzman
Martin Newark Dealership,
plaintiff, a White
male,
sued
his
former
employer,
alleging retaliatory
White
termination
after
he reported
termination
reported a coworker for using racially derogatory
4 3'
language.
language.431
In addition to his federal civil rights claims, the plaintiff
claimed that his employer
employer had breached
breached the covenant of good faith
432
and fair dealing under Delaware
The defendant dealership
Delaware law. 432
dealership argued that the state antidiscrimination
antidiscrimination statute was an exclusive remedy
433
that barred the plaintiff's
Although
plaintiff's common law good faith claim. 433
Although
the court acknowledged
acknowledged the support
support in the lower courts
courts for defendant's argument,434
argument,43 4 it then turned
Schuster, stating that:
turned to Schuster,
[T]he Delaware
Delaware Supreme
Supreme Court recently held as a matter of first
[T]he
impression that a plaintiff can maintain a common law claim for
impression
discriminatory conduct, such as sexbreach of the Covenant due to discriminatory
ual harassment, despite the fact that said conduct
is prohibited
prohibited by
conduct is
both state and federal law. The
The Court finds this reasoning to be
circumstances, which involves [sic]
equally applicable to the instant circumstances,
retaliatory
conduct against an
an employee
retaliatory conduct
employee who reported
reported racially discriminatory conduct
to his
superiors. Therefore,
Therefore, the
Court conconduct to
his superiors.
the Court
concriminatory
430
v. larif
A.2d 1254,
1254, 1258
1258 &
nn.6 &
& 77 (Del.
(Del. Ch.
Ch. 2002),
2002), the
the Delaware
Delaware
430 In
In Holland
Holland v.
Zanf, 794
794 A.2d
& nn.6
discussed briefly whether
antidiscrimination statute created
created
Chancery Court discllssed
whether the Delaware antidiscrimination
a private right
right of action. The court noted that:
[C]ourts interpreting
interpreting the Act have held
held that it creates
creates no private
private right of
of
Act
action independent
independent of the administrative procedures set forth in the Act
itself. Other decisions have rejected
rejected common law claims premised on discrimination prohibited by the Act, reasoning that the Act created a statucrimination
tory remedy in derogation of the common law employment-at-will
employment-at-will doctrine,
and that complainants
complainants are stuck with the relief provided
provided for them expressly
by the Act.
Id. at 1258 (footnotes omitted).
[d.
omitted). Curiously, the Chancery Court cited decisions
decisions of the Delaware lower
courts and
and federal district court in support of its observation,
observation, despite its explicit
explicit
ware
lower courts
recognition
Schuster. See id.
id.
recognition of the Supreme
Supreme Court of Delaware's contrary
contrary decision
decision in Schuster.
431
158 F.
Supp. 2d 392, 397 (D.
2001).
431 158
F. Supp.
(D. Del. 2001).
432
432

433
433
434

Id.
[d.
See id.
id. at 399.
[d.
Id.
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cludes
eludes that Plaintiff's
Plaintiffs breach
breach of Covenant
Covenant claim
elaim falls
fans within the
the
4 35
public
public policy
policy exception
exception to the
the at-will
at-win employment
employment doctrine.
doctrine. 435
Thus,
Thus, Schatzman used
used the Schuster decision
decision to sustain
sustain a claim
claim based
based on
on
White plaintiffs
plaintiff's refusal
refusal to
to tolerate
tolerate racially
racially pejorative
pejorative remarks
remarks in
in the
the
a White
workplace.
workplace.
The court in Reed v. Agilent Technologies,
Technologies, Inc., on
on the other
other hand,
The
failed
failed to acknowledge
acknowledge Schuster,
Schuster, and
and accordingly
accordingly refused to recognize
recognize
43 6
In Reed,
plaintiff's breach
breach of
of good
good faith claim.
claim. 436
Reed, the plaintiff
plaintiff
the plaintiff's
Title VII claims
claims for "reverse"
"reverse" discrimination
discrimination and
and common
commOn law
brought Title
37
Although
breach of good faith claims against
against his former employer.
employer.4437
Although
breach
have reached
reached the correct
correct outcome,
outcome, the court incorrectly
incorrectly anaReed may have
Supreme
Reed's good faith claim. Reed misstated
misstated the Delaware's
Delaware's Supreme
lyzed Reed's
4438
38
Court's
holding
in
Lord
v.
Souder.
Specifically,
the
Reed
court
stated
court stated
Souder.
the
Court's holding in
that
that one
one of
of the
the good
good faith exceptions
exceptions to the at-will doctrine
doctrine is "where
remedial scheme
and no other
the termination
termination violates
violates public policy
policy and
other remedial
' 4- 9
However, neither Lord nor E.I. DuPont
exists."
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
exists."439
Pressman
Pressman incorporated
incorporated the alternate remedies doctrine
doctrine into the cate440
gorical
exceptions. 440
The Reed court thus bypassed
bypassed an opgorical good faith exceptions.
subordination and Reed's
portunity to discuss
discuss the nature
nature of racial
racial subordination
Reed's
portunity
attempt to misappropriate
misappropriate the rhetoric
rhetoric of civil rights jurisprudence.
Certainly
Certainly the court could
could have
have reached
reached the same
same conclusion in a more
addressed Reed's good
nuanced
nuanced manner
manner had it directly
directly addressed
good faith claim.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
of
This Article has argued that courts
courts should use the doctrine
doctrine of
improper use of racial
good faith in contract law to prohibit the improper
contract formation and performance
prejudice in contract
performance and, moreover,
eliminating racial
should recognize
recognize good faith as a device for eliminating
racial subordiconventional civil rights
nation that can function beyond
beyond the scope of conventional
remedies to
Although civil rights laws provide important remedies
discourse. Although
discrimination, this Article has argued
argued that the elimination
elimination
victims of discrimination,
civil
of racial subordination cannot remain the exclusive domain
domain of civil
inrights law, and that other substantive
substantive areas of law should and can inexpansive equality principles to achieve that end. For excorporate expansive
ample, this Article has demonstrated how the implied obligation of
of
context,
contract law, applied in the at-will employment cOntext,
good faith in contract
remeprinciples to provide alternate
can employ expansive
equality principles
alternate remeexpansive equality
435
435
436
436

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
omitted).
See
174 F.
Supp. 2d
2d 176,
176, 191-92
191-92 (D.
(D. Del.
See 174
F. Supp.
Del. 2001).
2001).
437 Id.
Id. at 178, 184.
437
and accompanying
accompanying text.
393, 400
400 (Del.
(Del. 2000);
2000); supra
supra note.
note. 426
438
See 748
748 A.2d
A.2d 393,
438
See
426 and
text
& Co.
Co.
DuPont de
de Nemours
added) (citing
(citing E.1.
E.I. DuPont
at 191
191 (emphasis
(emphasis added)
See 174
174 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 2d
2d at
439
439
See
Nemours &
(Del. 1996)).
1996)).
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442-44 (Del.
v.
A.2d at
at 441-44.
441-44.
748 A.2d
A.2d at
at 400;
400; Pressman,
Pressman, 679
440
See Lord,
Lord, 748
440
See
679 A.2d
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employees who may
may not be able to obtain civil rights
dies to at-will employees
remedies because of the onerous burdens they must satisfy in order to
prevail on their civil rights claims.
Although the 'courts
courts have used the doctrine of good faith largely
Although
to achieve economically
economically efficient outcomes, courts need not limit the
of
doctrine's use in that way. Rather, courts can use the doctrine of
subordination
good faith to provide just outcomes to victims of racial subordination
on those occasions in which, from the victim's perspective,
perspective, civil rights
on
laws
fail
to
do
so.
By
screening
laws fail
screening the doctrine of good faith through the
lenses of critical race and law and market economy theories, this Artilenses
cle has further argued that using the doctrine of good faith in this way
is consistent not only with the equitable principles
principles embodied by the
contract goals of protecting the parties'
parties'
doctrine, but also with the contract
wealth formation, and the facilitation of exchange
bargain, wealth.
transactions.
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